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There are two things I want to get across to the reader before they begin 
reading this book: (i) whom I owe thanks to, and (ii) what kind of book 
this is. Gratitude is first priority, but gratitude to friends and family, i.e. 
those I owe the most, will be dealt with in privacy.
Thanks are due to Riksbankens Jubileumsfond: Swedish Foundation 
for Humanities and Social Sciences, for graciously awarding me funds 
(Grant-ID: P14-0822:1) to devote four years of my life to refine the ideas 
put forward in this book and then to make it possible for it to appear 
Open Access in the Routledge Studies in Metaphysics series. It is fantastic 
that a central bank puts its money where it really matters in the long run: 
research into the big questions of ‘life, the Universe, and everything’ (hop-
ing the answer isn’t actually ‘42’).
I also owe thanks to Anna Marmodoro and all the wonderful peo-
ple frequenting the seminars in her Power Structuralism in Ancient 
Ontologies and Metaphysics of Entanglement projects. I happened to live 
in Oxford in the period 2010–15 (enjoying the status of Academic Visitor 
for six months) and could take full advantage of the incredible line-up of 
invited speakers and reading seminars. As an invited speaker I could also 
put some of the ideas in this book to the test.
Material from this book has also been presented to audiences for 
critical scrutiny in Innsbrück, Geneva, Ligerz, Warsaw, Aarhus, Helsinki, 
Tampere, Gothenburg, Linköping, Lund, Stockholm, Södertörn, Umeå, 
Kristiansand, Oslo, Pittsburgh, Cologne, Pistoia, Macerata, and Milan.
Now, I am afraid that many of those I owe the most will find themselves 
criticised the most in this book. I hope it may soften the blow if I explain 
that this is because I engage the most with the philosophers that stimulate 
me the most. I have said many times before that the best a philosopher 
can hope for is to write something that someone finds important enough 
to refute. They can hope to also be adored, but that is frivolous and vain. 
Don’t do it.
To make up for the lack of adoration expressed in the book, let it 
be known, in contrast to the criticism I offer, that if I were to make a 
list of philosophers (in no particular order) from which I have learnt 
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the most about causation and powers (including where I think they are 
wrong) it would look like this: Mario Bunge, Ingvar Johansson, Dorothy 
Emmet, Michael Esfeld, Jonathan Lowe, Stephen Mumford, Rani Anjum, 
Hobbes, William Huemer, Ben Kovitz, Johanna Seibt, Wesley Salmon, 
Anna Marmodoro, David Hume, David Armstrong, John Heil, Aristotle, 
Alexander Bird, Anjan Chakravartty, Craig Dilworth, W.E. Johnson, C.B. 
Martin, J.S. Mill, Tim Maudlin, Phil Dowe, and Peter Simons. If I appear 
critical of the views of these thinkers, it is because they have written 
something worth refuting. If I don’t seem to express clearly enough how 
they have inspired me, it is because it is difficult to keep track of such 
things. Unfortunately, the good things you agree with tend to meld into a 
background against which the flaws and mistakes appear clearly.
People who have offered very useful commentaries of some part of the 
text herein, or papers/presentations/grant proposals on which it builds, 
are Ingvar Johansson, Jonathan Lowe, Sophie Gibb, William Huemer, 
Johanna Seibt, Anna Marmodoro, John Heil, Robin Hendry, Anjan 
Chakravartty, Peter Simons, Phillip Blum, Mark Steen, Lorenzo Azzano, 
Andrea Raimondi, Simone Gozzano, Paul Needham, Rani Anjum, Olivier 
Massin, Henry Laycock, Holly Andersson, Akiko Frischhut, Jani 
Hakkarainen, Markku Keinänen, Tuomas Tahko, Tobias Hansson 
Wahlberg, Robin Stenwall, Fredrik Stjernberg, Martin Berzell, András 
Szigeti, Harald Wiltsche, James Lennox, Toby Friend, John Pemberton, 
Brian Prince, Tamer Nawar, David Yates, Avril Styrman, Florian Fischer, 
Cord Friebe, Anne Sophie Meinck, Cristian Kanzian, Eric Olson, Ludger 
Jansen, Max Kistler, Petter Sandstad, Alex Broadbent, Uwe Meixner, and 
many, many more. Thank you all.
Now, what kind of book is this? It is a book that deals with ideas 
and arguments rather than philosophers. And it is an attempt to develop 
what I think is a new and promising theory about the nature of causa-
tion which has the potential to unify our understanding of causation, 
constitution, persistence, properties, and change. The approach is there-
fore all at once broad in terms of the issues it addresses, and yet narrow 
since I try to avoid getting entangled in the nuances and quirks of indi-
vidual philosophers. I do worry that many readers will be uneasy about 
my approach, especially the lack of detailed engagement with particular 
thinkers. Even when you cannot really tell if anything relevant is missing, 
the mere fact that it isn’t explicitly addressed can set alarm bells off. My 
impression is that the philosophical community does have a tendency to 
tie ideas and arguments to individuals and is uncomfortable with the use 
of paraphrase to merge ideas expressed with redundant dissimilarity by 
different people, into a view and/or argument that we cannot tie explic-
itly to an individual. I think it tends to be perceived as bad scholarship, 
unless done really well.
In my defence, I appeal to the fact that one has to adapt the means 
to the ends. This book takes a very big-picture approach, in bringing 
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together ideas about causation, constitution, persistence, process, prop-
erties, and more. To deal with the ideas involved in these issues, while 
paying attention to the details and nuances of everyone involved, is too 
big an enterprise, at least for me, and would provide a very difficult read 
for you. Simplification and paraphrase, hopefully without too much loss 
of precision, seems the only way. I hope the effect is that the book is per-
ceived to get quickly to the point and moves clearly in a direction that 
appears promising, without getting entangled in details; it may also at 
every turn generate the feeling that more can be said, and things remain 
to be explored. Take it as inspiration to explore the loose ends and say 
what more there is to say.
It is important to keep in mind that I am not trying to prove that my 
view is the only option, but rather setting a stage on which my view can 
plausibly be perceived as a promising option. I don’t even dare say I am 
presenting you with an inference to The Best explanation, but possibly 
an inference to a hitherto overlooked explanation that should be seen 
as among the best. I don’t believe in arguments that definitively prove 
a point, at least not in issues as complex as this, and I even doubt it is 
possible to construe an unambiguous inference to the best explanation. 
All I can hope for is to have provided a new context that provides the 
philosophical community with an opportunity and reason to re-evaluate 
their previous choices and conclusions. However, many of you will prob-
ably detect omissions and flaws that you think tip the balance in another 
direction. If you do, you have the aims of your future research clear in 
front of you. For my part, this is by no means intended to be the final say 
in the matter, and I reserve full right to change my mind about everything 
in light of future research.
R.D. Ingthorsson
The research on which this book is based was made possible by a gen-
erous grant from Riksbankens Jubileumsfond: Swedish Foundation for 
Humanities and Social Sciences, grant-ID: P14-0822:1. It allowed me to 
devote four years of my life to refine the ideas put forward in this book. 
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond also allocated funds to cover the cost for 
this book to appear Open Access in the Routledge Studies in Metaphysics 
series (grant-ID: P14-0822:2). For this I am very grateful.
R.D. Ingthorsson
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The 21st century has seen a dramatic revival of realist approaches in phi-
losophy to the issue of properties and causation (Ellis 2001; Ingthorsson 
2002; Molnar 2003; Heil 2003, 2012; Lowe 2006a; Bird 2007a; 
Martin 2008; Marmodoro 2010; Mumford & Anjum 2011; Jacobs 2011; 
Tugby 2012; Cartwright & Pemberton 2013; Vetter 2015; Livanios 2017; 
Williams 2019). Central to the realist revival is the notion of powers, i.e. 
the idea that natural properties are best understood as determinate ways 
an object can affect other objects and be affected by them. Indeed, phi-
losophers not only investigate what role this notion might play in the elu-
cidation of causation, but a host of interrelated notions such as natural 
laws, natural kinds, and agency.
As I will argue, we are really seeing a re-examination of what used to 
be the standard view of causation from Aristotle until Hume (henceforth, 
‘the standard view’), notably that causation involves the production of 
changes through the interaction of powerful particulars. This standard 
view is perhaps most frequently associated with Aristotelianism but it 
is also—with slight variations—at the core of atomism, Scholasticism, 
and the natural philosophy of the early Enlightenment, and is accurately 
presented to modern readers by W.E. Johnson (1924), and recently advo-
cated by Dorothy Emmet (1985) and Ingvar Johansson (1989/2004). 
Mainstream philosophy has for some time shunned the standard view 
in favour of neo-Humean accounts, for, I will argue, meta-philosophical 
reasons that really don’t have much to do with causation. It has to do 
with scepticism about the kind of rational theorising required for the 
standard view to make sense. And yet, it seems to me, people in general 
continue to live their lives as if the standard view is true (including neo-
Humeans), and the natural sciences implicitly endorse it.
1.1  The Aims of This Book
This book is a constructively critical examination of the causal realist 
revival. It is critical in the sense that it aims to show (i) that contempo-
rary realists often inadvertently incorporate into their characterisation 
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of powers and causation certain ideas that really belong to the domi-
nant neo-Humean framework that they are in opposition to, (ii) that the 
incorporation of these neo-Humean ideas are an obstacle to the further 
development of powers ontology, and (iii) that some of the Aristotelian 
components of the standard view on which contemporary powers-based 
accounts are built are arguably incompatible with the theories and find-
ings of modern science; in other words, they are falsified by science. The 
last point is particularly relevant for those causal realists who think that 
metaphysical theories should be compatible with the theories and find-
ings of the empirical sciences, or, rather, that seek a reflective equilibrium 
between philosophy and the empirical sciences. The book is construc-
tive in that it suggests a way to avoid the fallacies involved in (i)–(iii) to 
arrive at a modified powerful particulars view that is compatible with 
modern science. Here I build on what I have previously argued in ‘Causal 
Production as Interaction’ (Ingthorsson 2002).
To briefly elaborate on the first critical concern, my worry is that 
although contemporary causal realists are in a certain sense revolting 
against the prevailing neo-Humean framework—which has dominated 
the debate for so long—and have done a lot to challenge it, they are still 
in some ways implicitly conforming to it. First, many enough still operate 
under the assumption that the task of a powers-based metaphysics is to 
provide a semantic analysis of dispositional ascriptions of the kind we find 
in ordinary language (for instance, McKitrick 2018). Second, many still 
operate with an understanding of powers that is almost indistinguishable 
from the simple conditional analysis of dispositions (SCA), championed 
by reductionists like Carnap (1936), Ryle (1949), and Goodman (1954). 
Third, on a related note, many enough also implicitly accept—if not for 
anything else then by making use of SCA (or a derivate)—that the nature 
of powers must be accounted for in terms of some observable correlate, 
i.e. a so-called ‘manifestation’, which is the core idea of empiricism. 
Fourth, and final, many either fully accept the neo-Humean conception 
of causation as a two-place relation between Kim-style events—albeit 
events that are meant to be understood as involving the instantiation of 
powers and not categorical properties—or simply make use of the two-
place conception for the sake of convenience because they think it is of 
no particular consequence to conform to established ways of expressing 
the issue.
All four ways in which contemporary causal realists conform to the 
neo-Humean framework are implicit in the widespread acceptance of 
the idea, clearly derived from SCA, that a property P is a power if it is 
instantiated by a particular, a, of which it is true to say that ‘a will φ in 
circumstances S’, where ‘φ’ is to be understood in terms of an observ-
able change, either in a itself (if we are talking about a passive power) 
or in some object b on which a exerts an influence (when we are dealing 
with an active power). I will call this the dispositional analysis of powers, 
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because we are expected to understand the nature and identity of a power 
solely in terms of some particular observable behaviour exhibited in given 
circumstances by the objects that possess them, or the objects affected by 
them. These behaviours are roughly what the term ‘manifestation’ refers 
to. Very few seem to find it strange that we are expected to understand 
the nature of a power, P, in terms of something that is not identical to P, 
but a consequence of P.
As I have argued elsewhere, and will return to in Chapter 8, the dispo-
sitional analysis of powers goes hand in hand with the idea that powers 
are essentially relational properties and thus cannot be fundamental; it 
characterises powers as being for their nature and identity dependent on 
their manifestations. In the extreme, they are described as pure powers, 
i.e. as properties whose nature is exhausted by whatever manifestation 
they are able to bring about, and hence properties that do not determine 
what an object currently is, but only what it can do, provided some or 
other circumstances obtain in future. This idea in turn is at the heart of 
the idea that powers/dispositions—rather than being themselves occur-
rent properties in their own right—are mere potentialities inhering in 
objects until the moment they are actually instantiated in the realisa-
tion of the manifestation. The problem with this view comes out clearly 
in the most popular objection to pandispositionalism—the view that 
all properties are powers—notably that if all powers are mere relations 
to manifestations it leads to a vicious infinite regress (Campbell 1976: 
93; Swinburne 1980: 316–19; Foster 1982: 68; Robinson 1982: 114; 
Martin 1997; Armstrong 1997: 80; Lowe 2006a: 138; Engelhard 2010; 
Ingthorsson 2015). In Chapter 8, I side with Martin (2008), Heil (2003), 
Jacobs (2011), and Esfeld & Sachse (2011: Ch. 2.1), to defend the view 
that powers are both qualities and powers at once; they are powerful 
qualities.
It is a further consequence of combining a dispositional analysis of 
powers with powers-based accounts of causation that causation ends up 
being characterised in a way that bears close affinity to the neo-Humean 
account of causation. Notably, as a two-place relation between tempo-
rally distinct entities; between the exertion of powers and the realisation 
of their manifestation. Friends of powers sometimes even characterise 
the relata of the causal relation in terms of Kim-style events, just as neo-
Humeans are wont to do, i.e. as an event e1 in virtue of instantiating a 
power F, bringing about an event e2 instantiating a property G. There 
are some proponents of powers that explicitly reject the two-place rela-
tion characterisation and insist that causation is really a continuous pro-
cess (Ingthorsson 2002; Chakravartty 2005; Mumford & Anjum 2011). 
I think this is the way to go, but more needs to be said about the nature 
of that process.
The second critical concern is that the standard view is arguably falsi-
fied by modern physics. This was first argued by Mario Bunge (1979), and 
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later by me (Ingthorsson 2002, 2007, 2019). Roughly, the standard view 
depicts interactions between powerful particulars as involving a unidi-
rectional exertion of influence of an active particular (the ‘Agent’) upon 
a passive particular (the ‘Patient’). The notion of power is accordingly 
understood to involve a distinction between active and passive powers, 
which account for the ability of an Agent to exert influence, and the ability 
of a Patient to be influenced, respectively. However, according to modern 
physics, unidirectional actions do not exist; all interactions are perfectly 
reciprocal in a way that excludes the characterisation of the particulars 
involved as either ‘active’ or ‘passive’ (Bunge 1979; Resnick, Halliday, & 
Krane 2002). If this is right, all notions deriving from or influenced by the 
idea of unidirectional actions risk being false by the same measure.
This flaw, although serious, is not fatal, and in my previous work I have 
sketched a way to accommodate the reciprocity of interactions within a 
powerful particulars view (2002). Indeed, I think the resulting view offers 
a range of very attractive possibilities. First, it allows us to understand the 
constitution of compound entities as a causal phenomenon, in a way that 
has affinity to what Karen Bennett calls diagonal building (2017: 85). 
Second, it offers a way to understand the persistence of compound enti-
ties as a causal phenomenon. Third, it allows us to understand compound 
objects as causal processes while still retaining their status as substances; 
it may serve to reconcile the presumed incompatibility of process and 
substance ontologies, or at least clarify what kind of process/substance 
ontologies are incompatible, and which are compatible.
1.2  The Outline of the Book
The outline of this book, very roughly, is as follows. In Chapter 2, I dis-
cuss the relation between powers-based and neo-Humean accounts. I 
argue that they do not need to be understood as contrary to each other, 
if we understand the neo-Humean accounts as attempts to describe 
causation without any deeper ontological commitments, while powers-
based accounts attempt to explain why causation occurs in the way it is 
described. Of course, once neo-Humean accounts of causation are linked 
to the ontological commitments of neo-Humean metaphysics, i.e. the 
view that there are no substantial connections between anything in this 
world, they are incompatible with powers-based accounts.
In Chapter 3, I introduce in greater detail the view I call the standard 
view, and discuss how to best understand causal realism today. I argue 
that contemporary realists are neglecting certain foundational issues 
that were part and parcel of causal realism before the reductive neo-
Humean views rose to power in the philosophical community, and that 
this explains why contemporary realists tend to accept the above men-
tioned neo-Humean elements in their characterisation of powers and of 
causal relations.
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In Chapter 4, I present a hitherto largely overlooked problem for 
 powers-based accounts, which is that they are implicitly assuming certain 
features of the standard view that are incompatible with modern physics. 
While outlining the problem, I develop a modified powerful particulars 
view, which aims to correct the flaw of the standard view.
In Chapter 5, I reassess the arguments against causal necessity and 
argue that they do not address any view that has actually been put for-
ward to defend causal necessity, as well as showing that both the stan-
dard view and my modified view is immune to them.
In Chapter 6, I argue that my account of causation in terms of interac-
tion allows us to understand the constitution of compound objects, and 
their persistence over time, as thoroughly causal phenomena. Indeed, in 
Chapter 7, I continue to argue that my causal account of constitution and 
persistence also offers a way to reconcile process and substance ontology; 
it presents compound objects as causal processes without robbing them 
of their status as substances.
In Chapter 8, I address the question of how to understand powers 
and argue, in opposition to the categorical/dispositional distinction, that 
they can be conceived of as powerful qualities. Finally, in Chapter 9, 
I  illustrate the consequences of the book for our appreciation of what 
stands out today as the main neo-Humean view of causation, counter-
factual theories. Roughly, I argue that we cannot explain causation in 
counterfactual terms, but we can explain counterfactuals in causal terms. 
Chapter 10 then provides a brief summary of similarities and differences 
between the powerful particulars view I defend, and other recent causal 
realist accounts. However, before I embark on the issues outlined above, 
let me offer some background reflections on the philosophy of causation 
that will facilitate the reading of this book.
1.3  Causation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the 
Natural World
For a long time, the slogan ‘there is a cause to everything’ was understood 
as an expression of the spirit of the scientifically informed mind, and an 
encapsulation of the belief that everything is naturally determined. The 
epistemic consequence of this belief is that we should seek natural expla-
nations for all phenomena. In other words, the slogan expresses the belief 
that there is nothing haphazard or magical about the way the world is, 
and that therefore the world can be rationally understood. The idea that 
the world can be rationally understood doesn’t imply that the world fol-
lows the rules of the conceivable. I take it to be fairly clear that our imagi-
nation easily outstretches the restrictions imposed by the natural world. 
We can easily imagine Superman flying at three times the speed of light 
without having any idea of how to achieve thrust for that kind of speed, 
or without knowledge of what makes this factually impossible.
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We can conceive of time speeding up or slowing down, going back-
wards or what have you. And although an elucidation of what can and 
cannot be conceived is an important part of the project of finding out 
about the world (for instance, it can rule out options), then to find out 
what the world is actually like cannot only be an exploration of the 
conceivable. My idea of how to get closer to what the world is actually 
like is to confront some of the ways we can conceive it to be, with the 
theories and findings of the empirical sciences. They live under other 
constraints than the philosophical constraints of what can and cannot be 
conceived. They are obliged to confront what they conceive with what 
actually happens when we interact with the world, letting the outcome 
of those interactions rule out some of the ways we can conceive of the 
world.
To test philosophical theories against the theories and findings of the 
empirical sciences is not to let science dictate anything. The various empir-
ical sciences have a narrow focus. Each investigates only a narrow seg-
ment of reality. Physics examines the smallest components and how they 
interact. Chemistry investigates larger compounds and how they react. 
Biology studies self-replicating compounds. Psychology studies conscious 
entities. Sociology studies groups of conscious entities. Nobody in these 
disciplines takes a step back to consider whether there are phenomena 
that cut across the segments each discipline studies. For instance, no 
physicist considers whether interactions between the particles they study 
are causal in the very same way reactions between chemical compounds 
are causal, or how monkeys peel bananas. That is a task only metaphysi-
cians engage in. Obviously, physicists, chemists, and others can join in, 
but they can’t join in by doing more physics, chemistry, etc. They have to 
do metaphysics.
Now, however widespread the belief used to be that an understanding 
of causation is key to understanding the natural world, it is not univer-
sally accepted today that causation is a natural phenomenon. Indeed, for 
a couple of centuries the philosophical community has tended to favour 
approaches that reduce causation to some or other feature of how the 
world appears to us in experience, largely owing to the way our faculties 
of representation work, or of how we think about those features of expe-
rience, while avoiding speculation about what it is about the world that 
could make it appear to us in that way and therefore make our thoughts 
about it true. This is one of the senses in which philosophers understand 
themselves as ‘neo-Humeans’, i.e. as following the dictum that we should 
think of things only in terms of how they appear in experience while 
suspending judgement about how things really are. There is another kind 
of neo-Humeanism, one that doesn’t just suspend judgement but posi-
tively affirms that causation in the world is like it appears in experience, 
notably as a ‘mosaic of local matters of fact’, between which there are 
no substantial connections. So, there is both neo-Humean anti-realism 
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and neo-Humean realism, although the resulting accounts of causation 
are practically indistinguishable; they only differ with respect to whether 
or not their proponents suspend judgement about whether their account 
of causation applies to reality or only to our way of thinking. It can be 
difficult to tell the difference. Both approaches can be seen in the writ-
ings of the same thinker. In his early writings, David Lewis only had the 
ambition to elucidate the ‘ordinary’ concept of causation, i.e. the way we 
ordinarily think (Lewis 1973a), while his later writings are more onto-
logically serious. In The Plurality of Worlds (1986a), Lewis postulates 
not only that people ordinarily think in terms of possible worlds (a claim 
that is up for debate), but that reality is actually made up of a plurality of 
worlds that are all equally existent and real.
Neo-Humeanism does trace its ancestry back to British empiricism, 
and we can see the same division in the empiricist tradition between real-
ist and anti-realist empiricists. Hobbes (1656), Locke (1689), and J.S. 
Mill (1843) all believed that we acquire knowledge of the external world 
by deliberating on the input of the senses, although Mill suspended judge-
ment about mysterious ties between the observable facts he took to be 
real. Berkeley (1709) and Hume (1739), however, argued that because all 
knowledge is confined to what our senses tell us, we can really only know 
something about the content of the mind. This split in the empiricist tra-
dition is rarely brought out explicitly, and that carries over into contem-
porary neo-Humeanism. Realist neo-Humeans appropriate arguments 
from anti-realist empiricists for uses they were not originally meant to be 
used, assuming this to be of no consequence. As I will show in the next 
chapter, it does make a difference.
Although, arguably, realism dominated the empiricist thinking in the 
beginning, the dominant trend in 19th- and 20th-century philosophy 
has been to treat causation as merely a category of the mind, because 
it has been believed that the prospect of knowing what objective mind- 
independent reality is really like is hopeless. As a result, the philosophy 
of causation has predominantly aimed to reduce the notion of causation 
to some feature of how we think about causation, and/or some feature of 
experience that we accordingly identify with causation, rather than delib-
erating on whether such thinking is right or wrong in terms of accurately 
describing an objective feature of mind-independent reality, and/or why 
the world appears to us in experience in the way that it does. The current 
Aristotelian revival is a reaction to that trend.
The features of experience or of our thinking to which neo-Humeans 
have reduced causation so far, are regularity (Hume 1748; Graßhoff & 
May 2001; Baumgartner 2008), necessary and/or sufficient conditions 
(Mill 1843; Mackie 1965), counterfactual dependence (Lewis 1973b; 
Paul 1998; Hall 2000; Collins 2000), intervention (Gasking 1955; von 
Wright 1974; Menzies & Price 1993; Woodward 2003), and causal pro-
cesses (Salmon 1984), the last often being complemented by an appeal 
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to transmission accounts (Dowe 1992, 2009; Kistler 1998). Below, I’ll 
return to the details of these accounts.
It is not surprising that the shift from understanding causation as a 
form of natural determination to merely be a feature of cognition had 
the consequence that many of the features traditionally associated with 
natural determination have moved to the background. The philosophical 
community doesn’t seem to worry much today about the materialist prin-
ciple that nothing comes into being out of nothing or is completely anni-
hilated, wherefore there is no longer much focus on answering questions 
about the origin of the existing features of the world. Neo-Humeans are 
perfectly willing to postulate the brute existence of every physical state 
at every spacetime point from the beginning to end of time (and even 
of a plurality of worlds), without worrying about the question of how 
these states/worlds came to be. Indeed, even causal realists argue that 
the rejection of creation ex nihilo is just as much in need of justification 
as the claim that the world is recreated from nothing at every moment 
(Williams 2019: 213). Nor is there much focus on the idea that changes 
in the intrinsic properties of things only happen as a result of some influ-
ence being exerted by one thing on another. Indeed, Lewis can write a 
paper called ‘Causation as Influence’ (2000), elaborating on the notion 
of influence within a neo-Humean framework, without anyone objecting 
that the paper doesn’t say a single word about the influence exerted by 
anything on anything else. His talk of ‘influence’ reduces to talk about 
differences between worlds, which by definition cannot influence each 
other.
The idea that causation is a category of mind supports the validity of 
what is sometimes called armchair philosophy, i.e. types of reasoning that 
stays within the confines of our everyday conceptual scheme, and which 
takes the theories and findings of the empirical sciences to be irrelevant. 
Obviously, if we are only dealing with a conceptual category or feature of 
experience, then the empirical sciences—that profess to be about the way 
the world really works as opposed to how it appears to work—aren’t 
really relevant; we have all the access we want to the way we think from 
our armchair.
However, in the last two decades there has been a dramatically renewed 
interest in an engagement with the sciences, as a result, I believe, of the 
limitations of armchair philosophy with respect to deciding whether the 
way we think is right or wrong. As a result, contemporary realists have 
increasingly sought to re-evaluate the validity of the views of those think-
ers of the past that took a naturalist approach and saw causation as a 
feature of the world. For a naturalist, the natural sciences provide impor-
tant and relevant input for philosophical views. That kind of naturalist 
approach to metaphysics goes back to Aristotle, rather than to Plato, 
wherefore the Aristotelian tradition has naturally become a focal point 
of this movement. It bears to state already at this point that the main 
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purpose of a re-evaluation of that kind is not primarily to arrive at a 
correct understanding of Aristotle. The main point is to consider whether 
there is something in his ideas that can be brought to bear today on how 
to understand causation. Some philosophers, Anna Marmodoro being 
one notable example, do a good job doing exegesis and constructive 
metaphysics at once (Marmodoro 2007, 2013). This book is an attempt 
to critically assess the progress of the causal realist revival, and to arrive 
at a view of causation that stands a better chance of being compatible 
with the theories and findings of natural science.
1.4  Causation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural 
Determination
It is important to note that the slogan ‘there is a cause to everything’ gives 
too much credit to causation as the only form of natural determination 
(Frank 1932; Bunge 1979: Ch. 1). There are many forms of natural deter-
mination, some of which are arguably non-causal, at least in light of the 
narrower sense the term ‘cause’ has attained in modern times, notably as 
efficient causation (Bunge 1979: Ch. 1.3). For instance, time and space 
are significant determinants of natural phenomena, and yet are not (typi-
cally) regarded as causal determinants. Furthermore, objects in uniform 
motion continuously change position without being continuously caused 
to do so. Obviously, a uniformly moving body was at some point acted 
upon to change their state of motion, but to attribute every change of 
position from then on to that original act would be to accept action at a 
temporal and spatial distance.
Indeed, it is really only in the broader, and older, sense of ‘cause’—
as any natural kind of determination or principle of change—that the 
phrase ‘there is a cause to everything’ makes much sense at all. We can 
then understand it as an expression of the belief that everything is deter-
mined in a natural manner. In fact, the slogan ‘there is a cause to every-
thing’ can be read as a paraphrase of Aristotle’s claim that ‘in all cases 
of production there is something that is produced, something by which 
it is produced and something from which it is produced’ (Metaphysics: 
7, 7; 189), which at least doesn’t say that everything can be explained in 
terms of efficient causes alone. His claim includes also the material cause 
out of which something is produced, and the nature of both Agent and 
Patient, as the determinants of what comes to be. We should then inter-
pret Aristotle as using the term ‘cause’ in the wider sense of ‘principle of 
change’, which is perfectly in line with the idea that everything that hap-
pens in the natural world is determined in a natural manner. I’ll return to 
the details of this older form of causal realism in Chapter 3, but for now 
let me make it clear that I am not discussing causation as the only form of 
natural determination, but only as one among many. I assume then that 
the nature of causation can be conditioned by some of the other kinds of 
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natural determinations, e.g. that nothing comes into being out of nothing, 
or is ever completely annihilated.
1.5  Standard Approaches to Causation
The philosophical community has for a long time favoured reductive neo-
Humean accounts of causation, so much so that The Oxford Handbook 
of Causation lists them under the heading ‘standard approaches’ while 
powers-based accounts are found under ‘alternative approaches’ (Beebee, 
Hitchcock, & Menzies 2009). Neo-Humean accounts characterise causa-
tion in terms of regularity, necessary and/or sufficient conditions, coun-
terfactual dependence, intervention, causal processes and/or transmission 
of conserved quantities. Below I’ll characterise each in turn, using lower 
case c and e to denote token causes and effects, and upper case C and E 
for types.
The core idea of regularity accounts is that some phenomenon c is the 
cause to some other phenomenon e, iff phenomena of type C are always 
followed by phenomena of type E. Now we have an operationalisation 
of the application of the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ and can with a good 
degree of reliability identify causal connections (provided the characteri-
sation is true).
Accounts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions really count 
as regularity accounts (see, for instance, Psillos 2009). They are mere 
refinements, based on the empirical fact that phenomena of type C are 
not invariably followed by phenomena of type E, but only when C occurs 
in the circumstances S. Furthermore, probabilistic accounts only deviate 
from the above by allowing the regularity to come in degrees. They add 
statistics as a tool to quantify the degree of the regularity in which C is 
followed by E on the basis of the available empirical data, and of course 
to decide whether any given correlated events e1 and e2 are correlated 
strongly enough for us to have reason to suspect that they might be caus-
ally related.
The core idea of counterfactual accounts is that c counts as the cause to 
e iff (in worlds closest to ours) phenomena of type E never occur unless 
C occurs, and the core idea of agency and interventionist accounts is that 
c counts as the cause to e iff E reliably appears and disappears when you 
manipulate C.
Causal process theories state that causation needs to be understood 
in terms of causal processes and their interactions, in which conserved 
quantities are transmitted between causal processes. I will treat causal 
process/transmission accounts slightly differently than other neo-
Humean accounts, because although they are ultimately reductive, it 
appears their proponents are driven by the same explanatory concerns as 
the causal realists that push the powers-based agenda. The line between 
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neo-Humean realists and causal realists is thin at some particular points, 
and particularly with respect to causal process/transmission accounts.
Now, all reductive accounts suffer from various types of counterex-
amples which the proponents of each view struggle to resolve by offer-
ing modifications. To my mind, the problems will remain as long as no 
attempt is made to answer the following question: what is it about Cs and 
Es such that they occur in ordered pairs, that Cs increase the probability 
of Es, that make Es counterfactually dependent on Cs, and that make 
intervention a reliable way to identify causal connections? In Chapter 2 
I will argue that the standard approaches do not even try to answer this 
question, and that is why causal realists find them unappealing.
The powerful particulars view, in contrast, is an attempt to offer an 
explanation of causation, and it may come as a surprise (see Chapter 2) 
that the powerful particulars explanation of causation does not really 
contradict the reductive standard accounts, if the latter be understood 
merely as attempts to describe how causation appears in experience. 
Furthermore, the reductive views are compatible with each other. The 
alleged incompatibility of neo-Humean and powers-based accounts, 
I will argue, hinges almost entirely on a meta-philosophical disagreement 
about the proper method of philosophy in general; speculate vs. don’t 
speculate about what the world is really like such that it appears to be a 
certain way.
1.6  Powers-Based Approaches
Something resembling what is known today as powers-based accounts 
of causation dominated philosophical thought from Aristotle and well 
into the Early Modern period. The general idea is that causation involves 
the production of changes brought about by the exertion of influence by 
one powerful particular on another. We find it in Aristotle, the Stoics, 
the Atomists, the Scholastics, and the natural philosophers of the Early 
Modern period, like Hobbes, and Locke. There was a disagreement on 
the nature of powers and of the particulars that bore the powers, as well 
as about the details surrounding their interaction, but agreement on the 
general idea mentioned above. It is because the powerful particulars 
view is found in all these traditions—traditions that are in some respects 
mutually incompatible—that I call it the standard view rather than the 
Aristotelian view.
With the development of empirical science and under the influence of 
the sceptical philosophy of Hume, philosophy turned ever more suspi-
cious of the core notions of the standard view—especially those whose 
origins were Aristotelian—and also turned more sceptical toward the 
ability of philosophy to find out anything about objective reality. It turned 
sceptical more generally toward anything that could be interpreted as 
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metaphysical speculation, i.e. anything that went beyond what at any 
given time was believed to be the limits of our observational powers.
Strange as it would seem, under the joint influence of Hume’s sceptical 
philosophy, and Kant’s transcendental idealism, we saw the dawn of an 
era where ‘causation’ primarily denoted a feature of our innate way of 
organising our experiences and/or the way we think, rather than a feature 
of objective reality. Indeed, much of what counts as philosophy of causa-
tion in the 20th century can best be understood as an attempt to clarify 
some or other ‘ordinary’ concept of causation—something that somehow 
is emblematic of the way we think—rather than attempts to say some-
thing about what the world is really like (Goodman 1954; Mackie 1965; 
Lewis 1973a). I take it that the current rise of powers-based accounts is at 
least in part an expression of the growing suspicion that further analysis 
of the way we think is not going anywhere.
Even though mainstream philosophy of the 20th century has predomi-
nantly focused on aspects of the way we think about causation, then 
even before the current revival of causal realism there have been indi-
viduals who insisted on treating causation as an ontological category, for 
instance, Mario Bunge (1979), Roy Bhaskar (1975), Rom Harré & E.H. 
Madden (1975), Sydney Shoemaker (1980), Dorothy Emmett (1985), 
Ingvar Johansson (1989/2004), Nancy Cartwright (1989), and Jonathan 
Lowe (1998). What stands out is that all these thinkers argue that causa-
tion is a process of production involving powerful particulars, although 
they disagree on the details about the nature of the particulars and the 
production. They endorse some or other version of the standard view. 
However, although I hope to introduce some interesting ideas from these 
‘early’ contemporary proponents of the powerful particulars view, my 
focus will be on the development of powers-based accounts in roughly 
the last 20 years.
The literature reveals a fairly well defined ‘discourse’ on the power-
ful particulars view of causation that begins to gain momentum in the 
mid-90s with the work of C.B. Martin (1994, 1997). From then on 
there has been a continuous stream of books, papers, and anthologies 
from philosophers defending the viability of a powerful particulars view, 
such as Stephen Mumford (1998, 2005), Brian Ellis (2001), Ingthorsson 
(2002, 2007, 2013, 2015), George Molnar (2003), John Heil (2003, 
2012), Anjan Chakravartty (2005, 2017), Mumford & Rani Anjum 
(2011, 2018), Jonathan Lowe (2006a), Anna Marmodoro (2007, 2017), 
Alexander Bird (2007a), Michael Esfeld (2011), Jonathan Jacobs (2011, 
2017), Barbara Vetter (2015), John Greco & Ruth Groff (2012), Max 
Kistler (2012), Nancy Cartwright & John Pemberton (2013), Henry 
Taylor (2018), Neil Williams (2019), Davis Kuykendall (2019), Lorenzo 
Azzano (2019), and Joseph Baltimore (2020), just to name a few. Notable 
critical treatments of the powerful particulars view by those who do not 
endorse it are Vassilis Livanios (2017) and Travis Dumsday (2019).
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The main variation between different powers-based accounts has to 
do, with first, whether they accept a dispositional analysis of powers 
according to which powers are dependent for their nature and identity 
on their manifestation, and consequently accept the categorical/disposi-
tional distinction dictating that properties divide into the exclusive types 
of powers vs. qualities. The contrasting view is that natural properties 
are both qualities and powers. I’ll discuss this issue in Chapter 8. Second, 
whether they accept a relational account of causation, in which case 
they end up with a view of causation that closely approximates to neo-
Humean accounts, or reject a relational account to explicitly argue that 
causation is process of production. The next two chapters are devoted to 
that latter issue.
What there has emerged some consensus on is the characterisation of 
causation in terms of mutual manifestations of reciprocal disposition 
partners, following C.B. Martin. This characterisation has all but taken 
over from previous descriptions in terms of powers and stimuli. In fact, 
it is the nature of mutual manifestations that occupies most of this book, 
and in particular the implicit assumption that disposition partners are 
typically of two different kinds—roughly equivalent to the Aristotelian 
distinction between active and passive powers—whose relation is asym-
metric despite what is implied in the terms ‘mutual’ and ‘reciprocal’. 
Roughly, the idea is that mutual manifestations involve the joint contri-
bution of an active and a passive power in the bringing about of a change 
in the object possessing the passive power. Sometimes the commitment 
to this kind of asymmetry, or unidirectionality, present in interactions, is 
merely implicit, revealed only in the examples chosen to illustrate powers-
based causation; say, soluble salt thrown in dissolving water to dissolve 
the salt. But often enough it comes out explicitly in the characterisation 
of mutual manifestations, in terms of the coming together of active and 
passive powers to jointly manifest some particular outcome. An active 
power is an ability to influence other objects, while a passive power is the 
ability to receive the influence of an active power and to change in some 
determinate way.
1.7  The Challenge from Modern Science
The manner of characterising interactions between powerful particu-
lars as involving a unidirectional exertion of influence by an Agent on a 
Patient, which results in a change in the Patient, goes back to Aristotle. 
One of the main points of this book is to point out that this characteri-
sation is arguably incompatible with what modern science treats as an 
established fact, notably that all interactions are thoroughly reciprocal 
(Bunge 1979; Ingthorsson 2002, 2007). The fact that interactions are 
reciprocal is understood in the natural sciences to mean that there are no 
unidirectional actions, i.e. no instances of one object acting on another 
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while not itself being equally acted upon by the other object (see, for 
instance, Resnick, Halliday, & Krane 2002: 83).
To be sure, the term ‘reciprocity’ occurs frequently in the contemporary 
literature on powers—it could even be described as a core concept in 
modern powers-based accounts—but it is then used with a very differ-
ent meaning than in the context of natural science. The difference is that 
most powers-based accounts depict powers as reciprocal even though 
the influence exerted between two objects goes only from the one to the 
other. The term ‘reciprocal’ is here only an admission of the fact that at 
least two powers have to be involved, and that both contribute to the 
production of the outcome of the interaction. An example would be that 
the heat of the fire and the ability of a hand to be heated both contrib-
ute to the end result of a hot hand. This is the basis of distinguishing 
between an active power, i.e. the power of an object to influence another 
object, and a passive power, i.e. the power to be influenced by another 
object. It is also the basis for distinguishing between Agents and Patients, 
i.e. objects possessing active and passive powers, respectively. However, 
according to modern physics, no object acts on another object without 
being acted upon by the other in return (i) in the same way, (ii) to the same 
magnitude, and (iii) at the same time. If this is right, we no longer have 
any objective criterion to distinguish between an Agent and a Patient. 
Furthermore, if there are no unidirectional actions and the active/ passive 
and Agent/Patient distinctions are mistaken then all notions deriving 
from or influenced by the idea of unidirectional actions also risk being 
false by the same measure. This flaw, although serious, is not fatal to the 
powerful particulars view. In previous work I have sketched a modified 
powerful particulars view that accommodates the reciprocity of interac-
tions (Ingthorsson 2002, 2007). Indeed, as I will show in Chapter 4, the 
modification serves to strengthen the powerful particulars view. And, as 
I have already mentioned, it allows us to understand constitution and 
persistence of compound entities as causal phenomena, and reconcile 
(at least to some degree), substance and process ontologies.
1.8  The Empiricist Bias
The influences of empiricism are tangible in much of what counts as 
mainstream analytic philosophy today, and of course explicitly so in the 
works of those working within the neo-Humean framework. One aim of 
this book is to elucidate how empiricist thinking has filtered down to the 
presuppositional depth-structure of the debate, to the degree that causal 
realists have now inadvertently assimilated ideas that originate from the 
empiricist reduction of core ideas that are found in the causal realist tradi-
tions. I have already mentioned some ways that this expresses itself, but 
I’d like to add here that others have expressed similar thoughts. Barry 
Smith (2005) and Ingvar Johansson (2016) have argued that first-order 
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predicate logic, advocated by Quine as the language of philosophy, favours 
a neo-Humean framework. Smith coined the term ‘Fantology’ to denote 
this neo-Humean bias. Mumford & Anjum (2015a), and Johanna Seibt 
(2018), have independently argued for the same conclusion, but focusing 
on how the acceptance of a certain kind of logic has worked against the 
acceptance of powers-based and process ontologies, respectively. The ques-
tion to be asked is of course why first-order predicate logic was accepted 
so easily by the philosophical community. The answer is, arguably, because 
philosophy was already geared toward a neo-Humean view of both sci-
ence and philosophy as primarily descriptive rather than explanatory.
Now, what could really be wrong with the idea that we shouldn’t pos-
tulate what goes beyond the observable or measurable? Isn’t that also 
a kind of naturalism? Yes, but there is a huge difference between say-
ing (i) that we should base our views about the world on observations/ 
measurements and that all our theories must be empirically adequate, 
and (ii) that we should describe the world only in terms of the observable/
measurable, and never go beyond that to theorise about what the world 
is really like such that it appears to us in observations in the way that it 
does. To begin with, the second option is saying that in hindsight people 
never ought to have hypothesised about any of the things we now con-
sider observable but weren’t when they hypothesised about them.
Another interesting example of when prior commitments affect the 
appreciation of philosophical views—and which helps to understand 
why contemporary philosophers are not comfortable with presentism, 
the view that only the present exists, the future not yet, and the past no 
longer—is that it is difficult to deal with presentism in the language of 
first-order predicate logic. At least if first-order predicate logic is meant to 
function like Quine prescribed, notably to specify our existential commit-
ments (for arguments to this effect, see Øhrstrøm & Schärfe 2004; Seibt 
2018). Sure, one can introduce temporal operators, but on Quine’s under-
standing, such operators must operate on something existing, wherefore 
the use of past-tense operators to talk about Chrysippus being in the mar-
ket place yesterday is still to quantify over existents (there exists an x such 
that Px). Indeed, as Peter Øhrstrøm and Schärfe argue, it was concerns 
about Quine’s idea about ontology that drove Arthur Prior to develop a 
temporal logic of a different kind. Ultimately the point is that the philo-
sophical community, arguably, only accepted a logic construed to quan-
tify univocally over entities in a neo-Humean ‘mosaic of local matters of 
fact’ because the community was already sympathetic towards such ideas.
1.9  About the Method of My Project
I take it that a naturalist approach is appropriate to the kind of scru-
tiny I propose to undertake of powers-based accounts of causation. 
After all, the proponents of such accounts aim to provide an account of 
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how causation works in the world we inhabit, and by and large assume 
that their accounts must be empirically adequate; i.e. compatible with 
the (true) theories and findings of the empirical sciences. I insert ‘(true)’, 
because it is not naively assumed that the empirical sciences already have 
all the answers, while metaphysics is doomed to uncritically receive the 
input from the empirical sciences to try to make the best of whatever it 
says. It is assumed that metaphysics, as it always has done, is capable 
of critical scrutiny of the way the empirical sciences make sense of their 
own theories, and can provide them with very useful feedback that allows 
them to get closer to the truth (not only the other way around). But I’d 
better spell out in a little more detail than I did above what I take to be 
a naturalist approach in metaphysics, i.e. the way the empirical sciences 
and metaphysics are continuous and yet distinct approaches to the same 
subject matter.
Allowing myself a healthy dose of oversimplification (more detail in 
Ingthorsson 2020), the empirical sciences each focus on a particular seg-
ment of reality and focus on the understanding of the particular phe-
nomena within that segment. Physics focuses on the elementary particles, 
their properties, and the particular interactions they engage in, all of 
which are unobservable to the naked eye. Chemistry focuses on com-
pound entities, constituted by the simpler entities studied by physics and 
the interactions that occur between those simples; in chemistry they talk 
about ‘reactions’ when the compounds interact with other compounds. 
Often, the reactions studied by chemistry are observable to the naked 
eye. Biology focuses on even more complicated systems and their interac-
tions. The demarcation between chemistry and biology might perhaps 
be drawn between systems that have some form of function or causal 
feedback loops, and which can procreate.
Metaphysics, on the other hand, focuses on broader categories of enti-
ties, their ways of being and interacting, that cut across the segments 
of reality that are the focal points of the individual empirical sciences. 
Physics deals with electrons and their charges and how charged particles 
interact. It doesn’t deal with cell-division or metabolism in mitochondria, 
and it certainly does not consider whether there are classes of phenom-
ena that we find in all the segments. That is what naturalist metaphysics 
does (or can do). It can look at all the different entities studied by the 
different sciences, and the manner in which they interact, and ask if there 
is any similarity in the characterisation of widely disparate phenomena. 
The result of such a scrutiny could be that every empirical discipline pos-
tulates entities that can be characterised as persistent bearers of proper-
ties (substances), the properties that they bear (properties), the relations 
they hold (relations), and the events that these bearers enter into (events), 
and which often bring about a change in them (causation). The empirical 
sciences do not ask what the most general characteristics of persistent 
entities are, or of properties, relations, events, causation, etc. The only 
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discipline that tries to ask and answer such questions is metaphysics. 
Metaphysics, the kind that I pursue, is the business of asking whether all 
the phenomena in all the segments fit into a general scheme that all the 
sciences can incorporate in their scheme of things, or even if they already 
have incorporated it without realising it.
The fact that I take the findings and theories of the natural sciences 
to be relevant input to metaphysics—as something we must consider—
doesn’t mean that I slavishly accept their theories and findings uncritically 
(a common but misguided criticism of naturalism). They are not the only 
input of ideas about how things could be. Another input of how things 
can be comes from our everyday conceptual scheme, from phenomenol-
ogy, from semantics, and from so-called armchair speculation. None of 
these individually represent a privileged access to how things really are, 
but empirical science has the privilege of being the only discipline that 
explicitly aims to find out something about the mind-independent reality, 
and to test their hypothesis by strategic interactions with that external 
reality, and so should be considered to provide important input to our 
common enterprise in figuring out reality.
In the approach that I take, the findings and theorising of the empirical 
sciences—at least those parts I can hope to understand—are only taken 
as valuable input on how the world appears to us in experience, and as 
providing a plethora of explanations of how things work and a basis for 
excluding some explanations. I contrast that input with input about how 
we make sense of the world in our everyday conceptual scheme, and how 
we talk about them, as well as phenomenological analysis, and I pitch the 
findings from each of these approaches against the other in an attempt 
to find some way to bring it all together in one coherent whole. If one 
approach seems to say something very different from the other, we need 
to find an explanation as to why that is. Either it is because one is right 
and the other wrong, or vice versa; we need to figure out which one it 
is. In doing that, we will be construing some way that it all fits together. 
I take this to be pretty much the role of metaphysics as described by 
Johansson (1989/2004), Lowe (1998), Heil (2003), and Simons (2000).
I don’t believe we can come to any conclusion about the world merely 
by scrutinising language, or merely by phenomenological analysis, or 
merely by a priori reflection on the conceptual scheme already in place, 
or merely by accepting the facts and theories of physics. Metaphysics, in 
the sense I have sketched it, is a project beyond the scope of an individual. 
We all take a shot at some part of the overall project, in our own limited 
way, and in time, over generations, we hopefully move towards greater 
clarity. Here I take a shot at pushing our understanding of causation, and 
of the philosophical discussion about causation, just a little bit further.
Although powers-based accounts of causation have grown in popularity 
in recent years to the degree that they are no longer a peripheral view, 
they cannot be described as mainstream. Indeed, as I have already men-
tioned, The Oxford Handbook of Causation lists neo-Humean accounts 
as ‘standard approaches’ while powers-based accounts are among ‘alter-
native approaches’ (Beebee, Hitchcock, & Menzies 2009). It is therefore 
not surprising that many are uneasy with powers-based accounts—they 
don’t know what to make of them—especially those that have been 
brought up in the dominant neo-Humean framework. And many enough 
are brought up entirely on a neo-Humean diet. On the other hand, there 
is a curiosity about powers-based accounts too.
Sara Bernstein (2013) nicely sums up the situation in a review of a 
volume of papers attempting to bring the new powers-based metaphysics 
to bear on the problem of mental causation (Gibb, Lowe, & Ingthorsson 
2013). Bernstein can see the appeal of the powers-based approach, but 
worries that it does not relate to the neo-Humean framework with which 
she is familiar:
I am optimistic about the potential of the powers-based approach, 
but I see its major barrier to success to be bridging the gap between 
itself and other systems, or at least, clearly situating itself with 
respect to the dominant dialectic. Many advocates of more tradi-
tional approaches see the powers-based system as operating within 
its own philosophical universe and making little contact with the 
existing framework. This hurts both sides: powers-based theories are 
only taken seriously by those antecedently friendly to them, and pre-
vailing approaches do not benefit from the theoretical resources of 
the powers approach. At the same time, using the tools of the more 
dominant strategies would benefit powers-based theories, as some of 
their key concepts (properties and substances, to name a few) remain 
underdeveloped. Clearly connecting powers-based theories to the 
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traditional neo-Humean framework will open up greater theoretical 
resources for both sides.
(Sara Bernstein 2013)
I agree that proponents of powers-based approaches must situate them-
selves with respect to the ‘dominant dialectic’ but I disagree that the tools 
of the dominant strategies would benefit friends of powers.
The way to situate powers-based accounts, in my view, is not alongside 
the neo-Humean framework, in the guise of a rival, or as an admixture to 
the neo-Humean framework, but as operating on a different level; they 
should be understood as attempts to explain causation, while reductive 
neo-Humean accounts merely describe how causation appears empiri-
cally, and how we reason about that appearance in the absence of a 
deeper explanation of why it appears that way. Now, neo-Humeanism is 
of course often used as a name for the specific doctrine that everything is 
‘loose and separate’, i.e. that we live in a world of facts between which 
there are no substantial connections. But it is not obvious to me that 
every advocate of so-called neo-Humean accounts of causation really are 
neo-Humeans in that sense. Many enough believe that there are substan-
tial causal connections, but think those connections are beyond our reach 
for epistemic reasons. This is the explicit view of J.S. Mill whose views on 
causation are a forbear to modern neo-Humean views.
The interesting question is why proponents of neo-Humean accounts, 
even such as do not think that everything is loose and separate, resist 
attempts to explain when the explanations do not obviously disagree with 
them on the level of description. Indeed, the neo-Humean accounts do 
not really contradict each other over the issue of how causation appears 
to us but can be said to disagree about how we popularly reason about 
causation. We are seeing here a clash between descriptive and reductive 
approaches (neo-Humean) vs. revisionary and explanatory approaches 
(powers-based); really, between empiricist and rational realist views. 
This clash comes to the fore in discussions about causation like it does 
nowhere else, because causal explanations are the epitome of explana-
tions generally. Operate with a descriptive approach to metaphysics and 
you will arguably find it difficult to understand the resulting accounts 
of causal explanations as anything other than further descriptions that 
call for explanation. Why does the light come on when I flip the switch? 
Because whenever I flip the switch the light comes on (regularity analy-
sis)? Because when flipping occurs in conditions S, then the light comes 
on (conditional analysis)? Because in every world closest to ours the light 
only comes on if the switch is flipped (counterfactual analysis)? Because 
the repeated manipulation of the switch makes the light reliably come on 
and off (intervention)? None of these actually answers why the flipping 
of the switch makes the light come on.
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2.1  Explaining vs. Characterising Causation
I worry that the philosophical community has for such a long time 
favoured reductive neo-Humean approaches that the presuppositions 
that go with that approach have faded away into obscurity, so that they 
are no longer universally appreciated as reductive. Consequently, neo-
Humean accounts are understood as incompatible rivals to powers-based 
views, for the title of most satisfying explanation of causation. I will 
argue that this is not the case. Neo-Humean accounts describe causation 
in illuminating and useful ways but do not explain it, while powers-based 
accounts explain causation in a way that is compatible with neo-Humean 
characterisations. Let me explain.
Jonathan Lowe, in The Possibility of Metaphysics (1998: 108), draws 
an interesting distinction between ‘saying what something consists in’ and 
‘explaining’ that something. The distinction I draw is more or less the one 
Lowe draws, although I cast it in terms of ‘characterising’ (i.e. describing) 
and ‘explaining’. To characterise a phenomenon of interest is to point out 
some salient feature of the phenomenon as it appears in experience, such 
that we can recognise it and tell it apart from other things. However, 
such a characterisation need not really explain the phenomenon, say, why 
it occurs at all. For instance, we can characterise persistence as when 
something exists for more than a moment, but that does not explain why 
anything persists, or why some things persist for a short time and others 
for a long time. Note that the notions of endurance and perdurance do 
not explain why something endures or perdures, they are merely charac-
terisations of persistence within the constraints imposed either by an A or 
B view of time. We can still ask why something endures or perdures, and 
neither endurance nor perdurance answers that question.
Explanations of persistence do exist. We need not worry here whether 
they are good or bad, since the point is merely to illustrate the difference 
between explaining and characterising. In most materialist ontologies 
of the past it is postulated that the world ultimately consists of small-
est indivisible component parts that persist because they must; they are 
permanent. The persistence of the fundamental simples is ‘explained’ by 
attributing to them a fundamental and primitive property of permanence, 
a property we cannot even in principle establish empirically. The postula-
tion of this property is motivated by the perceived need for permanent 
simples in order to explain why we experience changes in middle-sized 
compound objects while also taking for granted that nothing comes into 
being out of nothing and nothing is ever completely annihilated; it all 
boils down to the rearrangement of the permanent simples. Unfortunately, 
permanence only explains, at best, the persistence of simples but not of 
compound objects. A separate explanation is needed for why the simples 
sometimes come together to constitute compounds, and why they con-
tinue to constitute them over time so that they continue to exist for more 
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than a moment, i.e. persist. The permanence of the simples cannot help 
us here; we are short of an explanation. In Chapter 6 I will offer a causal 
explanation of the constitution and persistence of compounds, but, for 
now, I hope to have said enough to make sense of the distinction between 
explaining and characterising in order to apply it to the issue of causation.
Reductive views, as already mentioned, offer an account of causation 
in terms of some or other feature of our experience or way of thinking 
about the world, but do not offer an explanation of what gives rise to 
those features. Indeed, that is the whole point of reductive views; to avoid 
speculation about what something is really like such that it appears a 
certain way, and yet say something illuminating about the appearance. 
Let’s have a quick look at the standard views to illustrate that they only 
characterise but do not explain.
The core idea of regularity theories is that the occurrence of some phe-
nomenon c is the cause to the occurrence of some other phenomenon e, 
iff phenomena of type C are always followed by phenomena of type E. 
This characterisation offers an operationalisation of the application of 
the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ that seems to allow us a fairly reliable (but 
not infallible) way to identify causal connections. But if we ask what it 
is about phenomena of type C such that they always are followed by a 
phenomenon of type E, the regularity theory doesn’t have an answer. It 
is the regularity that informs us that c is a cause and e an effect, not vice 
versa. Indeed, the original motivation for developing regularity theories 
was to avoid speculation about such things because it was believed to 
inevitably lead into a quagmire of theoretical entities whose nature is 
forever beyond our grasp. The idea is that we can know what a cause is 
and what is an effect without knowing on a more fundamental level what 
it is about the causes such that they bring about effects (or even without 
knowing whether anything really is brought about at all).
The conditional account is really just a slight improvement on the sim-
ple regularity theory, based on the observation that as a matter of fact 
causal regularities aren’t dyadic. C is not invariably followed by E, but 
only when C occurs in the circumstances S. But again, if we ask what it is 
about C and S and E such that they stand in that triadic relation, then the 
conditional account doesn’t have an answer. I take it that Mackie’s analy-
sis of causation in terms of INUS conditions is an illustration of the fact 
that we are unable to distinguish between a cause C and circumstances 
S only on the basis of the empirical grounds the neo-Humean allows, 
notably whether something occurs or not (Mackie 1965). In the absence 
of a clear criterion of the difference between C and S, we can equally 
say that S is sufficient given C, as we can say that C is sufficient given 
S. In his view, the mere occurrence of any individual factor in a causal 
nexus is never singularly sufficient for anything, but merely a necessary 
component of a nexus of conditions that might jointly be sufficient for 
an outcome.
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I allow myself to simplify grossly (for the sake of convenience, since 
it is of no consequence here) and say that the probability theory only 
deviates from the regularity theory by allowing the regularity to come in 
degrees. But, again, probability theory does not explain why the occur-
rence of C increases the probability of E; it can only quantify the degree 
to which C does increase the probability of E, on the basis of the avail-
able empirical data. The result may give us reason to suspect that C and E 
actually are related as cause and effect, but further empirical data cannot 
establish this. We need to also know the causal mechanism that makes C 
bring E about, and perhaps also understand on the basis of that mecha-
nism how reliable it is in the production of E.
It is important to note that when I ask for an explanation in this con-
text, I am not asking for the empirical explanation of particular phenom-
ena; why a glass breaks when it hits the floor, or why negatively charged 
electrons repel each other. I am asking for an account of what it is, in 
the most general sense, that makes anything be the cause to any other 
phenomenon (and why the latter is then an effect). In the metaphysics 
of causation, we look for the most general features of the category of 
causal connections, and although the input from the empirical sciences 
is important for that task, they do not do the work for us. No empirical 
scientist stands back from the multitude of particular causal phenomena 
in order to ask what all these phenomena have in common such that they 
count as causal phenomena. Or, rather, if empirical scientists were to do 
that, they would no longer be doing empirical science but metaphysics. 
The ambition of the proponents of the standard view is to provide that 
kind of model (or it should be). Neo-Humeans have no such ambition. 
They might have the ambition to show that explanations cannot be given, 
but their accounts of causation cannot support that claim. They need a 
meta-metaphysical theory about why metaphysics cannot provide expla-
nations. More about that later in my treatment of Hume below.
Getting back to the neo-Humean accounts, then the core idea of coun-
terfactual theories is that c counts as the cause to e iff (in worlds closest 
to ours) phenomena of type E never occur unless C occurs. However, we 
can again ask what it is about E and C in those closest possible worlds 
that make E counterfactually dependent on C, but the counterfactual 
accounts don’t answer that question. The idea is that we can know what 
is the cause of something else without knowing on a deeper level how 
causes in general bring about effects, merely by knowing what would 
count as a smallest deviation from the actual world and what the con-
sequences would be from that deviation. Since counterfactual accounts 
are the most widely adopted neo-Humean approach, I will make a spe-
cial effort in Chapter 9 to question the plausibility of the idea that we 
could know what counts as a smallest deviation, and the consequences 
thereof, without first having knowledge of the causal workings of the 
actual world.
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The core idea of agency and interventionist theories is that c counts as 
the cause to e iff E reliably appears and disappears when you manipulate 
C. Again, we can ask what it is about C and E that make them be related 
in that way, and the agency and interventionist theories do not answer 
that question; we learn to identify Cs and Es by noting what happens in 
manipulations.
Causal process theories state that causation needs to be understood in 
terms of causal processes and their interactions. I postpone discussion of 
them until Chapter 3, because I find them to be a mix of reductive and 
non-reductive accounts, and which should be understood in contrast to 
the powerful particulars view that emerges in Chapters 3 and 4. Here I 
will only say that I find many of them to be reductive despite the explana-
tory ambitions of their proponents, because they accept the empiricist 
dogma that real-worldly phenomena must be defined in terms of observ-
able features. For instance, that a causal process is something that carries 
a ‘mark’, or that a causal interaction is when conserved quantities are 
transmitted between causal processes. They are reductive in so far as (i) 
they remain silent on the causal role of the mark, and (ii) lack an explana-
tion as to why the conserved quantities are transmitted in the way that 
they are (my interaction model is meant to provide such an explanation).
Now, all reductionist accounts suffer from various types of counterex-
amples that the proponents of each view struggle to resolve by offering 
modifications. I suspect that the problems are likely to remain as long 
as no attempt is made to answer the question I have been asking here: 
what is it about Cs and Es such that they come in ordered pairs, that Cs 
increase the probability of Es, that make Es counterfactually dependent 
on Cs, and that make intervention a reliable way to identify causal con-
nections? I won’t try to prove that the problems will forever remain, 
but I will attempt to show that the powerful particulars view I offer in 
Chapter 4 answers the question.
2.2  Powers-Based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on 
the Level of Characterisation
If neo-Humean views are treated merely as characterisations of causation 
then they do not significantly contradict powers-based accounts, because 
they neither try to compete on the level of explanation nor do they dis-
agree on the level of characterisation. Indeed, neo-Humean views don’t 
significantly disagree with each other either. Let me illustrate these points 
using a rough sketch of the standard view and which I will elaborate on 
in the next chapter. According to the standard view, causation involves 
the production of changes through interactions between powerful par-
ticulars. The characteristics of the changes produced are determined 
partly by the influence being exerted between the objects in virtue of 
their so-called active powers (their ability to influence other objects), and 
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partly by their respective passive powers (ability to change in some way 
in response to the exertion of influence of an active power). The idea is 
that, whenever an object possessing certain active powers interacts in a 
certain way with another object possessing certain passive powers, the 
outcome is always the same. Whenever you throw the same kind of brick 
in the same kind of way at a window of a certain type, the window will 
break. On this view a cause C is really a determinate kind of interaction 
between two determinate kinds of powerful particulars and the effect E 
is the outcome of that interaction. The core idea of this view has been 
expressed by Mario Bunge (1979: 47) in the following way:
If C happens, then (and only then) E is always produced by it.
Note that I have yet to explain the nature of ‘production’ (see subsequent 
chapters), but this is enough for our present purposes.
The interesting point about the standard view is that it entails that 
causation will exhibit all the salient features pointed out by the reduc-
tive views. It entails that whenever C happens E will follow, just as the 
regularity view predicts, but offers a further analysis of C that incor-
porates the distinction between the sufficient and necessary conditions 
drawn in the conditional analysis; C in Bunge’s characterisation cor-
responds to the nexus of C and S in the conditional analysis, i.e. of the 
action of the Agent and the passive object or state of affairs upon which 
the Agent acts. Note that it provides criteria to distinguish between C 
(something ‘active’) and S (something ‘passive’). It also entails that C will 
increase the probability of the occurrence of E, although on necessitarian 
accounts we have to understand the uncertainty implied in ‘probably’ as 
due to our uncertain knowledge of the details of any particular instance 
c of the kind C.
One of the nicest examples of a dependency between the anti- reductive 
and reductive views is between the standard view and intervention-
ist accounts. The standard view entails that intervention is an excellent 
method to identify causal connections. Given that it is true that whenever 
C happens, and only then, E invariably follows, it follows that when C 
occurs E will appear and when C is removed E will be removed, and that 
C is the only thing that can do that. So, all you have to do to find out the 
cause to E is to manipulate anything that could conceivably be the proxi-
mate cause and whenever the presence or absence of anything reliably 
makes E appear or go away, you will have found the cause. Conversely, 
assume the falsity of the standard view, and it entails that intervention 
is an unreliable method to identify causal connections. Suppose C only 
sporadically produces E, and is not the only thing that produces E, 
then it follows that intervention will be an unreliable method to iden-
tify causal connections, and it will be less reliable to the same degree as 
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the production is less reliable. At least, in the absence of an explanation 
of why causes reliably bring effects about, the interventionist account 
doesn’t have an explanation as to why manipulation of causes makes the 
effect appear/disappear.
Galileo Galilei is nowadays often portrayed as an early intervention-
ist. To be more precise, it is argued not only that Galileo developed the 
scientific method—the use of manipulative experimentation to identify 
causal connections—but developed a radically new concept of causa-
tion (Ducheyne 2006; Ducheyne & Weber 2007). Like William Wallace 
(1988), I disagree with this reading of Galileo. To my mind he is much 
more reasonably understood as drawing out an epistemic consequence 
from the standard view of his time, notably that whenever objects of a 
certain kind interact in a certain way the outcome is always the same. 
Now, as Wallace points out, Galileo’s own texts are probably inconclu-
sive as evidence of his actual views on this particular matter, and I am not 
really concerned with proving Galileo right or wrong. The main point is 
that if we assume the standard view, it will work as an explanation of 
why intervention works, and it does not really contradict interventionist 
accounts considered as attempts to characterise causation. Contrariwise, 
if we assume the standard view to be wrong, no explanation exists of why 
the world should exhibit the features pointed out by the neo-Humean 
views. Indeed, it is often assumed that these features are brute facts.
It is also interesting to note that the reductive views are compatible 
with each other. It can be simultaneously true that causation appears to 
us as a regularity (albeit a triadic rather than a dyadic one), as probabi-
listic, as counterfactual, and as interventionist. We can however debate 
which of these characterisations offers the most reliable way to recognise 
causal connections, but that is surely an epistemic issue.
It seems to me that if proponents of neo-Humean accounts are going to 
reject powers-based accounts it is not because of any disagreement about 
how causation appears to us in experience. And it will not be based on 
disagreement on the level of explanation, because neo-Humean accounts 
do not offer explanation. The disagreement will revolve around a meta-
philosophical disagreement about the proper method of philosophy in 
general. In other words, the disagreement will revolve around the ques-
tion of whether or not philosophy (and science) is confined to merely 
characterise reality as it appears to us in experience.
Of course, there is the issue of necessity, which has been a disagree-
ment between causal realists and neo-Humeans, but more recently 
also internally between causal realists. But how are we to understand 
that disagreement? Usually it is understood in terms of neo-Humeans 
insisting that there is no substantial connection between entities in the 
world (everything is loose and separate) while causal realists insist there 
is a substantial connection while perhaps disagreeing on whether that 
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connection amounts to necessitation or not-quite necessitation. However, 
there is a vast difference between accepting neo-Humean accounts as 
simply empirically adequate descriptions of a world that may or may 
not contain substantial causal connections, or accepting them on a more 
ontological level as correct accounts of a world in which substantial con-
nections are missing. As I have explained, the epistemic reading of neo-
Humean accounts makes them compatible with the standard view, and 
therefore not of much interest to the subject of this book. From now 
on, unless otherwise specified, I will predominantly be discussing the 
ontological understanding of neo-Humean accounts, or, really of neo-
Humean metaphysics, the doctrine that there are no substantial connec-
tions between the entities of our world.
The clash between the descriptive and explanatory approach is 
nowhere as clear as in Hume’s discussion of causation. Indeed, where 
most contemporary neo-Humeans don’t really bother to explicitly moti-
vate their aversion to metaphysical speculation—that is just taken to be 
the default stance—Hume is very explicit on that point. I gather that is 
why neo-Humeans often appeal to Hume for support for their position. 
However, it does not seem to me that Hume offers much to support neo-
Humean metaphysics.
2.3  Hume’s Discussion of Causation
Much of the discussion about causation and of causal necessity in the 
modern era has revolved around Hume’s dismissal of necessary connec-
tions, apparently under the assumption that his discussion is of inter-
est generally. However, as far as I can see, his argument is only relevant 
for those who accept his sceptical empiricism and his extremely reduc-
tive philosophy of mind. Anyone who does not accept those aspects of 
Hume’s philosophy cannot appeal to his discussion of causation in sup-
port of their view, nor do they have a reason to disagree with him over 
causation; they should only disagree with him about his sceptical empiri-
cism and/or philosophy of mind. Let me explain.
Before Hume turns his attention to causation he has already arrived 
at the conclusion that the content of our minds is limited to sense data 
(impressions) and the ideas that derive from them, and that all of our 
ideas are as particular as the sense data they derive from (i.e. no abstract 
concepts). He then infers from this result, with admirable consistency, 
that we are unable to conceive of anything that exists independently of 
perceptions:
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and 
since all ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the 
mind; it follows, that ’tis impossible for us so much as to conceive 
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or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions.
(1739: 67)
It immediately follows from this view about the limits of cognition—
independently of any concerns about causation—that any putative meta-
physical category (such as causation, substance, property, etc.) cannot be 
conceived of as a feature of mind-independent reality, but only a feature 
of our understanding. This reading of Hume is perfectly in line with his 
kind of ‘naturalism’, notably that we must ground our philosophy on 
human nature (the only nature we are acquainted with in experience).
Ironically, even neo-Humean metaphysics is a non-starter on Hume’s 
view, because it too makes claims about the mind-independent reality 
that Hume claims we cannot conceive of. Neo-Humean metaphysics is 
therefore not the kind of sceptical empiricism that Hume represented, 
nor is it the kind Mill advocated, the one that doesn’t doubt the reality of 
physical facts but suspends judgement on mysterious ties between them. 
Neo-Humeanism, in so far as it can be understood as a metaphysical 
position (in contrast to an anti-realist neo-Humeanism), is the ‘deliberate 
affirmation that, as a matter of fact, our world is such that it instanti-
ates no necessary connections between its instances’ (Sparber 2009: 15). 
‘Our world’ is meant to be the mind-independent reality we inhabit, not 
the mind-dependent world of experience. In other words, neo-Humean 
metaphysics doesn’t suspend judgement on mysterious ties but explicitly 
rejects them.
Hume’s position is similar to Berkeley’s (1709: §§ 41, 71), notably that 
the intellect cannot move beyond the appearance of things to construe 
conceptions of what things are like outside the mind, nor can we make 
judgements about them. Contemporary neo-Humean realists reject this 
position, and therefore have no reason to accept an analysis that depends 
on its truth. Indeed, neo-Humeans cannot avail themselves of arguments 
that presuppose the unintelligibility of their own position. And if causal 
realists have a quarrel with Hume, it is not with his analysis of causa-
tion but the premises on which his analysis rests. Those premises don’t 
explicitly contradict the causal realist account of causation, but of real-
ism generally.
It is important to fully realise the consequences of the limitations 
Hume puts on cognition. He is not just saying that we cannot conceive 
of unobservables in the usual sense, i.e. entities that do not affect the 
senses and of which we therefore have no sensible ideas. He is saying that 
we cannot even conceive of the things we commonly regard as observ-
able, i.e. the things we believe affect our senses to give rise to perceptions 
about them. All we can conceive of are the objects of perception, and they 
are either impressions or ideas. Hume declares that we are just as much 
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unable to draw conclusions about external objects from our perceptions, 
as we are unable to draw inferences from one object of perception to 
another object of perception: ‘there is nothing in any object, consider’d 
in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond 
it [Hume’s emphasis]’ (1739: 139). The ‘objects’ of which Hume speaks 
are the objects of perception, since in his view those are the only objects 
present to the mind. Furthermore, Hume was not a naïve realist, so he 
did not think that perception amounts to direct unmediated contact with 
mind-independent objects; ergo, the objects of perception are not iden-
tical to the objects that gave rise to those perceptions, and we cannot, 
Hume claims, form any conception about such objects outside the mind.
It bears mentioning that the so-called ‘New Hume’ interpretation has 
no bearing on the issue (for overview, see Read & Richman (eds) 2007). 
According to that interpretation, Hume was a sceptical realist, that is, he 
believed there was real causation in nature, but also that we could not 
rationally justify such a belief. Assuming that reading, we still arrive at 
the conclusion that causation, as a philosophical subject matter, has only 
to do with what is in the mind, and we are still not able to account for 
it except in terms of sense data and/or their derivate ideas. For criticism 
of the New Hume interpretation, see Millican (2009), Crean (2010), and 
Hakkarainen (2015).
As you can see, it is something of a puzzle how neo-Humean 
 metaphysics—which is a positive claim about the nature of mind-inde-
pendent reality—is both meant to be somehow derived from Hume’s 
views on properties and causation, and yet manages to completely dis-
regard his views about our inability to justify any belief about anything 
distinct from perception. I’ll be content to suggest that Hume inadver-
tently inspired neo-Humean metaphysics by raising the conceptual pos-
sibility of an objective reality without substantial connections. Basically, 
neo-Humean metaphysics is the hypothesis that the structure of reality 
outside the mind mirrors the structure Hume described within the mind. 
Nothing in Hume’s philosophy justifies this hypothesis, and, as far as 
I can tell, the reason philosophers accept it today is that it is a part of 
the dominant dialectic that they have been brought up to accept. For 
more detailed criticism of neo-Humeanism, see Bunge (1979: Ch. 3), 
Armstrong (1983: Part 1), and Maudlin (2007: Ch. 2).
To this it could be objected that neo-Humeans today only have to add 
to their scheme a form of justification that Hume did not allow, i.e. infer-
ence to the best explanation. So they might accept that the content of 
our minds, in so far as our mind is concerned with matters of fact, is 
confined to impressions and associated ideas, but that we can still by 
way of an inference to the best explanation conclude that (most likely) 
the structure of the world outside the mind mirrors the structure inside 
the mind. Lewis, for one, clearly appeals to such an inference to the best 
explanation argument in favour of modal realism. However, the problem 
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is that contemporary neo-Humeanism is chock-full of ideas that cannot 
be traced to impressions, and most of its proponents are Platonists about 
abstract objects, and propositions in general, and many of them accept the 
reality of negative facts. My critique here is really that neo-Humeanism 
is inconsistent. It rejects the reality of mysterious ties in spatio-temporal 
reality, but has no qualms accepting mysterious ties outside spatio-tem-
poral reality, including those holding between distinct spatio-temporal 
realities (possible worlds). And, is it really the case that the best explana-
tion of the observed features of the world is that there is no explanation? 
Is it a brute fact that things are the way they are?
Ultimately, the main point is that causal realists have no direct quar-
rel with Hume about causation, but only with his reductive theory of 
mind, and that the dispute between causal realism and neo-Humeanism 
today should be perceived as a dispute between two camps that assume 
contrary working hypotheses for reasons that today have very little to 
do with Hume. We have two contrary hypotheses about the best way to 
make sense of the structure and regularity we observe: (i) that it is the 
result of substantial connections of some sort yet to be elucidated (causal 
realism), or (ii) to assume that there are no substantial connections to be 
elucidated (neo-Humeanism). The dispute will have to be settled by judg-
ing their respective success in making sense of the structure and regularity 
we observe. I will not speculate here about when or how such a judge-
ment is to be made, but I want to make sure that we will be talking about 
the right kind of causal realism when it is time to make that judgement, 
and that we understand the objections in the right way.
2.4  The Tools of the Dominant Strategies
We have yet to consider whether Bernstein is right to think that some 
of the key concepts of powers-based ontologies are underdeveloped, 
such as properties and substances, and that they would therefore benefit 
from using the tools of the more dominant strategies. Or, in other words, 
would a connection to the traditional neo-Humean framework ‘open up’ 
greater theoretical resources for both sides? I have doubts about that. 
Sure, there are problems/controversies about most if not all the core con-
cepts of powers-based accounts. However, those problems are related to 
an attempt to develop concepts that play some explanatory role. The neo-
Humean framework avoids those problems by stripping the concepts of 
their explanatory roles, therefore appearing unproblematic (rather than 
‘developed’). In most if not all cases, it reduces the problematic concept 
to some other less problematic concept, but usually at a cost with respect 
to explanatory power.
Take the paradigmatic neo-Humean conception of property. At the 
most fundamental level we have categorical properties. They are causally 
inert qualities, useful for not much more than serving a role as abstract 
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identifiers in conjunction with Leibniz’ law. I say abstract, because 
although they were once thought to be observable (see, for instance, 
Goodman 1954: 40) they are now generally assumed to be unknowable. 
Only neo-Humeans who are also direct realists (if there are any) will 
disagree. The reason they are supposed to be unknowable is because they 
are only contingently associated with the second-order powers that affect 
our senses to inform us about the first-order categorical properties. Since 
the powers are in turn only contingently related to the sensory qualities 
that they give rise to, there is no way to tell whether the way a property 
appears in experience is the way the property really is. This is a strange 
situation for a type of property that is supposed to ground the identity of 
objects. The consequence is that we cannot in principle know the identity 
of anything (not even of properties), and yet we can supposedly know a 
priori that it is necessarily true that if a and b are identical, they have all 
properties in common. Leibniz’ law is thus turned into a piece of abstract 
trivia that can at best be applied in purely formal models.
Similar things can be said about the concept of substance. For an 
Aristotelian, the concept of substance, with the distinction between 
form and matter, has a certain explanatory role. It explains why there is 
always something that remains through any kind of change. The reason 
Chrysippus remains the same as he saunters from the gymnasium to the 
market is that he changes in accidents (qualitative change) but neither 
in essence nor matter (numerical identity). On the neo-Humean account 
of properties and how they ground identity, identity and change are a 
priori incompatible. This point might actually be one the most impor-
tant things I have ever tried to argue for in print, and I owe it partly to 
J.M.E. McTaggart. He realised that, if the identity of things is grounded 
in its qualities, then whenever there is qualitative dissimilarity there is 
numerical distinctness, and vice versa. Which is why he thought Leibniz’ 
term ‘indiscernibility of identicals’ was a misnomer; it should be called 
‘dissimilarity of the diverse’ instead. He didn’t connect this to the issues 
we are dealing with now, but the connection is straightforward. And it 
is very clear that the problem of temporary intrinsics, as formulated by 
Lewis, is a case where we arrive at the same conclusion; nothing can 
remain numerically the same unless it remains qualitatively the same. 
Ergo, change is impossible.
I think this should be enough to show that the sentiment that core con-
cepts of powers-based ontologies are underdeveloped can be understood 
only as the sentiment of those who only want to describe reality but not 
to explain it, and are bothered by the extra complications that inevita-
bly accompany the explanatory project. Again, the friction between the 
neo-Humean framework and powers-based accounts (or causal realists 
generally) revolves largely about meta-philosophical assumptions about 
the purpose and/or limits of metaphysical thought, and not specifically 
about the nature of causation, properties, etc.
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2.5  Does It Really Matter?
So far I have described causal realism as largely being in agreement with 
neo-Humeanism about the way causation appears to us; it appears as 
a regularity in the occurrence of entities of which the effect is counter-
factually dependent on the cause, such that if the cause is manipulated 
the effect will come and go away. Causal realists don’t really disagree 
with anything in this picture, except in degree. For instance, Mumford & 
Anjum will accept the above description with the qualification that the 
regularity, counterfactual dependence, and reliability of intervention are 
not perfect, because they don’t think causation involves necessity (only a 
substantial tendency).
Some neo-Humeans may reject causal realism as an ill-construed 
attempt to figure out what objective reality is like; or, rather, an attempt 
to figure out what cannot be figured out. This would be an epistemi-
cally motivated neo-Humeanism that opposes powers-based accounts 
for reasons that have nothing to do with what exactly powers-based 
accounts suggest about causation. We are talking about people who 
don’t see any appeal in Bernstein’s suggestion about a mutual benefit 
resulting from bridging the gap between the two systems. But they should 
then also accept that no realism makes any sense, not even neo-Humean 
metaphysics.
Others may reject causal realism, not because they think nothing can 
be figured out about mind-independent reality, but because they think 
powers-based accounts are wrong about mind-independent reality. These 
would be the proponents of neo-Humean metaphysics, which say that 
there really are no substantial connections between anything. Now, 
I find it difficult to discern between realist and anti-realist neo-Humeans, 
because very few, if anyone at all, explicitly state their position in the 
matter. However, David Lewis is surely one who explicitly endorses neo-
Humean metaphysics, the view that the world is nothing but a mosaic of 
local matters of fact between which there are no necessary connections. 
He even explicitly commits to the reality of a plurality of worlds existing 
in parity.
In sum, the benefits of the powers-based approach is really in the more 
fine-grained account of what constitutes the cause C which is followed 
by E, and on which E is counterfactually dependent, and therefore offers 
a more fine-grained idea of what it is that we can manipulate to produce 
E or variations of E. The more fine-grained account has consequences for 
what we would consider to be good scientific practice. So, for instance, 
Anjum, Copeland, & Rocca (2020) argue, on the basis of Mumford & 
Anjum’s powers-based account of causation, that there is a fundamental 
flaw in the idea that only randomised controlled test studies (RTC) are of 
high enough quality to ground evidence-based practices. Very roughly, the 
idea that only RTC are good enough is based on the idea that causation 
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boils down to a two-place relation between temporally distinct events 
or states, i.e. ‘if C, then E’. It is acknowledged that the effectiveness of C 
is contingent on the situation in which it occurs, but it is still assumed 
that there must be some particular factor C that is decisively responsible 
for the outcome E. Consequently, it is assumed that any investigation 
into the causes of some negative outcome E has to involve the compari-
son between two controlled settings in which background conditions are 
fixed, and that onsly differ with respect to the presence/absence of C. 
As Anjum and colleagues point out, this model is at a disadvantage in 
discovering, for instance, the aetiology of multifactorial diseases. In that 
case a more fine-grained powers-based approach has the advantage. The 
alluring promise of powers-based accounts resides in their potential not 
only for solving certain philosophical problems, but for improving actual 
research practices in order to be able to better understand multifacto-
rial illnesses such as chronic fatigue and various other psychosomatic 
disorders.
Causal realism—in its most general form—is the view that causation is 
an objective feature of the world and not only a feature of our thinking 
(see, for instance, Bunge 1979: sect. 1.1.2; Costa 1989; Price 2001: 106; 
Esfeld 2011). Many enough consider themselves to be causal realists in 
this sense—they believe in real causal connections—and yet are happy to 
make do with neo-Humean characterisations of causation, for the sake 
of convenience, because they think it is at least empirically adequate. 
Although this book is meant to reveal some of the dangers of that choice 
of convenience, then in this particular chapter I am concerned more nar-
rowly with more substantial accounts of the nature of causal relations. 
In fact, I will in the end focus specifically on causal realist accounts that 
in one way or another appeal to causal powers. This limitation excludes 
very little since most causal realist accounts involve an appeal to powers. 
Indeed, Michael Costa divides causal realism into causal objectivism and 
power realism (1989: 173), of which the former is merely a commitment 
to the idea that causal relations would obtain in the world even in the 
absence of minds perceiving them, while the latter commits to the idea 
that such relations are to be explained by appeal to powers.
Having identified the kind of causal realist accounts that are in focus 
here, which are meant to stand in contrast to neo-Humean accounts that 
are coupled to neo-Humean metaphysics, I will also introduce an inter-
mediary class of accounts: those that believe causation is a substantial 
connection but don’t want to make a clean break with the traditional 
neo-Humean framework. I call them objectivist accounts (not to be iden-
tified with ‘causal objectivism’, which is just a commitment to the real-
ity of causation). We have then (i) neo-Humean accounts, (ii) objectivist 
accounts, and (iii) powers-based accounts. I don’t mean this division to 
be exhaustive, but merely good enough for the purposes of this discus-
sion. The neo-Humean and powers-based accounts are here understood 
as metaphysical contraries, but objectivist accounts have sympathies in 
both directions. According to the neo-Humean accounts, there is no sub-
stantial connection between causes and effects; causation is a relation 
that supervenes on the distribution of Kim-style events that obtain as 
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a matter of brute fact. According to powers-based accounts, causation 
is a substantial connection that can be explained in terms of interac-
tions between powerful particulars. Objectivist accounts are built on 
the assumption that causation is a substantial connection (contra neo-
Humeanism), but their proponents nevertheless either think that the neo-
Humean framework (or something very close to it) is the best we have by 
way of understanding causation, or they take themselves to be developing 
an alternative explanatory model of causation that is better than power 
realism. As I will argue, they end up not really being explanatory because 
they stay true to the neo-Humean restrictions on rational speculation.
Another way to explain the difference between neo-Humean and objec-
tivist accounts is that the neo-Humean accounts that are of relevance here 
are not the ones that merely endorse neo-Humeanism because of epistemic 
constraints; they believe we can know—if we can know anything—that in 
objective reality there are no substantial causal connections. Objectivists 
might on the other hand endorse the neo-Humean characterisations of 
causation—or settle for them—because they believe an explanation of 
causation is beyond our reach because of some epistemic constraint. I ven-
ture to suggest that they share, or come very close to sharing, the attitude 
of J.S. Mill with respect to philosophical method and its limits.
3.1  Powers-Based Accounts
If we now focus on powers-based accounts, they do not only commit to 
the reality of powers, but will typically also commit to, or at least have a 
stance on, some or all of the following characteristics: necessity, produc-
tion, efficiency, uniformity, and process (see, for instance, Bunge 1979: 
Ch. 1; Dorothy Emmet 1985; Johansson 1989/2004; Ingthorsson 2002, 
2007; Huemer & Kovitz 2003; Chakravartty 2005; Maudlin 2007; Esfeld 
2011; Mumford & Anjum 2011; Anna Marmodoro 2017). These charac-
teristics are then in one way or another tied to powers; say, that it is the 
exercise of powers that efficiently produce certain outcomes in a uniform 
(or more or less uniform) manner, a manner better described as a process 
than a two-place relation. I think the following passage by Michael Esfeld 
captures very well the prevailing stance among those causal realists that 
are looking to explain causation. Note that for purposes of presentation, 
I have divided into three parts what is originally a single paragraph and 
edited out an irrelevant parenthesis:
Causal realism is the view that causation is a real and fundamental 
feature of the world. That is to say, causation cannot be reduced to 
other features of the world, such as, for instance, certain patterns of 
regularities in the distribution of the fundamental physical proper-
ties. Causation consists in one event bringing about or producing 
another event, causation being a relation of production or bringing 
something into being […]
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I shall take events to be the relata of causal relations, without argu-
ing for this claim in this paper, since this issue is not important for 
present purposes. More precisely, an event e1, in virtue of instanti-
ating a property F, brings about another event e2, instantiating a 
property G.
One can therefore characterize causal realism as the view that prop-
erties are powers. In short, Fs are the power to produce Gs. Saying 
that properties are powers means that it is essential for a property to 
exercise a certain causal role; that is what constitutes its identity. One 
can therefore characterize causal realism as the view that properties 
are causal in themselves. To abbreviate this view, I shall speak in 
terms of causal properties.
(Esfeld 2011: 157)
To sum up, causal realism is the view that causation is the production or 
bringing about of effects by causes, and that this production is accom-
plished by powers that exercise a causal role. I take this to imply an 
acknowledgement of the features I have called production and efficiency, 
although there is no commitment to process in this particular passage. 
Esfeld’s acknowledgement of ‘patterns of regularities’ in the world may 
well be interpreted as an implicit commitment to at least some degree of 
uniformity of causal production, but perhaps a uniformity that does not 
quite add up to necessity.
The problem facing us now is that further analysis of what it involves 
for causes to bring about or produce effects are rare, at least in the con-
temporary debate. Most of those who do discuss causal production, as 
Esfeld does, stick to the characterisation of an event e1 bringing about 
another event e2, which only deviates from the regularity theory—when-
ever Fx occurs, Gy follows—by a commitment to the idea that ‘brings 
about’ denotes a substantial connection; it doesn’t explain how an event 
brings about another. Indeed, Phyllis Illari has recently complained 
that no good account of causal production exists and insists that one is 
needed (Illari 2011). Illari, unfortunately, seems unaware of my contribu-
tion (Ingthorsson 2002, 2007), but mentions Wesley Salmon (1980) and 
Ned Hall (2004), as examples of philosophers that in recent times have 
to some degree discussed production. I can add Stuart Glennan (2017) to 
this group, and also the transmission account favoured by Phillip Kitcher 
(1989), Phil Dowe (1992), and Max Kistler (1998).
As far as I can see, Salmon, Hall, Glennan, Kitcher, Dowe, and Kistler 
all take themselves to be causal objectivists and to be developing an 
explanatory account of causation. However, they all have strong empiri-
cist sympathies and their accounts suffer from similar problems to those 
I outlined in Chapter 2 for neo-Humean accounts. Below I will briefly 
address them each in turn and conclude that while they are trying to go 
beyond the reductive analysis of neo-Humean accounts, they come short 
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of an explanation. Nevertheless, I think they are interesting because they 
highlight a number of neglected features that realist accounts should take 
into account. It is to be noted that The Oxford Handbook of Causation 
lists the transmission account of Salmon, Kitcher, Dowe, and Kistler as a 
standard approach, but Glennan’s mechanistic approach as an alternative 
approach. To my mind the similarities between them are greater than the 
differences.
3.2  Salmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal 
Processes
Salmon suggests that causation be understood in terms of the notions 
of propagation and production. Propagation refers to the way persis-
tent things conserve their structure and ability to exert causal influence 
between the times they interact with other objects, and production refers 
to the way interactions between things result in modifications in their 
structure and ability to exert causal influence. In other words, interac-
tions produce changes in persistent entities. Furthermore, persistent enti-
ties are to be understood in terms of causal processes. They are causal 
in the sense that they are able to exert influence, and they are processes 
because they are not static and unchanging despite the fact that they pre-
serve a certain structure.
Salmon is an empiricist, wherefore he resists any commitment to mys-
terious causal powers. Instead he appeals to what he calls ‘marks’, which 
are basically some observable property of a causal process which are 
meant to play the same explanatory role that powers do. It is important 
to note that Salmon explicitly denies that talk of objects as causal pro-
cesses commits him to an event ontology, i.e. processes are not simply 
structured series of events, but he doesn’t really offer an alternative anal-
ysis; he just points to examples (1984: 139ff). I don’t take this rejection 
as a sign of a commitment to substance ontology, but as a rejection of 
any ontology that tries to go beyond the observable while sticking to the 
observable fact that things are not static and unchanging even though in 
many ways they remain the same over time.
Initially, Salmon admits to using the terms ‘causal process’, ‘structure’, 
‘propagation’, ‘interaction’, ‘production’, etc, as undefined and intuitive 
notions (1980). It is this intuitive formulation that appeals to causal 
realists, and which persuades them to think Salmon is saying something 
interesting. I am one of those, and the view I develop in Chapter 4 builds 
on these intuitive ideas. But, to make them intelligible within an empiri-
cist framework, Salmon has to find observable correlates. Here is where 
I find things to worry about.
One of the possibilities Salmon explores is to distinguish genuine 
causal processes from non-causal processes (say, a shadow) by saying 
that the former are able to carry a mark; some feature that remains sta-
ble and which—according to science—is causally relevant for any future 
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interaction between causal processes (Salmon 1984). Marks are then 
meant to define what a causal process is, what is being propagated, and 
what is meant by saying that the process has an ability to influence.
Salmon then defines ‘interaction’ and ‘causal production’ in terms of 
the notion of ‘interactive fork’. An interactive fork is when two causal 
processes intersect, resulting in a modification in their respective marks. 
Salmon later gave up the mark account due to criticism from Kitcher 
(1989) and Dowe (1992) and proposed instead to talk of causal pro-
cesses as entities that propagate conserved quantities, and interactions as 
the exchange of such quantities between causal processes (Salmon 1984). 
Salmon then really ends up endorsing the transmission account of causa-
tion, i.e. that causation is in some way reducible to the transmission of 
conserved quantities between cause and effect. More about that later on.
We can illustrate Salmon’s account using the example of a batter hit-
ting a baseball with a bat, but striking it in such an unfortunate way that 
it hits and breaks a window in a neighbouring house. The bat and base-
ball are causal processes propagating the conserved quantity of momen-
tum. When the bat hits the baseball, the interaction produces a change in 
the state of motion of the ball; it acquires a different momentum, velocity, 
and kinetic energy. As the ball travels across the pitch, it preserves its new 
momentum and propagates it from point A to point B. When the ball 
later interacts with the window, it is in virtue of the preserved momentum 
that it is able to influence that window and modify it (it breaks).
To my mind, this account of a causal process is reductive in the sense 
that it tries to define causal processes and interactions in terms of observ-
able features they have, rather than in terms of why they have these fea-
tures. Why are the conserved quantities transmitted in an interaction, and 
why in the particular way they actually transmitted? We are only told 
that this is what they do. This point becomes clearer in a discussion of 
transmission accounts.
3.3  The Transmission Account of Causation
There are two types of transmission accounts; those that take transmis-
sion to occur between events, and those that take transmission to occur 
between what Salmon would call a causal process, i.e. persistent objects. 
If we take the event-based accounts first, then Kistler presents the core 
idea in what he calls a reduction statement:
(T) Two events a and b are causally related in the sense that one is a 
cause of the other if and only if there exists a conserved quantity Q of 
which a particular amount P is transmitted between a and b.
(Kistler 1998: 1)
I find this unsatisfying for three interrelated reasons. First, because it offers 
no criteria to distinguish causal and non-causal instances of transmission. 
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Second, because it doesn’t say what will bring about a transmission of a 
conserved quantity in the causal instances. Third, because we don’t have 
a generalisable account of the transmission of conserved quantities; it 
doesn’t work for all the cases.
The first problem is that conservation laws entail that any quantity 
present in any Kim-style event e1 will be transmitted to the next event e2, 
whether or not anything causal occurs between e1 and e2. A uniformly 
moving body will through any given temporal interval constitute a suc-
cession of distinct Kim-style events, between which any conserved quan-
tity possessed by any event en will be transmitted to a subsequent event 
eo. The same holds for two successive states of any arbitrarily chosen 
material system, regardless of what happens within the system.
The causal process version has the advantage of narrowing things 
down a little more, since it specifies that the transmission is not just 
between two distinct events, but between two causal processes, i.e. persis-
tent particulars, when they interact. Dowe (2009: 219) offers the clearest 
statement of this view, by combining criteria previously put forward by 
himself and Salmon:
CQ1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world lines that involves 
exchange of a conserved quantity.
CQ2. A causal process is a world line of an object that possesses a 
conserved quantity. (Dowe 1995: 323)
Definition 1. A causal interaction is an intersection of world-lines that 
involves exchange of a conserved quantity.
Definition 2. A causal process is a world-line of an object that trans-
mits a nonzero amount of a conserved quantity at each moment of 
its history (each spacetime point of its trajectory).
Definition 3. A process transmits a conserved quantity between A and 
B (A ≠ B) if it possesses [a fixed amount of] this quantity at A and 
at B and at every stage of the process between A and B without any 
interactions in the open interval (A, B) that involve an exchange of 
that particular conserved quantity. (Salmon 1997: 462, 468) 
Kistler—underestimating how uncharitable critics like me are willing to 
be—obviously assumes in his reduction statement that everyone realises 
that the statement is only meant to apply to what happens in interactions 
between particulars, but Dowe makes this explicit. Dowe’s account takes 
care of the first and second problem. Causal transmissions occur in events 
involving interactions between two distinct particulars, and it is the inter-
action between the two particulars that triggers the transmission. It also 
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brings us closer to the picture offered by physics, which indeed depicts 
conserved quantities as being transmitted between particles. Physics even 
postulates virtual particles as carriers for any quantity that appears to be 
transmitted between spatially discrete entities.
However, the third problem remains. The assumption is that the direc-
tion of causation follows the flow of the transmitted quantity—really, 
that it follows the flow of energy—and this flow is assumed to explain 
the nature of causation. Why did the ball in motion make the ball at rest 
move when they collided? Because a quantity of motion was transmitted 
from one to the other. My problem with this explanation is that it does 
not generalise to all the relevant cases and will eventually suggest that 
we need to postulate something more to explain the manner in which 
the quantities flow, in order to get an account that generalises; we need 
to postulate that interacting objects always exert an equal and opposite 
influence on each other, and that this explains the resulting transmission 
(or distribution) of the conserved quantities. Let me explain this further.
The process version of the transmission account seems to make pretty 
good intuitive sense only as long as we stick to the standard examples. 
That is, examples of an apparently active (or more active) thing acting 
on another more passive thing which suffers a change: a billiard ball in 
motion encounters another at rest, and changes the state of motion of the 
latter from rest to motion (Hume 1748: § 36); a leaden ball dropped onto 
a pillow produces a hollow in the pillow (Kant 1787: A203); a locomo-
tive pulls a truck (Taylor 1973: 35); a baseball is hit by a bat to strike and 
break a window (Salmon 1980: 50). All these examples fit the standard 
view, according to which interactions involve an active object influencing 
a passive object, or, as Aristotle claimed: ‘whenever the potential active 
and the potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious 
to the potentiality, the former must of necessity act and the latter must of 
necessity be affected’ (Metaphysics: 9, 5; 264). Consider instead two iden-
tical billiard balls moving at the same speed, but in opposite directions, 
that collide head on. They will compress each other and then bounce 
back in opposite directions, both moving (roughly) at the same speed 
again but now in opposite directions from before. Which ball transmitted 
a quantity to the other? Did both transmit to the other, or was any quan-
tity transmitted at all? Perhaps both balls merely changed the direction of 
their respective quantities without transmitting anything between them? 
If we are confined to merely describing the manner in which quantities 
go, we have no explanation, and we have no universally valid account 
of the direction of causation. To my mind, and which will be elaborated 
on in Chapter 4, what is missing here is some account of how interact-
ing particulars exert an influence on each other and which explains why 
the conserved quantities are distributed/changed the way they are when 
particulars interact. The mere exchange of quantities doesn’t answer that 
question.
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Traditionally, it is the concept of ‘force’ that has explained how inter-
acting particulars influence each other. However, in the friction between 
reductionistic and anti-reductionist accounts, the concept of force has 
been just as controversial as the notion of power. Empiricists like Heinrich 
Hertz wanted to get rid of the concept—to him it represented one of the 
occult and mysterious entities we postulate only through an invalid infer-
ence from observed changes to some imagined invisible cause to those 
changes—and instead wanted to describe interactions between material 
entities merely in terms of the changes in the state of motion that they can 
be observed to suffer. Accordingly, he suggested the second law of motion 
should not be understood as saying that the force is proportional in mag-
nitude to the object’s mass times the acceleration it suffers, but as stating 
an identity of force and change in state of motion. It really meant that 
the third law of motion (F1on2 = –F2on1) could just as well be expressed by 
a reconstructed two-way second law; m1 x a1 = m2 x a2. In plain English, 
when two material systems interact, the observed change in the state of 
motion of the first (m1 x a1) is always equal to the observed change in the 
state of motion of the second (m2 x a2). Why should we accept a reduc-
tion of this kind? The empiricist answer is that we must otherwise appeal 
to the occult notion of force.
Now, to my mind, the proponents of the transmission account should 
not really have any qualms about the concept of force, in so far as they 
seek to ground their view in the notions already in use in the natural 
sciences. However, to accept it, they have to accept that there is a more 
fundamental feature to physical interactions than the transmission of 
conserved quantities. This they do not do, and therefore end up in want 
of an explanation of why conserved quantities are transmitted in the way 
they in fact are.
3.4  Ned Hall on the Generative Conception of Causation
Ned Hall aims to spell out the production view of causation, or, as he 
calls it, the generative conception. However, as far as I can see, despite 
his use of the notion ‘pure causal history’ his analysis does not go very 
far beyond the superficial characterisation offered by Bunge, notably that 
c is the cause to e iff whenever C happens in circumstances S, E is pro-
duced. As usual, it is assumed that S is to be defined in such a way as 
to exclude the presence of any intervening factor, P, in the minimal set 
of components constituting S; one that would prevent C from produc-
ing E (these assumptions are what Hall refers to below as ‘foregoing 
constraints’):
Given some event e occurring at time t’ and given some earlier time t, 
we will say that e has a pure causal history back to time t just in case 
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there is, at every time between t and t’, a unique minimally sufficient 
set for e, and the collection of these sets meets the two foregoing con-
straints. We will call the structure consisting of the members of these 
sets the “pure causal history” of e, back to time t.
(Hall 2004: 265)
The problem here, from my perspective, is that Hall’s account gives us 
no suggestion as to what kind of entities would constitute the minimally 
sufficient set for e, or in what manner that set brings about e, wherefore 
we are still left with only a two-place relation between the two events e1 
and e2 which is claimed to involve ‘generation’, but whose nature is left 
unanalysed.
3.5  Stuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal 
Production
Glennan’s account is an attempt to say something more about what kind 
of entity is sufficient for bringing about e. As he himself notes, his account 
may at first blush look similar to previously offered accounts. We can 
have Esfeld’s and Hall’s account in mind, even though Glennan does not 
explicitly mention anyone in particular. One main difference is that we 
are explicitly told not to understand the event that brings about an effect 
merely in terms of Kim-style events, i.e. as the exemplification of proper-
ties (or relations) by an object (or set of objects) at a time (Kim 1973, 
1976), but in terms of an activity of the objects involved in the event 
(Glennan 2017: 177). Glennan’s point is to stress the processual nature of 
causation as a natural consequence of taking causal production to consist 
in the exertion of influence between particulars; that this exertion must 
be understood as an activity, which is something that cannot fit within 
an instantaneous Kim-style event. To be more precise, Glennan thinks of 
events as activities of particulars and not as entities that themselves are 
engaged in activities such as ‘causing’.
Glennan’s account in many ways resembles Salmon’s but is sensi-
tive to other details in the causal structure of the world. He suggests 
we understand causation in terms of constitutive, precipitating, and 
chained production. Constitutive production corresponds roughly to 
what Salmon calls ‘production’, i.e. the ‘the ways in which a single 
event produces changes in its constituent entities’ (Glennan 2017: 180), 
but with added detail. Glennan illustrates constitutive production using 
the example of searing a steak. The interaction between the steak and 
the skillet involves the transference of energy to the steak which pro-
duces various reactions between the constituents of the steak, i.e. water, 
proteins, carbohydrates, and fat. Glennan suggests we focus on the 
changes that matter to the cook, i.e. what happens in the steak. When 
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the temperature of the steak rises above a certain limit (+140°C), the 
constituents of the steak—various sugars and amino acids—react with 
each other to produce a variety of molecules responsible for a range 
of pleasant flavours and aromas. This is known as the Maillard reac-
tion. The details are not essential to our story, but for those interested 
see McGee (2004: 778–9). For my purposes, what the reader should 
remember for the discussion that follows is that Glennan describes pro-
duction in the following terms: interaction between two particulars (the 
skillet and steak) is the cause to the changes occurring in the particulars 
(special focus on the reactions between the constituents of the steak), 
and that both the interaction and the ensuing changes are processual 
rather than Kim-style events.
Precipitating production is ‘the way in which one or more events pro-
duce another event […] by creating start-up conditions for a different 
mechanism’ (2017: 182). The steak being placed on the skillet is given 
as an example of an event that creates the start-up conditions for the 
Maillard reaction in the steak.
Finally, chained production is a connection between events between 
which there exists a chain of intermediary precipitating events. We might 
say that the connection between someone buying a steak and eating it is a 
series of precipitating events starting with grabbing the steak at the store, 
putting it in the carrier bag, carrying it home, putting it onto the skillet, 
browning it, placing it on the plate, and finally eating it.
Is Glennan’s account an improvement on previous accounts? I think 
so. It stresses that causation is at rock bottom a process of production 
in which propertied objects interact to change each other rather than 
merely a relation between Kim-style events. In doing so he implicitly 
takes sides with Salmon (1980) and myself (Ingthorsson 2002), as well as 
Chakravartty (2005) and Mumford & Anjum (2011), in saying that the 
kind of relational account offered by Hall (2004) and Esfeld (2011) isn’t 
enough. But in so far as he moves beyond Salmon’s account, it is mainly 
by way of going into greater detail about the changes that happen intrin-
sically to the objects as a result of their interaction, i.e. what happens in 
the steak when it interacts with the skillet. That puts increased focus on 
what happens intrinsically to objects.
In anticipation of what follows in the next chapter, then my complaint 
is that while Glennan’s account—in its abstract form—verges on being 
identical to the account I offer in ‘Causal Production as Interaction’ 
(Ingthorsson 2002), then in the way he concretely illustrates it he appears 
to be at least implicitly influenced by the idea that causation involves 
unidirectional influence. He thinks the skillet influences the steak unidi-
rectionally (or at least more than the other way around):
What makes this a productive activity is, in the first instance, the fact 
that the activity of searing produces changes in the steak and, to a 
lesser extent, the pan. Let us focus on the change that matters for the 
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cook: searing both browns and cooks the steak; it also releases oil, 
water, and other compounds from the steak.
(Glennan 2017: 180)
It should be admitted that I find the unidirectionality in Glennan’s account 
less explicit than in other accounts, or rather, it can be read as verging on 
a proper reciprocal understanding. It is mentioned that something does 
happen to the skillet, but this is somehow a ‘lesser’ consequence than 
what happens to the steak, or at least less important to us. However, as I 
will argue in the next chapter, the risk is that the reason the effects on the 
skillet are judged to be ‘lesser’ are anthropocentric. We care what hap-
pens to the steak, but not too much about what happens to the skillet; 
but does the universe care more about steaks than skillets? It also ignores 
that what the reciprocality of physical interactions tells us, as described 
by physics, is that, in terms of the abstract quantity of influence we call 
‘force’, the skillet is influenced in the same quantity as the steak; the skil-
let cools down as much as the steak heats up. The difference is the char-
acteristics of the change that this same quantity of influence has on skillet 
vs. steak; the influence that will change the temperature of the steak to 
the degree that it becomes seared will also change the temperature of the 
skillet to the same degree, but will not make the skillet tasty. Now, while 
the cooling of the skillet is usually less important to us, sometimes it is 
quite annoying. If we put too much meat on the skillet in one go, the 
temperature may drop below what is required to produce the Maillard 
reaction and the meat will cook instead of being seared. That is a disaster 
in any gourmand’s mind (Gordon Ramsey will give any sous-chef a hid-
ing that makes a mistake like that).
The novelty of Glennan’s account lies mainly in the characterisation of 
constitutive production. Without it, precipitating production would be 
equivalent to the kind of relational realist view offered by Hall (2004) 
and Esfeld (2011). After all, chained production is really just a succession 
of precipitating productions, and precipitating production is a succes-
sion of constitutive production. Arguably, constitutive production is an 
elaboration on Salmon’s idea of production, but then Glennan focuses 
not so much on what Salmon calls propagation, i.e. the preservation of a 
status quo in the object when it is not interacting, but more on the intrin-
sic changes of the particulars when they interact, and then looks at the 
more coarse-grained structure of the world in terms of precipitating and 
chained production that is grounded on the close-knit structure of consti-
tutive productions. This is a reasonable thing to do from a pragmatic per-
spective, in our attempt to make sense of what is happening to us and the 
world we live in. We need to make a difference between what happens on 
the scale where nicotine molecules cause the destruction of organic cells 
in the alveola of the lungs (constitutive production), the scale at which 
that destruction causes a person to cough (precipitating production), and 
the scale at which smoking causes cancer (chained production). It is a 
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shift in perspective from the genuine proximate causes and effects to the 
distal causes that emerge on a larger scale, and yet it all boils down in the 
end to the close-knit structure of proximate/constitutive causation that 
constitutes precipitating and chained production. Indeed, Glennan points 
out that when we start to talk about chained production, we don’t get 
clear linear chains, but intertwining chains of precipitating production 
(which are themselves constituted by chains of constitutive production).
Glennan moves in many ways beyond Salmon’s account, but I miss 
the distinction between production and propagation. Production, on 
Salmon’s account, are instances of disruption and change in the causal 
processes, and Glennan goes into minute details over what happens in 
one of the causal processes involved. Propagation, on the other hand, are 
periods during which the object stays the same in the respects relevant 
for any changes that happen later when it again interacts with another 
causal process. Propagation is not explicitly accounted for in Glennan’s 
account, either in terms of chained or precipitating causation. Salmon 
stresses that causal processes, i.e. particulars, are continuously chang-
ing even through periods of propagation, but they must still be able to 
preserve a certain structure through that change. Now, I would not say 
that Salmon gives an account of propagation, but he at least acknowl-
edges that this seems to be an important feature of the causal structure 
of the world. In Chapter 6, I will argue that what Salmon describes as 
propagation is a causal phenomenon, but one that should be cashed out 
as a combination of constitution and persistence. Indeed, I will argue that 
sometimes constitutive causation produces persistence.
To conclude, what is missing from Glennan’s account is the same thing 
missing from the processual version of the transmission theory. How do 
we explain the exertion of influence or transference of energy between 
interacting objects? There is no other causal mechanism implied other 
than what can be understood as transference of energy. As I have already 
said, that is a mechanism that doesn’t generalise to all the cases. I also 
think Glennan doesn’t address the propagation side of things, what hap-
pens within an object between interactions when it stays the same.
This completes my discussion of contemporary attempts to say some-
thing about causal production while remaining true to the empiricist 
framework. Now it is time to address those authors that, like Glennan, 
think that causation must be seen as a continuous process rather than as 
a relation between events, but who also reject the constraints on specula-
tion imposed by the empiricist tradition; those that talk of powers.
3.6  Causation as a Continuous Process of Production
There are a few friends of powers that, like Glennan, explicitly reject a 
relational characterisation of causation and suggest instead that causa-
tion is a continuous process (for instance, Ingthorsson 2002; Huemer 
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& Kovitz 2003; Chakravartty 2005; Mumford & Anjum 2011: Ch. 5). 
What these writers have in common is that they characterise effects as 
beginning at the same time as the cause begins, and both take time to be 
completed (wherefore, like Glennan, they deny that the causal relata are 
Kim-style events). They also take powers to be central to our understand-
ing of causation (for Huemer & Kovitz the appeal to powers is implicit). 
What is different is that Ingthorsson and Huemer & Kovitz, as well as 
Chakravartty, consistently talk of objects as exerting influence on each 
other, while Mumford & Anjum talk of powers doing all the work to 
jointly bring about an effect, which in turn is again to be accounted for in 
terms of powers (this will turn out to be a decisive difference in Chapter 5). 
Huemer & Kovitz, as well as myself, appeal to a greater degree on the 
manner in which interactions are described in classical mechanics, while 
Chakravartty, Mumford & Anjum, are more prone to appeal to everyday 
examples, like sugar dissolving in water. As for the ancestry of such ideas 
in the history of philosophy, then Chakravartty and Mumford & Anjum 
appeal to individual thinkers that have entertained similar ideas, mainly 
to Kant’s discussion of simultaneous causation in the Second Analogy of 
Experience in Critique of Pure Reason (1787), and to Hobbes’ discussion 
in ‘Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body’ (1656). Like me, Huemer 
and Kovitz appeal to a view we find implicit in classical physics. What I 
want to argue now is that the kind of powerful particulars we are now 
developing as a novelty was actually the received view across the board 
of philosophical traditions well into the Early Modern period.
3.7  The Standard View
It is possible to extract from the causal realist tradition a view of causal 
production that has been circulating in philosophy at least since Aristotle, 
and about which there was a rough agreement among all the materialist 
schools of thought, with slight modifications and variations. I will call it 
the standard view. My characterisation of this standard view is extracted 
from the way the causal realist tradition is rendered in the works of 
Johnson (1924), Bunge (1979, especially Ch. 2), Dorothy Emmett (1985), 
Johansson (1989/2004, especially Ch. 12), Dilworth (1996), and Susan 
Peppers-Bates (2009), as well as in the works of individual thinkers like 
Aristotle, Hobbes (1656), and Locke (1689). This view can even be dis-
cerned in Kant (1787), as an account of how causation appears in the 
field of apperception.
I discern two main variations to the common theme. First, that while 
Aristotle listed four different kinds of ‘causes’—material, formal, effi-
cient, and final (Physics: Bk. 2, 3)—the competing schools, and even later 
Aristotelians, tended to be sceptical to final causes. Hobbes, for instance, 
argued that there was no intrinsic purpose to the behaviour of inanimate 
objects, but allowed that intentional agents could initiate actions in order 
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to achieve a certain goal. Intentions could therefore possibly count as 
a kind of ‘final cause’ (Hobbes: 1656: Ch. X, sect. 7). However, inten-
tions are physically inefficacious mental entities, and therefore can only 
make a difference to the world by accompanying and guiding the physi-
cal actions of an Agent. We can intend to drink water all we want, but 
unless we reach out a hand and lift a glass to our mouths, our intention 
will not be fulfilled. Hobbes therefore concluded that final causes should 
be understood as physical actions guided with intention, and therefore 
count as a sub-class of efficient causes, only present in interactions involv-
ing intentional agents. Jonathan Lowe (2006b) and Uwe Meixner (2008) 
have recently expressed similar views about the role of the will in guiding 
physical actions.
Second, the concept of formal cause arguably changed to exclude the 
Aristotelian notion of ‘essence’, to include only the accidental properties 
of objects, often conceived of as mechanical powers though still described 
in much the same way that Aristotle often talks of powers as active and 
passive. For these reasons, I hesitate to attach the name ‘Aristotelian’ 
to the standard view, although it is clearly continuous with it in many 
ways. Indeed, one could argue that much of what today counts as ‘neo- 
Aristotelian’ isn’t so much a revival of Aristotle’s original view but of 
what could better be described as a rational realist mix of Aristotelian 
and mechanistic ideas; what I call the ‘standard view’. However, I don’t 
mind calling myself neo-Aristotelian, having noted some of the qualifica-
tions that go into that term.
While final causes tend to be excluded from the standard view, the 
other three Aristotelian causes are usually included, albeit in a slightly 
modified form. The material cause can roughly be understood as the 
material entity on which the efficient cause acts, and which provides the 
raw material out of which the effect is produced. The qualitative charac-
ter of the effect is determined by the properties of the efficient cause and 
the properties of the material entity on which it acts, those properties 
together roughly constituting the formal cause. The efficient cause is then 
the actual exertion of influence of one material entity on another as they 
interact. These three components are needed to characterise the produc-
tion of effects in the world of inanimate material objects, while the issue 
of whether the production is done in order to achieve a goal, or a good, is 
only relevant in cases where there are intentional agents involved, acting 
with a purpose.
According to the standard view, then, new states of affairs are brought 
into existence when an already existing material body, or complex of 
bodies, changes due to an external influence without which the change 
would not have occurred, and the new state of affairs never had existed. 
The kernel of this view comes out clearly in the slogan ‘whatever comes 
to be is necessarily born by the action of a cause’; very likely a paraphrase 
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of Aristotle’s claim that ‘in all cases of production there is something 
that is produced, something by which it is produced and something from 
which it is produced’ (Metaphysics: 7, 7; 189), and/or Plato’s claim that 
‘every thing that becomes or changes must do so owing to some cause; for 
nothing can come to be without a cause’ (Timaeus: 28a). Typically, the 
external influence, or cause, is depicted in terms of an ‘extrinsic motive 
Agent’ (or, simply, Agent), basically some object possessing causal pow-
ers, which acts upon another object, that object sometimes referred to by 
the term Patient since it lacks a similar active power but is instead able to 
passively receive the influence exerted by an Agent. Accordingly, a cause 
is the action of some object upon another object, and an effect is the 
change produced in the object acted upon; or, in other words, a cause is 
the exertion of influence by an Agent upon a Patient and an effect is the 
resulting change in the Patient.
When I say that a cause is the action of an Agent upon a Patient, then 
one should not understand the standard view as saying that a cause is 
merely the action of the Agent, but the interaction between Agent and 
Patient; the passive powers of the Patient are equally important to deter-
mine the outcome of the interaction. It is this interaction that I identify 
with a process of production. In other words, the standard view depicts 
causal production as involving three components: (i) the material causes, 
which comprise the Agent and Patient conceived of as material bodies, 
(ii) the formal causes, which are the powers of the Agent and Patient, and 
(iii) the efficient cause, which is the actual exertion of influence by the 
Agent on the Patient.
The three components are intimately connected to three fundamental 
principles about natural reality. The first is the materialistic thesis that 
nothing comes into being out of nothing or is ever completely annihi-
lated. Craig Dilworth calls it the principle of (the perpetuity of) substance 
(1996: 53), while Bunge uses the term genetic principle (1979: 24). The 
latter captures well what I think is the core idea at play, notably that 
everything has a natural origin; everything comes into being through 
the alteration of some already existing natural entity from one state to 
another, due to the influence of some other already existing natural entity. 
This principle embodies the conviction that there is no magic in the world.
The second principle is the belief that physical action is a distinguish-
ing mark of causal change in the natural world, i.e. any kind of influence 
exerted by one object upon another. I propose to call it the principle 
of action instead of what it is usually called, notably the causal prin-
ciple (Bunge 1979: 26), or the principle of causality (Dilworth 1996: 57). 
The reason for this change of name is that the principle of causality is 
today understood very generally as the claim that ‘there is a cause to 
everything’, and where it is left entirely open what can count as a cause; 
even neo-Humean regularity can fit the bill. However, in the causal realist 
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tradition it is without doubt the exertion of influence that distinguishes 
causal from non-causal determination.
The third principle expresses the conviction that the world changes in 
a regular and determinate way, depending on the properties of the objects 
involved. This is often taken to be equivalent to the belief that the world 
behaves according to natural laws. That is why Bunge calls it the prin-
ciple of lawfulness (Bunge 1979: 26), but it is also called the principle of 
the uniformity of nature (Dilworth 1996: 55). It is important to point out 
that this principle does not entail a commitment to the existence of some 
kind of abstract entities, the laws, which somehow rule the behaviour 
of concrete entities. The principle is equally compatible with the idea—
explicitly incorporated into the Aristotelian view—that objects behave in 
certain ‘patterns of being and becoming’ in virtue of their intrinsic and 
universal properties, patterns that we can express in highly generalised 
law-statements (Bunge 1979: sect. 10.1). That is, the principle is just as 
compatible with immanent realism—and therefore with powers-based 
metaphysics—as it is with Platonism about laws. Indeed, when Mumford 
rejects laws, he is really saying that whatever uniformity there is in nature 
(and he believes it to be an imperfect uniformity) it is determined by the 
intrinsic powers of the particulars and not by general laws that directly 
rule the behaviour of the particulars, or indirectly rule them by determin-
ing the causal role of the powers that the particulars bear (Mumford 
2005). Anyhow, the three principles described above form the metaphysi-
cal framework on which the standard view rests.
Although strictly speaking irrelevant here, it bears mentioning that a 
Platonist rendering of the principle of the uniformity of nature is only 
compatible with the genetic principle (everything has a natural origin) 
if we interpret abstract entities as natural entities. But then again, how 
such entities can meddle with physical interactions in which influence 
is exerted is a further difficulty. This is a point of disagreement between 
immanent realists and Platonists.
There are two salient features of the standard view that I would par-
ticularly like to emphasise, because they stand in stark contrast to more 
recent powers-based accounts. First, that it depicts causal influence as 
something that is exerted by an Agent on a Patient. In other words—and 
this is critical for understanding the main point of this book—the stan-
dard view depicts actions as occurring between persistent objects, not 
between events or states, not even when events are understood Kim-style 
as consisting of a particular (or particulars) with certain properties at a 
certain time, i.e. ‘a-is-F-at-t1’. Second, that it does not depict effects as the 
product solely of the action of the Agent, but of the sum total of mate-
rial, formal, and efficient causes; the effect is depicted as the product of 
the way two or more material bodies act on each other in virtue of their 
powers to produce a change in those very bodies. Let me explain.
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3.8  Action or Influence in the Standard View
The idea that influence is exerted between objects runs counter to what 
has been the mainstream view in philosophy for at least the last century, 
notably that actions occur between events. It takes some effort to sort 
out the crooked route by which philosophy converted from what used to 
be the standard view—that objects act on each other—to the view that a 
certain kind of event, called the ‘cause’, acts on a temporally distinct but 
contiguous event, called the ‘effect’. But, as the following quotes from 
Hobbes show, it is clear that at the beginning of the 17th century the 
standard view was still alive and well:
A body is said to work upon or act, that is to say, do something to 
another body, when it either generates or destroys some accident in 
it: and the body in which an accident is generated or destroyed is said 
to suffer, that is, to have something done to it by another body; as 
when one body by putting forwards another body generates motion 
in it, it is called an AGENT; and the body in which motion is so 
generated, is called the PATIENT; so fire that warms the hand is the 
Agent, and the hand, which is warmed, is the Patient. That accident, 
which is generated in the Patient, is called the EFFECT.
(Hobbes 1656: Part II, Ch. IX, sect. 1)
What Hobbes says entails that a Kim-style event e1 existing at t1 cannot 
possibly act on an effect e2 existing at t2, because that effect does not 
exist until the Agent has worked its influence on the Patient to provoke 
a change in the Patient, thus bringing the effect into existence. Whatever 
influence is transmitted from cause to effect must be mediated through 
the Patient. Indeed, Hobbes continues to say ‘when an Agent and Patient 
are contiguous to one another, their action and passion are then said to 
be immediate, otherwise, mediate’ (Hobbes 1656: Part II, Ch. IX, sect. 2). 
The contiguity of which Hobbes speaks is spatial contiguity, not tempo-
ral contiguity; it is the spatial contiguity of two continuously coexistent 
objects. This is still the basic idea behind the so-called principle of local-
ity, the conviction that objects can only interact with their immediate 
surroundings.
Arguably, the reason philosophy stopped talking of influence being 
exerted between objects and began talking about influence being exerted 
between events has to do with the empiricist reduction of material, final, 
and formal causes (including the notion of powers). That shift had only 
just begun when Hobbes was writing. Indeed, Hobbes is contemporary 
with Galileo and Bacon, and earlier than Newton, wherefore we can 
place his works in the very early stages of the scientific revolution (for 
reference, see Shapin 1996). Hobbes is critical to final causes and reduces 
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formal causes to the accidents (which he takes to be powers) of the things 
involved, but retains the idea of causation involving the exertion of influ-
ence between an Agent and Patient. The development of modern science 
and the rise of a corresponding empirically minded philosophy in the 
years following Hobbes’ work challenged the standard view even more, 
leaving in the end only the notion of efficient cause, but in a modified 
sense.
Following Bunge, the empiricist reduction of the Aristotelian causes 
to just ‘efficient cause’ was motivated on the following grounds: (i) that 
the efficient cause was the only clearly conceived cause, (ii) that therefore 
only the efficient cause was mathematically expressible, (iii) that only 
the efficient cause could be assigned an observable correlate, notably, 
an event (usually a motion) related to another event (another motion) 
in accordance with fixed rules (i.e. laws of motion), and (iv) that as a 
consequence only the efficient cause was controllable in a manner that 
made possible the harnessing of nature, which was the sole aim of science 
according to Bacon’s instrumentalism (Bunge 1979: 32–3).
In the process, the empiricists not only reduced the notion of ‘cause’ 
to ‘efficient cause’, but also substantially modified the notion of efficient 
cause from the one we see in Hobbes. To later empiricists, the trans-
mission of influence from an Agent to a Patient, and the powers that 
were meant to determine the nature of such influence, were mysterious 
because they were unobservable and hence a mere metaphysical fic-
tion. So, for instance, Hume argued we have no impression of the force 
exerted between two objects, but we can observe the changes in the state 
of motion from before to after the objects become contiguous. Similarly, 
Hertz defined the notion of Force, not as influence exerted by one object 
on another, but as the observed effect of such (alleged) exertion of influ-
ence, notably as ‘the independently conceived effect which one of two 
coupled systems […] exerts upon the motion of the other’ (1956: 185). 
Compare this to Newton’s definition of ‘impressed force’ in the Scholium 
to the Principia: ‘An impressed force is an action exerted upon a body, in 
order to change its state, either of rest, or of moving uniformly forward 
in right line’ (1686: Bk. I, Definition IV). Newton clearly thought of force 
not as the resulting change in the state of motion, but as the cause to that 
change, and he thought of the force as being exerted on a body, not on 
an event. The event later thinkers identify with the effect, i.e. the change 
of state of motion, alternatively the resultant state of motion, is here con-
ceived of as the result of an impressed force between bodies, but not as 
the proximate recipient of that force.
Following the empiricist reduction of influence to just lawfully con-
nected changes, the efficient cause—formerly the action of Agent on 
Patient—came to be understood merely in terms of some observable cor-
relate, usually the motion of an object preceding a contact with another 
object. Effectually, the notion of efficient cause was thus transformed into 
an observable behaviour (e1) that was predictably followed by another 
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behaviour (e2) according to fixed laws of motion. This is a conception of 
efficiency in which the notion of ‘influence’ is at best implicit in the man-
ner in which the laws of motion predict changes (or observed differences) 
in some observed quantities. However, we are getting closer to a concep-
tion of causation as an event e1 being followed by another event e2; one 
in which it is perhaps implicitly assumed that the relation between them 
somehow involves the exertion of influence of something on something 
else, but where that component is not spelled out. Since it is not explic-
itly specified how that influence is exerted, and any speculation about it 
is sure to be judged as metaphysical speculation, then we can easily see 
how people may have come to think of the relation between e1 and e2 as 
somehow involving the exertion of influence by e1 on e2, even if that is not 
really spelled out. I take it to be the task of causal realists to reintroduce a 
substantial account of causal influence, but they have to put it in its right 
place; between objects, not events.
3.9  Two Types of Empiricism
It is worth noting that empiricism comes in two very different flavours: 
realist vs. anti-realist empiricism. On the one hand we have realists like 
Locke and Hobbes who clearly think we can know about the world 
through experience, and only through experience (see, for instance, Locke 
1689: Ch. 26; Hobbes 1656: Ch. 1). For them causation is a connection 
in nature that involves the production of effects by causes, although they 
believe also that our understanding of this connection must be inferred 
in a rational manner from the content of the ideas of sensation, and the 
manner in which they were presented to our minds as a result of the influ-
ence of the objects on our senses.
Anti-realists like Berkeley (1709: §§ 41, 71) and Hume (1739: 8–13) 
deny that experience allows us knowledge of an external reality, and deny 
that rational reflection can make up for the deficiencies of our senses, 
and therefore take causation to be a mere psychological link between 
impressions/ideas in the mind from which nothing can be inferred about 
objects that caused those impressions/ideas. As Bunge observes, Berkeley 
and Hume gave birth to the idea—still widely present in the empiricist 
tradition—that causation is not an ontological but a purely epistemologi-
cal category (1979: § 1.1.2). Indeed, some neo-Humeans argue it is an 
epistemic/conceptual category that we project on a world in which the 
corresponding ontological category is absent.
However influential the empirical anti-realists have been, they haven’t 
persuaded every empiricist that empirical knowledge of the world is 
impossible. J.S. Mill, like Locke, clearly thinks of causation as an onto-
logical category involving production, although he too wants to make 
sense of that category in empiricist terms (Mill 1843: Ch. 5). However, I 
worry that the conflict between these different flavours of empiricism is 
not yet resolved, with the result that arguments that really depend on the 
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Berkeleyan/Humean rejection of experience as a way of knowing about 
the world—for instance, Hume’s discussion of causation and properties 
(see §3 in the previous chapter)—are used and accepted by empiricists 
who do not accept the rejection of the possibility of knowledge of an 
external reality.
To appreciate the difference between realist and anti-realist empiricism, 
consider the role played by the notion of ‘contiguity’ in Hume’s analysis 
of causation, compared to anyone thinking of causation as a connec-
tion in nature. Contiguity, in the ontological sense, is a constraint on the 
exertion of influence in accordance with what is known as the principle 
of locality, the idea that things only act on their immediate surround-
ings because influence has to be mediated by some material substrate; no 
object can exert an influence on nothing, nor can influence be transmitted 
by nothing across empty space. Originally—in accordance with the idea 
that actions occur between bodies—this constraint had to do with spa-
tial contiguity, as we already discussed in relation to Hobbes. However, 
according to Hume the notion of action or force has no empirical con-
tent and, in his analysis of causation, contiguity therefore only serves as 
a condition for the psychological association of two events or bodies in 
perception; it is a mere psychological trigger. It just so happens that we 
are equipped with a principle of association that creates a conceptual 
link between those objects of perception that appear to be spatially and 
temporally contiguous. For Hume it is entirely beside the point whether 
they really are contiguous because their contiguity has nothing to do with 
influence passing between them.
3.10  A Return to the Empiricist Reduction of Causes
To repeat, under the influence of empiricism the expression ‘efficient 
cause’ no longer came to mean ‘influence exerted by Agent on Patient 
on contact’ but instead came to mean more specifically ‘observable 
behaviour of object prior to becoming contiguous with another object’. 
Likewise, the effect was no longer understood as ‘change in Patient as 
result of the exertion of influence’ but instead as ‘observable behaviour 
of object after becoming contiguous with another object’. Consequently, 
realist empiricists that wanted to retain the notion of ‘action’ as an intel-
ligible notion were required to treat ‘action’ in terms of the precedent 
motion of one object (the observable correlate of influence) and ‘effect’ 
as the subsequent motion of another object (the observable correlate of 
the reception of influence). In other words, efficient causation came to be 
considered either as the passing over from cause to effect of some observ-
able quantity, such as motion, or as a mere relation between motions. 
This idea is at the core of contemporary transmission accounts of causa-
tion (Kitcher 1989; Dowe 1992; Kistler 1998).
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Arguably, whereas in philosophy the reduction of the idea that objects 
act on each other to the idea that causation is just a succession of observ-
able behaviour was fairly successful, it didn’t impact as strongly on the 
scientific community. Just consider the following passage from James 
Clerk Maxwell in 1877:
The mutual action between two portions of matter receives differ-
ent names according to the aspect under which it is studied, and this 
aspect depends on the extent of the material system which forms 
the subject of our attention. […] if we confine our attention to one 
of the portions of matter, we see, as it were, only one side of the 
transaction—namely, that which affects the portion of matter under 
our consideration—and we call this aspect of the phenomenon, with 
reference to its effect, an External Force acting on that portion of 
matter. The other aspect of the stress is called the Reaction on the 
other portion of matter.
(1877: 26–7)
To Maxwell, influence is clearly exerted between two portions of matter, 
and not between events.
Everything is not always so clear-cut, though. For instance, we find that 
in classical mechanics the term ‘action’ is used in two different ways, one 
corresponding to the empiricist idea that action is the behaviour of an 
object prior to an interaction, and the other that action is the influence 
exerted by one object on another during an interaction. According to the 
former, ‘action’ denotes the sum of the kinetic energy of an object over an 
interval of time, whether or not that object actually influences anything 
else. This use complies with the idea that actions are to be identified with 
the motion of an object prior to an interaction. It is in this sense physicists 
may sometimes talk of pure motion as an ‘action’, but as Hertz observed:
the name ‘action’ for the integral in the text has often been con-
demned as unsuitable […] these names suggest conceptions which 
have nothing to do with the objects they denote [in mechanics, RI]. 
It is difficult to see how the summation of the energies existing at dif-
ferent times could yield anything else than a quantity for calculation. 
(1956: 228)
The other understanding of ‘action’—the way Maxwell uses the term—
refers to the exertion of force that occurs on contact between objects. 
Basically, the first sense of ‘action’ is of the energy acquired by an object 
as the result of a change in its state of motion and which is then preserved 
in the object over time as long as nothing acts on it. Salmon would call 
this propagation. The second sense of ‘action’ is of the influence exerted to 
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produce a change in the state of motion of another object, which complies 
more clearly with the earlier standard conception of efficient cause. This is 
what Salmon calls production and Glennan calls constitutive production.
In any case, it is the empiricists’ refusal to deal with anything other 
than observable events—this holds for realist and anti-realist empiricists 
alike—that motivated the shift in conception of efficient causation, such 
that actions came to be intuitively thought of as the exertion of influ-
ence by an event on another event (of one motion on another, as it were) 
rather than the exertion of influence by an object on another object. In 
light of this development it is ironic that in physics today—as it always 
has, really—actions (in the latter sense of ‘action’ discussed above) are 
still taken to occur between bodies, not events (see Resnick, Halliday, & 
Krane 2002: Ch. 3), while philosophers, even those who argue in favour 
of the reality of forces, will insist that talk of forces acting between bodies 
is a derivative manner of speaking. This comes out clearly in the follow-
ing passage by Bigelow, Ellis, & Pargetter, in a paper where they aim to 
develop a realist conception of forces as causes:
Often, we speak of forces as operating between, not events or states, 
but objects. On our view, this is a legitimate but derivative mode of 
expression. The primary relation holds between events or states; and 
in virtue of this primary relation there will be various derivative, 
indirect relations holding between the various salient individuals 
which are involved in the events.
(Bigelow, Ellis, & Pargetter 1988: 624)
The authors are actually claiming that physics is wrong to speak of forces 
operating between bodies. However, as far as I can see, philosophy is the 
only intellectual discipline that insists on forces operating between events 
rather than bodies.
There are other things to worry about in this brief passage, which relates 
to what I have previously discussed. For instance, they claim that the rela-
tionship holding between spatially contiguous bodies at t1 is derivative of 
a relation that holds between the event of their becoming contiguous at 
t1 and an ensuing event or state at t2. However, since these authors agree 
that causation involves the bringing into existence of effects by causes, 
then at t1 there is no future state at t2 to which the contiguous objects at 
t1 could stand in a causal relation or which they could exert an influence 
on. Are they saying that the relationships between the contiguous bodies 
existing at t1 only become causal once they have ceased to exist, notably 
at t2?
To my mind, the idea that the relationships holding between interact-
ing particulars is derivative of relationships between events makes little 
sense unless one also assumes that events are the fundamental building 
blocks of reality and therefore the primary bearers of powers. On the 
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basis of the citation above from Esfeld, seen in isolation from the rest of 
his writing, it would be possible to interpret him as thinking of events 
as the fundamental building blocks and the bearers of powers, but this 
would conflict with other passages in which he talks about charge and 
mass as powers of particles and not of the events in which those particles 
partake. Arguably, Esfeld resorts to talk about events exerting powers 
when discussing causation because it is a convenient choice in the current 
philosophical discourse, where events are by default treated as the relata 
of causation. However, he reverts back to talk of powers being the prop-
erties of things when discussing the nature of properties, because that is 
the received way of thinking about properties and their bearers. The most 
reasonable conclusion, from the perspective of substance ontology, is that 
events are epiphenomenal entities; they only exist in so far as substances 
are doing one thing or another. I’ll qualify that claim in Chapter 7.
I find it difficult to see that the idea that forces operate between events, 
or that events exert influence on each other, is anything other than a 
philosophical eccentricity that is the consequence of a temporary phase 
in the philosophical tradition, during which it was believed that sensory 
data was the only intelligible content of thoughts. As far as I can tell, 
none of the major schools of thought before the rise of empiricism con-
ceived of actions occurring between events. The Aristotelians, Stoics, and 
Scholastics took actions to occur between two material objects whose 
relation is synchronous. Similarly, the Atomists, both ancient and mod-
ern, assumed that the atoms impinge on each other and thus change each 
other’s state of motion, and this is still a standard understanding in par-
ticle physics. In the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, they are not trying 
to accelerate events to smash them into other events; they try to accel-
erate high-energy particles to make them smash together. In chemistry 
the assumption is that various substances react with each other. Oxygen 
reacts with some fuel to combust; oxygen does not react with combus-
tion. Furthermore, the common sense conception is that bodies act on 
each other: the leaden ball dropped upon a pillow acts on the pillow to 
make a hollow (the falling doesn’t act upon the forming of a hollow); 
the horse pulls the cart (not: the motion of the horse pulls the motion of 
the cart); the brick hits the window (not: the motion of the brick hits the 
breaking of the window). I find no other source of the idea that events 
influence other events than the reduction of the Aristotelian notion of 
efficient causation to what was believed to be the observable correlates 
of cause and effect, i.e. motion before and after two objects become con-
tiguous. But, this means that the idea that actions occur between events 
clearly originates from a tradition that wanted to remove the notion of 
influence and substitute it with observed regularity. Causal realists should 
better avoid this conception of causal influence.
To illustrate fully how the idea that influence is exerted between events 
has infiltrated philosophy, consider that the scholastic term ‘transeunt 
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causation’ is used today, in certain circles at least, to denote event causa-
tion and then in explicit contrast to Agent causation, in the belief that 
this follows the medieval use. The opposite is the case. Malebranche 
presented Suarez’s notion of transeunt causation as when ‘the action 
is in some way distinct in reality from the material cause that receives 
the effect’, and immanent cause as an action ‘received in the operating 
thing itself … received in the same faculty by which it is elicited’ (from 
Oeuvres Complètes de Malebranche, translated citation from Susan 
Peppers-Bates 2009: 108). W.E. Johnson drew the distinction between 
transeunt/immanent, in the correct medieval form, as action between 
continuants vs. within a continuant (1924: xxiii–xxiv), as did C.D. 
Broad following Johnson (1968: 78), and also Dorothy Emmet who 
claims that medieval philosophers derived the distinction from Aristotle 
(1985: 77). Emmett traces the origin of the misconception about tran-
seunt causation to Chisholm’s decision to use the term to denote event 
causation in contrast with agent causation (Chisholm 1966). To be fair, 
the blame is on his readers, because Chisholm admits that he may not 
be using the term in the original medieval sense. However, today, due to 
Chisholm’s influence, transeunt causation is often understood as event 
causation.
According to the standard view, while a cause can in some way be con-
sidered an event, the event in question is not itself an entity that exerts 
an action on the effect; the event is the exertion of influence by an Agent 
on a Patient. In fact, it is not really possible to conceive of the efficient 
cause as an entity distinct from the material cause, nor of them as wholly 
distinct from the formal cause, because the efficient cause is the influence 
exerted by one material object on another, and the characteristics of this 
influence are determined by the powers of the objects involved; it all 
comes together as one unity in an interaction, every component depen-
dent on the other. It is in this sense that the standard view is a total cause 
conception; any effect is always the product of the nexus of efficient, 
material, and formal causes. Consequently, the necessary connection—if 
there is one—should be looked for in the connection between the total 
cause and its product, not between the efficient cause alone and the effect. 
Indeed, that is exactly where Hobbes thinks a necessary connection is to 
be found:
an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the Agents 
how many soever they be, and of the Patient, put together; which 
when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood 
but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any one of 
them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not 
produced. 
(Hobbes 1656: Ch. X, § 3)
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The conclusion is that the standard view characterises influence as occur-
ring between objects, not events, and the necessitating cause as the sum 
total of causal factors present in an interaction between an Agent on a 
Patient. There is, however, a very serious problem with this view, first 
clearly identified by Bunge (1979) and later elaborated on by myself 
(Ingthorsson 2002, 2007, 2019), notably that it is in a certain sense 
incompatible with modern physics. This problem is the subject of the 
next chapter.
As I argue in Chapter 3, although contemporary causal realists often 
appeal to the notion of causal production, they don’t really say too much 
about what exactly it is. They list what they think are the ingredients, but 
I find there are gaps and faults in the description of the process leading 
from input to output. Furthermore, they seem unaware of the detailed 
account of causal production—the standard view—that has been around 
at least since Aristotle. However, the standard view has its problems. In 
this chapter I will illustrate these problems and develop my ideas on how 
the standard view can be modified to overcome them.
4.1  The Standard View: A Reminder
The core idea of what I call the standard view is that new states of affairs 
are brought into existence when an already existing material substance 
changes due to an external influence, without which the change would not 
have occurred, and the new state of affairs had never existed. Typically, 
the external influence, or cause, is depicted in terms of an object possess-
ing active causal powers, the Agent, which acts upon an object possessing 
passive powers, that object being called the Patient. Accordingly, a cause 
is the action of an Agent on a Patient, and an effect is the change pro-
duced in the Patient.
I emphasised three features of the standard view. First, that it depicts 
causal influence as something that is exerted between persistent par-
ticulars, not between events or states. Second, it depicts the exertion of 
influence as being unidirectional; it goes one-way from Agent to Patient. 
Finally, it does not identify causation with the action of the Agent alone, 
but with the way two or more material objects interact in virtue of their 
powers to produce a change in those very objects. In Hobbes’ words, ‘the 
efficient and material causes are both but partial causes, or parts of that 
cause, which in the next precedent article I called an entire cause’ (1656: 
Ch. IX, 4). It is this interaction between Agent and Patient—which is at 
the same time an exertion of influence between the two objects and a 
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change in those objects—that I identify with a process of production, 
and which I believe we should recognise as the instances comprising the 
ontological category of causation. However, since the standard view is 
partly mistaken about the exact nature of that interaction, it needs to be 
modified.
4.2  A Fundamental Flaw in the Standard View
As far as I can see, the standard view is incompatible with one particu-
lar finding of modern science—now accepted as fact—that unidirectional 
actions do not exist and that all physical interactions are instead thor-
oughly reciprocal; whenever one object exerts an influence on another, 
the other simultaneously exerts an influence of the same kind and of the 
same magnitude on the first. If this is true, we should infer that the stan-
dard view is false and that all notions deriving from or influenced by the 
idea of unidirectional actions—such as the concept of mutual manifesta-
tion and reciprocal disposition partners—risk being false by the same 
measure, in so far as they incorporate any aspect of the active/passive or 
Agent/Patient distinction.
Mario Bunge, in his book Causality, first published in 1959, was the 
first to note the above-mentioned incompatibility of the standard view 
with modern science. Later editions bore the title Causality and Modern 
Science, and all references in this book are to the third edition published 
in 1979. However, while Bunge came to the conclusion that the standard 
view is ontologically inadequate, he did not think a concept of causation 
based on interaction was viable. He suggested we keep the standard view 
as a methodologically useful approximation. Below, I will go through the 
details of Bunge’s critique of the standard view, and then argue that he 
is wrong to dismiss interaction as the fundamental feature of causation. 
The end result is a total cause conception based on interaction as the fun-
damental mechanism of causal production. I believe this view is compat-
ible with the theories and findings of natural science, establishes causal 
connections as necessary in two different ways (see Chapter 5), offers 
a way to understand constitution and persistence as causal phenomena 
(see Chapter 6), and which reduces the incompatibility of substance and 
process ontologies (see Chapter 7).
The idea that interactions are reciprocal is not new. It came to be estab-
lished as fact in conjunction with the acceptance of Newtonian mechan-
ics generally, and it is one of the features of classical physics that remains 
unchallenged by relativity and quantum physics. The exact sense in which 
interactions are reciprocal is expressed most clearly in the third law of 
motion:
 ThirdLawof Motion F F1on2 2on1:  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The novelty of my view is therefore not in the characterisation of interac-
tions as reciprocal, but in the suggestion that we can, and should, under-
stand causation in terms of interaction thus defined. To be more precise, 
it is new that such an idea is defended. Bunge considers the possibility 
but dismisses it.
The concept of interaction, as defined by classical mechanics, is one 
that philosophers constantly misunderstand, because of the connota-
tions that the terms ‘action’, ‘reaction’, and ‘interaction’ have in ordi-
nary language. It requires something of a shift of perspective to get a full 
grasp of the concepts. The claim ‘for every action an equal and opposite 
 reaction’—which is the essence of the third law of motion expressed in 
plain English—is familiar enough, but it is often misunderstood to mean 
that the terms ‘action’ and ‘reaction’ denote two ontologically different 
phenomena, of which the action comes first and provokes the reaction. 
In fact, it is often understood as saying that ‘for every influence transmit-
ted from A to B, A must lose as much as B gains’, which is really a ques-
tion of conflating classical mechanics with what the Scholastics called 
‘transeunt causation’, a forerunner to the transmission theory (see, for 
instance, Bennett 1974: 59; Le Poidevin 1988). In other words, the ‘reac-
tion’ is often understood as the effect of the action, and therefore it is 
assumed that ‘for every action a reaction’ states that effects react back on 
their causes. On this understanding, causes and effects interact, which is 
not at all how the third law is understood in science.
4.3  Colloquial Language vs. Science: ‘Action’, ‘Reaction’, and 
‘Interaction’
To begin with, let us become clear about what is meant by ‘action’ in this 
context. We are not talking about the behaviour of intentional Agents, 
i.e. our ‘actions’, nor are we talking generally about the motion of inani-
mate objects; we are only talking of the influence exerted by one object 
on another. The colloquial use of action is much broader. For instance, 
when a tennis player returns a ball across the net, we may describe every-
thing the player does from the moment she initiates the swing until the 
racket connects with the ball as an ‘action’. However, if by ‘action’ we 
mean ‘influence exerted by one object upon another’, then the racket only 
begins to act on the ball when they become contiguous. We unreflec-
tively think of the whole movement as an action upon the ball, because 
the swing is initiated and guided by the intention to strike the ball and 
because we think the power put into the entire swing is relevant for the 
outcome. The latter is in a sense true, but we have combined under one 
description what Salmon calls propagation and production.
Indeed, in an unreflective stance we are prone to think of the movement 
of a brick flying through the air, prior to its collision with a window, as 
a part of its ‘action’ upon the window. That is, as if that previous motion 
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involves a similar kind of effort as the muscle work of the tennis player. 
However, prior to actually touching the window, the brick exerts no influ-
ence upon it and exerts no effort to move through the air. Unaccelerated 
motion is not an action according to the law of inertia, which says that 
material bodies continue in their motion in the absence of forces. A mov-
ing object, unaffected by anything else, continues in its motion without 
having to ‘do’ anything about it. Uniform motion is really a state, a state 
of motion. We may say that the brick we threw ‘flies through the air’, as if 
it was actively engaged in some activity, but of course this is just a figure 
of speech. The brick only acts on the window in so far as it is exerting an 
influence on it, and that influence first begins on contact and ends as soon 
as they lose contact.
As already mentioned in Section 3.10, the above-mentioned ambiguity 
about action is actually found in the jargon of classical mechanics, not 
just in ordinary language. The term ‘action’ is used to denote the exertion 
of force in interactions between objects, and for the time integral of the 
kinetic energy of a material object, as taken between two times, whether 
or not that object exerts a force on anything. This may allow talk of uni-
form motion as an ‘action’. Hertz objected to this use of the term (1956: 
228), but with no noticeable effect. It is still used to denote the sum of the 
kinetic energy of an object. However, his objection is still valid and here 
I use the term ‘action’ only to denote the exertion of influence between 
objects in the former sense.
Let us turn to ‘interaction’ and ‘reaction’. In colloquial use, ‘interac-
tion’ refers to various types of communication where the parts take turns 
at affecting each other, e.g. in conversation when one person greets the 
other and the other ‘reacts’ with an appropriate response. Or, to use a 
somewhat construed example of communication, when boxers take turns 
delivering blows. This is not the kind of interaction I am talking about 
here. I am talking about the mutual exertion of influence between two 
objects as they come into connection with each other; when brick hits 
window, or glove meets face. The third law states that the window acts on 
the brick with a force of the same magnitude as the brick acts on the win-
dow, and the same goes for the face exerting a force on the gloved hand.
As for ‘reaction’, then it is popularly used to refer to the ensuing 
response to some influence, e.g. when someone ‘reacts’ to a greeting by 
greeting back or reacts to a blow to the head by wincing. In this use, 
‘reaction’ means ‘effect’ or ‘response’. In physics ‘reaction’ refers to the 
resistance immediately offered by a thing when it encounters another 
thing, e.g. the resistance offered by the window being hit. That is, ‘reac-
tion’ does not refer to the breaking of the window when it is hit by a 
brick; the breaking is an effect. It is the resistance offered by the window 
before, or while, it breaks that is a reaction. In the same way, wincing 
from a blow to the head is not a reaction but an effect. The immediate 
resistance offered by the face to the glove is a reaction, and it is felt in the 
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hand of the boxer and may well feel as painful as the blow to the head, 
say, if a bone breaks in the hand on impact.
4.4  Reciprocity of Interactions
Having clarified the relevant terms, let me explain in exactly what sense 
interactions are understood to be reciprocal, highlighting the most impor-
tant points by stating them as numbered proposals at the end of the argu-
ment for that particular point. I will then continue assuming the truth of 
that proposal. The first point, already established, is the scientific fact that 
whenever a material thing acts upon another thing, the thing acted upon 
reacts to that action:
(P1):  There are no actions without reactions.
The fact that the apparently passive recipient of an action does not merely 
‘react’ by suffering a change but by exerting an influence on the object 
that acts on it, is often neglected in discussions about causation. And yet 
it has been noted—most notably by Bunge—that the fact that there is 
always a reaction seriously threatens the standard view of causality:
A severe shortcoming of the strict doctrine of causality is that it dis-
regards the fact that all known actions are accompanied or followed 
by reactions […] In other words, the polarization of interaction 
into cause and effect, and the correlative polarization of interacting 
objects into Agents and Patients, is ontologically inadequate.
(Bunge 1979: 170–1)
The standard view is undermined because the ever-present reaction shows 
that there are no genuinely passive objects; there are no objects that only 
receive influence but do not in turn influence the object that influences 
them, nor are there substances that influence other things without being 
themselves affected in any way. This fact contradicts the supposed unidi-
rectionality of actions.
If P1 is correct, the standard view must be modified in some way to 
incorporate the reaction of the Patient. But will this decisively show that 
the relation between action and reaction is symmetrical? Can’t it be 
argued that, even if there is a reaction to every action, the reaction is pro-
duced or provoked by the action, and therefore counts as part of the effect 
produced by the action? Let me spell this objection out in concrete detail. 
According to P1, when a brick collides with a window, the brick acts 
upon the window and the window reacts to the brick, and both objects 
suffer a change: (i) the window breaks, and (ii) the brick changes its state 
of motion (i.e. its momentum, velocity, and kinetic energy). But is it pos-
sible to argue that it is the action of the brick that initiates everything, i.e. 
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provokes the reaction and so in effect produces both the breaking of the 
window and the change in the state of motion of the brick?
The action of the Agent has been considered to have causal pri-
ority mainly for two different but interrelated reasons: (i) because of 
the assumed distinction between active and passive substances, and (ii) 
because the action has been thought to be temporally prior to the reac-
tion. I find that when it has been pointed out that there are no genuinely 
‘passive’ substances, i.e. substances that merely receive influence but do 
not in turn influence other things, then the causal priority of actions 
over reactions depends on showing that the action is in some way tem-
porally prior to the reaction, either because the action begins prior to 
contact, or because the reaction is temporally retarded in relation to 
contact. How are you otherwise going to tell which one acts and which 
one reacts?
The idea that actions begin prior to contact presupposes that the motion 
of the Agent prior to the encounter is a part of its action upon the Patient, 
and this, as I argued above, is either to see it acting with a purpose that 
inanimate objects are incapable of having, or to conflate the two notions 
of ‘action’ described above: (i) action as exertion of influence, and (ii) 
action as a sum of the kinetic energy of an object over a period of time. 
Whatever uniform motion through space is, it is something different than 
the influence exerted by a thing upon another when they encounter one 
another. No influence is being exerted prior to contact.
The idea that the reaction is temporally retarded with respect to con-
tact requires that the thing acted upon initially ‘gives way’ to the intrusion 
of the other without offering any resistance. One could perhaps appeal 
to the way a rubber band initially offers little or no resistance when it is 
stretched, but successively the resistance increases. While examples of this 
kind may have some intuitive appeal when considering a rigid object in 
motion colliding with a soft, elastic body at rest, they don’t when consid-
ering a soft elastic body in motion colliding with a rigid body at rest. In 
the latter case it is obvious that the resting body resists the moving body 
from the first instant they gain contact with each other. And, on closer 
inspection, the former example is not as convincing as it may first appear 
to be. In order for the reaction to be temporally retarded, it is not enough 
that it is initially very small, but must be entirely absent, because if the 
reaction is initially very small, so is the action. It requires no large effort 
to begin to stretch a rubber band.
We may perhaps not arrive at decisive answers on this issue by consid-
ering common-sense examples, so let us consult the science. I am afraid 
the received scientific understanding leaves no leeway for an interpreta-
tion in which the reaction is provoked by the action. According to clas-
sical mechanics, action and reaction occur simultaneously in opposite 
directions, and both are of equal magnitude. This relationship is clearly 
expressed in the third law of motion, which says that whenever any 
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object whatsoever exerts a certain force on any other object, the latter 
always acts on the former with a force of equal magnitude and at the 
same time. The law depicts the action and reaction, or force and coun-
terforce, as being thoroughly reciprocal to the degree that ‘we are free 
to consider either of them as the force or the counterforce’ (Hertz 1956: 
185). We are free to do that because we lack any objective means to give 
either of them priority. Both happen simultaneously and are of the same 
magnitude and of the same kind. The explicitly expressed consequence of 
all this is that physics does not consider interactions as being composed 
of ontologically different kinds of influences, an ‘action’ and a ‘reaction’, 
of which one kind is only a response to the other. The terms ‘action’ 
and ‘reaction’ are only taken to reflect the subjective aspect under which 
the scientist considers the interacting objects, i.e. according to which 
changes the scientist is interested in: the changes in the window, or in the 
brick. The point comes out beautifully in the previously cited passage by 
James Clerk Maxwell, where he says that the mutual action between two 
objects ‘receives different names according to the aspect under which it 
is studied, and this aspect depends on the extent of the material system 
which forms the subject of our attention’ (1877: 26). However, as he 
points out, when we ‘take into account the whole phenomenon of the 
action between the two portions of matter we call it Stress’ (1877: 26). 
Physics really treats action and reaction as ‘two aspects of a single phe-
nomenon of reciprocal action’ (Bunge 1979: 153). That phenomenon is 
called ‘stress’.
Perhaps an even better way to illustrate the point is to consider that 
the idea that the action provokes the reaction only has intuitive appeal 
in a subset of all interactions, while the idea that neither action nor reac-
tion can be given priority generalises to all the cases. In other words, 
the standard view only has intuitive appeal when applied to cases when 
one object is in motion while the other is at rest, and when one object 
appears to us as more active, bigger, sturdier, etc. It doesn’t work if you 
consider cases such as two identical billiard balls, moving at equal speed 
in opposite directions, colliding head on. Or, two cars (or any object you 
like) of the same make, moving at equal speed in opposite directions, col-
liding head on. In those cases, it appears clear that each acts on the other 
simultaneously, to the same magnitude, but in opposite directions. I will 
now present as the second proposal what classical mechanics takes to be 
an empirical fact that:
(P2):  Interactions are thoroughly reciprocal.
It bears mentioning that, while the first and second laws of motion are 
known to fail in the domain of very fast-moving and massive objects (i.e. 
where relativity deviates from classical mechanics) as well as in the quan-
tum realm, the third law is still assumed to hold good.
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4.5  Bunge’s Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of Causation
Bunge acknowledges the ontological significance of the fact that there 
are no actions without reactions and takes it to show that the standard 
view cannot be anything but an approximation of causality. Nevertheless, 
Bunge rejects the idea that causality could be explained in terms of inter-
action, ‘if only for the simple reason that material objects are in a state 
of flux, so that generally the action has over the reaction the definite 
“advantage”—to use an anthropomorphic expression—of priority in 
time’ (1979: 162). He adds:
The frequent asymmetry of interactions, as well as the fact that 
processes in which the antecedent disappears altogether cannot be 
described as interactions (although they involve reactions upon dif-
ferent objects), renders interactionism inadequate as a universal 
doctrine. Causation cannot be regarded as a particular case of inter-
action because the latter lacks the essential component of irreversible 
productivity.
(1979: 170–1)
To sum up, Bunge has four objections against interaction as a universal 
doctrine of causality: (i) that when we consider the fact that things are 
in a state of flux, actions are temporally prior to the reaction, (ii) that 
interactions are often so asymmetric that the reaction and its effect can 
be quantitatively neglected, (iii) that some processes, e.g. the spontaneous 
decay of various kinds of micro-particles, cannot be described as interac-
tions, and (iv) that if the action does not give rise to the reaction then 
interaction contains no element of productivity, which he rightly consid-
ers an essential component of causality. I am afraid that these objections 
really show that Bunge misunderstands the nature of interactions.
I will discuss the objections in a different order than they appear above 
but begin with the first objection that the action is temporally prior to 
the reaction. This objection is based on not cleanly separating reaction 
from effect. When talking generally about interaction Bunge says that 
‘the effect always reacts back on the input’ (1979: 170), and when dis-
cussing gravitational interaction he says that ‘[e]very change produced by 
m1 on m2 reacts back on m1’ (1979: 150), and when discussing the sense 
in which interactions are reciprocal, he only states that there is a reac-
tion to every action, and that the reaction is equal to the action, but does 
not say that they occur simultaneously. In fact, he says that every action 
is accompanied or followed by a reaction (1979: 170). But reactions are 
not effects, they are exertion of influence, and that influence is exerted 
simultaneously with the action.
Indeed, Bunge’s third objection, that interaction cannot handle pro-
cesses where the antecedent ceases to exist, is only intelligible if one 
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assumes that he does identify reaction with effect. Bunge uses an example 
of spontaneous decay of particles to illustrate his point, notably of a pion 
into a muon with the emission of a neutrino:
In this case, the parent particle (π) is unstable; it decays spontane-
ously (that is, without any known extrinsic cause, though presumably 
as a result of an inner process) […] This is an irreversible, typically 
genetic process, the thing furthest from interaction—despite which 
meson theories usually treat this process as if it were a mutual action 
between coexistents. More exactly, the parent-child connection exist-
ing between the pion and its descendants is described as an interac-
tion eliciting that very transition—despite the fact that the products 
are not yet born.
(1979: 163)
If the muon and neutrino only exist after the decay of the pion, then 
obviously there cannot be talk of interaction between them and the pion. 
The pion cannot act on something that does not yet exist, and the muon 
and neutrino cannot react back on something that no longer exists. Note 
that Bunge does not object generally to the possibility of products react-
ing back on what produced them, but only in cases where the ‘producer’ 
ceases to exist in the process of producing the effect. I agree that the decay 
cannot be described as an interaction between the pion and its descen-
dants, because, as I believe, interactions do not occur between cause and 
effect, but only between two objects whose mutual action is arbitrarily 
called ‘action’ vs. ‘reaction’.
I think that the example is really a worse anomaly for the standard 
view. If the decay occurs in the absence of an external cause, then it isn’t 
a case of causation at all, because the standard view defines causation in 
terms of changes produced by an external influence. Then we are really 
dealing with a non-causal change, and the example falls outside the cate-
gory of phenomena being discussed, namely causal production. However, 
if the decay is a result of an inner process, as Bunge suggests, then it can 
be treated as a product of the interaction between the constituents of the 
unstable pion—a quark and antiquark—which ultimately results in the 
emission of a muon and neutrino. My conclusion is that Bunge identifies 
the reaction with the effect and therefore thinks that if the Agent ceases 
to exist in the process of producing the effect, then there is nothing for 
the effect to react back on. Secondly, he cannot see a process internal to 
the pion as being the cause of its decay, because he restricts the meaning 
of the term cause to ‘extrinsic motive Agent’ in accordance with the stan-
dard view:
Now, by definition, of all kinds of cause, the efficient cause is the 
motive or active one‚ it is, moreover, an Agent acting on things ab 
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extrinseco and one that cannot act on itself. The efficient cause is, in 
short, an external compulsion‚ hence, an essential mark of (efficient) 
causation is externality.
(1979: 173–4)
Let us now turn to Bunge’s second objection, that interactions are often 
so asymmetrical that the reaction can be neglected. This objection is 
an argument in favour of the standard view, but it is not really an 
objection to interaction. It is a justification of the application of what 
Bunge calls the causal approximation. He makes a point of the fact 
that interacting things always affect each other mutually with equal 
force (despite also talking about it as the effect reacting back on the 
cause), but then points out that, when there are large quantitative dif-
ferences between the things, the larger thing will hardly be affected at 
all by the interaction. Bunge uses gravitation to illustrate his point: 
‘Only if one of the masses is much smaller than the other (for example, 
a stone as compared with the whole Earth), can the greater mass be 
regarded as the cause of the acceleration of the smaller one, and the 
reaction of the latter’s motion be quantitatively neglected’ (1979: 150). 
That is, even though the interaction really is reciprocal, sometimes the 
effect produced by the reaction is so small that it can be neglected, and 
the interaction be treated as being approximately causal in the stan-
dard sense. Bunge argues that ‘[i]n some cases this involves no error at 
all’ (1979: 150).
It is justified to ask in accordance with which standards is the reaction 
negligible? The answer is ‘in accordance with the explanatory interests of 
the observer’: ‘by a suitable choice of the reference system (change from 
laboratory system to center-of-mass system) [...] an interaction problem 
is thereby transformed into an ideal causal problem’ (1979, 151). That is, 
Bunge argues that, when the effect on one of the things is for all practical 
purposes negligible, we are methodologically justified to do the kind of 
aspect-shift that Maxwell described so well, i.e. sometimes we are justified 
to neglect those aspects of reality that we have no explanatory interest in.
I will not argue that the application of the standard view is never meth-
odologically justified in scientific practice. But the fact that interactions 
can often be approximated to fit the standard view, by a suitable choice 
of what we think is negligible, is not an ontologically valid argument 
against interaction. Indeed, as Maxwell noted, we are often interested in 
both sides of an interaction, in which case it is inappropriate to apply the 
approximation. For instance, in playing billiards we need to be equally 
concerned about putting the cue ball in a good position for the next shot 
as with putting a colour ball in a pocket. Consequently, it appears we are 
only sometimes justified in applying the standard view, but we are always 
justified in regarding the interaction as reciprocal. Interaction generalises, 
the standard view doesn’t.
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There is clearly a tension between Bunge’s ontological and method-
ological considerations. He makes a point of the ontological inadequacy 
of the standard view, regarding the relation between the action and 
reaction, but prefers the standard view for its methodological utility in 
cases where there is a large quantitative difference between the effects 
produced in an interaction, and because he thinks interaction does not 
involve production. While I acknowledge the methodological concerns, 
my primary purpose is to find an ontologically adequate account of 
causal production, and I think, contrary to Bunge, that interaction, when 
properly understood, involves production.
Bengt Molander (1982, 140–3) has also considered the suggestion that 
the standard conception of causality should be replaced by a conception 
based on interaction but dismisses it on similar grounds as Bunge. He 
thinks that even if interactions are reciprocal it will still be true that the 
brick breaks the window, although at the same time the window causes 
the brick to lose momentum. My response is that such statements are 
not inappropriate or false as explanatory statements in relation to our 
explanatory interests. But it does make the individuation of causes and 
effects dependent on a subjective choice of reference, wherefore it is onto-
logically inadequate.
Bunge’s objection that interaction does not involve production is the 
most serious objection to interaction, but also one that is easy to counter. 
His objection is based on the mistaken view that the symmetry we find 
between interacting objects translates to a symmetry between cause and 
effect. In Bunge’s words: ‘Let us agree to call interactionism, or function-
alism, the view according to which causes and effects must be treated 
on the same footing, in a symmetrical way excluding both predominant 
aspects and definitely genetic, hence irreversible, connections’ (1979: 
162). This view, he claims, may be regarded as a ‘hasty extrapolation of 
the mechanical principle of the equality of the action and the reaction’ 
(1979: 162). I on the other hand think he has wrongly understood the 
mechanical principle as a statement about the relationship between cause 
and effect, when it should really be understood as merely a characterisa-
tion of the cause; a cause is reciprocal action.
4.6  Interaction Involves Production
Instead of taking the symmetry of action and reaction to show that cau-
sation cannot be modelled in terms of interaction—because it depicts the 
relation between cause and effect as symmetric—I propose we take it 
to show that the reaction cannot really be an effect, and that the action 
cannot really be a cause in its own right. Really, I propose we take it to 
show that we must re-examine the standard conception of ‘cause’. By 
abandoning the standard view that causes must be understood in terms 
of ‘extrinsic motive Agents’, an idea arguably originating from outmoded 
pre-Newtonian physics, we are free to conceive of the interaction as a 
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whole as the cause, and the change in the compound whole of interacting 
things as the effect. According to this view, the relation between action 
and reaction is symmetrical, but it does not follow from this that the rela-
tion between the cause (i.e. the interaction) and the change it produces is 
symmetrical. Bunge overlooks this possibility because he takes causes to 
be by definition external to the changing entity.
It is in fact difficult to conceive of interactions without thinking of 
them as the production of changes in the interacting things, when, as here, 
interaction refers to the mutual influence of two things upon each other. 
The notion of force has always been understood in terms of production 
of changes. Newton defined it as ‘an action exerted upon a body in order 
to change its state, either of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line’ 
(1686: 13), and Hertz defined it as ‘the independently conceived effect 
which one of two coupled systems […] exerts upon the motion of the 
other’ (1956: 185). If force, meaning the action of one thing upon another, 
cannot be separated from the changes it produces, then neither can inter-
action be separated from the production of changes, since an interaction 
consists in two reciprocal forces. That the forces are reciprocal means that 
neither can exist without the other, and that, therefore, neither can pro-
duce the other. However, together they can produce a new state of affairs.
It may be objected that static interactions are counterexamples to 
the claim that interactions always result in changes (see, for instance, 
Baltimore 2020: sect. 4.2). Two bricks leaning on each other exert a force 
on each other, and yet nothing changes. Baltimore suggests we instead 
use the term ‘result’ to describe the outcome of interactions. Now, while 
nothing important hinges on this point—the use of ‘result’ rather than 
‘change’ still admits that interactions are productive—I still am inclined 
to insist that the result be understood as ‘change’. Many of the ‘results’ 
we would prima facie identify as non-changes, because no change turns 
up in our experience, seem to me to be changes. Consider the two bricks 
leaning on each other. According to physics, each brick is in a state of 
downwards motion; they are falling, just like any object resting on the 
surface of the Earth. However, that falling is continuously thwarted by 
the other brick. From a human observer’s point of view nothing appears 
to change, but in physical terms, their state of downwards motion is con-
tinuously being changed to not falling. Now, whether or not this account 
of static interactions holds true, I take it still to be the case that:
(P3):  Interaction involves production.
4.7  Unidirectionality Due to Agency Bias
I have so far argued that inanimate material objects cannot be objectively 
distinguished into Agent and Patient, and thereby that the distinction 
between causes and effects in terms of ‘actions of an Agent’ and ‘changes 
in a Patient’, respectively, is ontologically inadequate. It involves a neglect 
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of the reaction of the Patient and change produced in the Agent. The 
causal production of a state of affairs involves the interaction of things, 
and this interaction is reciprocal. That is, in explaining the causal relation 
between events, there is always a story to be told about the interaction 
between the things involved. However, this account does not sit easily 
with our everyday view of the world, which appears largely to consist in 
asymmetries.
I do not deny that we often experience interactions as being asymmet-
rical, but I suggest that this experience of asymmetry is subjective. On the 
one hand, it boils down to the kind of choice of perspective that Maxwell 
describes so well, and which is guided by what we consider important 
from the perspective of our explanatory interests. It does appear to be 
more ‘fatal’ for a window to be smashed to smithereens than for a brick 
to lose momentum. But, surely, the sense in which the breaking or destruc-
tion of objects is ‘fatal’ is a subjective evaluation. A smashed window is 
inconvenient to a house-owner in a way that the loss of momentum by a 
brick is not. That is why we attend to the breaking of the window as an 
important effect of the interaction, while the loss of momentum by the 
brick is a negligible side-effect.
To be sure, different things change in different ways when entering into 
interactions, and these differences can be quite dramatic, but does not jus-
tify giving one of the interacting things, e.g. ‘the flying brick’, the privilege 
of being the sole producer of the subsequent change, e.g. that the win-
dow breaks and that the brick loses momentum and velocity. The objec-
tive character of the subsequent state of affairs as a whole is determined 
jointly, and reciprocally, by all the things involved. We can easily explain 
the difference in how things change in interactions by appeal to the differ-
ences in the intrinsic properties of the things themselves as they enter into 
an interaction, instead of to an asymmetry between the influences they are 
subject to. Different things change differently when they are influenced in 
the same way, not because of an asymmetry in the way they influence each 
other but because they are different before being exposed to the influence. 
If you exert a certain force on a window it will break. If you exert the 
same force on a brick it will only change its state of motion.
On the other hand, our tendency to single out objects in motion as 
particularly active and important in the production of an effect can be 
explained by appeal to the view of F.P. Ramsey (1929), R.G. Collingwood 
(1940), D. Gasking (1955), and G.H. von Wright (1974), that the con-
ception of cause in terms of ‘extrinsic motive Agent’ is biased by our 
conception of agency. The agency view states that we could not know 
causality, or could not form the concept of causality, unless we knew 
from ourselves and our actions what it is to act as a cause. The agency 
view might then be taken to claim that the concept of efficient cause is 
derived from our knowledge of ourselves as active Agents. This is indeed 
the view of Evan Fales. Fales accepts Hume’s thesis that knowledge of 
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necessity and forces are not given in outer experience but claims against 
Hume that knowledge of action and force is given in our inner experi-
ences of the effort exercised by our bodies (1990: 11–14). The question 
is: to what extent does our nature as intentional Agents, with all the 
cognitive capacities we have, memory, prediction, etc., bias our view of 
the objective workings of causality in the world of inanimate material 
objects? Is our conception of ourselves as ‘efficient causes’ really applica-
ble to how changes are produced in inanimate material objects by other 
inanimate material objects? What I have argued so far suggests that we 
cannot divide inanimate objects into Agents and Patients, and I have tried 
to abstract the component of intention from our notion of efficient cause 
to arrive at a more objective notion.
4.8  Interactions Are Causally Fundamental
If it is correct that causal production always involves interaction between 
coexisting things, then it follows that interaction is ontologically prior to 
the causal relations believed to hold between temporally distinct events. 
I think this is something we can observe in our everyday lives, when we 
reflect upon it. We know we cannot accomplish anything without acting 
upon things in some way or another, and we always feel their resistance 
(reaction) when we do. We always suffer a change ourselves when accom-
plishing a change in something else, but as long as this change is negli-
gible to our purposes, then it will go by unnoticed. It is indeed because we 
feel the resistance of the things we interact with, that we can adjust the 
effort we make to their resistance.
We also know we value different consequences of interactions in vari-
ous ways. Indeed, different people value the same consequences differ-
ently, and we know that the mechanical forces involved have little or 
nothing to do with their value. A tiny little push on the edge of a cliff can 
have dramatic consequences, while a full body tackle in the ice-hockey 
rink does not matter a jot. We even disagree on what is to be considered 
as the Agent, i.e. the efficient cause, e.g. in deciding questions of respon-
sibility. It may not be intuitively given at first glance that interactions are 
thoroughly reciprocal, especially when it comes to intentional acts, but I 
think it is convincing on second reflection in light of everything that has 
been said.
(P4):  Interaction between coexisting objects is ontologically prior to 
the one-sided existential dependence relation between two tem-
porally distinct events.
I am prepared to leave it open whether intentional beings could in some 
sense be examples of ‘extrinsic motive Agents’, in accordance with 
the standard view. That is, whether individuals with the capacity to a) 
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perceive themselves in relation to other objects, b) have preferences and 
desires, c) predict various consequences of various actions before they 
are performed, d) choose the action that is perceived to lead to a desired 
effect, e) adjust the effort and direction of the action to the reaction of 
other objects, may perhaps be capable of initiating actions, and not just 
interact with the environment in the sense described above. This has in 
fact been suggested by Lowe (2006b), and Meixner (2008), and Hobbes 
before them (1656: ch. X, sect. 7). The list of Agential capacities is not 
complete, nor do the distinctions aim to represent logically, or otherwise, 
independent capacities, but rather interdependent capacities. I just want 
to make a sharp distinction between how we calculate, and perhaps initi-
ate, our actions in the world, and how physical objects in general actually 
interact in the course of real events. To what extent intentional actions 
differ from interactions is beyond the scope of this paper, but I do think 
our cognitive abilities bias our understanding of the nature of causal pro-
duction in the world of inanimate material objects.
4.9  Necessary Connections
In Chapter 5 I will address more thoroughly the question of causal neces-
sity, arguing that if the character of an interaction is entirely determined 
by the properties of the interacting things, and the properties are uni-
versal powers, then whenever two objects of a certain kind interact in a 
certain way, the very same kind of effect is always produced. We would 
then have, in principle, constant and invariable type-type relations, i.e. a 
necessary connection. Here I will argue, however, that there is another 
kind of necessary connection to be found, a genetic token-token link.
Assuming, as I do, what appears to be an empirical fact, that nothing 
can be produced ex nihilo, then we must consider out of what a new state 
of affairs is produced. A potter cannot produce pots without clay, facto-
ries need raw material out of which they can produce ready products. 
Without raw material that can be altered into a new shape, nothing can 
be produced. What is the raw material out of which a new state of affairs 
is produced, and where does it come from? I propose that a new state of 
affairs is produced by the interaction of things, out of the very substance 
those interacting things are made of, i.e. the state which is produced is 
made of the same substances as were involved in the interaction. It is the 
same substance that constitutes a window and then a pile of broken glass. 
It is the same brick that comes flying through the air and then lies at rest 
in that very pile of broken glass.
Since interaction requires at least two things, then the production of a 
new state of affairs requires a unity of things or substances, and we can 
speak of that unity as a compound substance. My understanding of a 
compound substance is roughly that of a system, as this term is used in 
physics. If the state of affairs produced by the interaction is produced out 
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of the substance of the interacting things, then the state of affairs pro-
duced by an interaction consists in the very same compound substance 
that was involved in the interaction. On this account, the relationship 
between two different but in this sense causally related states of affairs 
is necessary in the sense that they are necessarily constituted by the very 
same substance. Causally produced change is then an alteration in the 
state of a compound substance, brought about by that very substance 
itself, through the interaction of its parts. Note that this also involves that 
the production of a state of affairs is always at the same time a destruc-
tion of an existent state of affairs. The coming into existence of a state 
of affairs, that does not come into existence through the transformation 
of a system from one state to another—the first going out of being as the 
second comes into being—must be creation ex nihilo.
(P5):  Two causally related states of affairs are necessarily constituted 
by the very same compound substance.
4.10  Production Requires Endurance and an A View of Time
If causation involves production, then things must endure rather than 
perdure, because perdurance is incompatible with production, if creation 
ex nihilo is ruled out. Also, this kind of production is incompatible with 
the B view of time. The argument for these two points is spelled out in 
greater detail in (Ingthorsson 2001, 2009, 2016: Ch. 7). Very briefly, if 
it were assumed that things persist by perduring, i.e. by having temporal 
parts, and all times exist in parity, then each part must be a distinct and 
independent substantial entity, each existing at that time without ever 
coming into or going out of being. If that is the case, then I fail to see 
what could be produced, by what, and out of what. If one temporal part 
of a thing is broken and an earlier part is whole, without the part being 
whole having changed into being broken, then out of what was the bro-
ken part produced? The broken part must either (i) always have existed, 
in which case it was not produced, (ii) be produced by being brought into 
reality from outside reality, (iii) be produced out of the substance of the 
Agent, in which case a brick would have to be able to change into a pile 
of glass and the problem would shift to the production of the brick lying 
in the pile of glass, or (iv) be produced ex nihilo.
Indeed, most perdurantists would agree and say that, since things per-
dure, there is no production, everything simply exists, albeit at different 
times. Here we have the neo-Humean idea of the world as a mosaic of 
local matters of fact, where everything is loose and separate and nothing 
originates from anything else. In such a world there can be no generic 
connections, since they would constitute a substantial connection. I want 
to make as good sense as I can of the idea that causality involves produc-
tion, but reject the possibility of creation ex nihilo, and will then have to 
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conclude that if causality involves production then substances persist by 
enduring. I take myself to be in agreement with Haslanger (1989), who 
argues that the perdurantist position commits to a neo-Humean interpre-
tation of causality, i.e. to a correlation view of causality, in which pro-
duction has no place (Ingthorsson 2001). Indeed, it is widely argued that 
change generally speaking, not just causally produced change, necessarily 
requires endurance of the substances involved (Metaphysics: Bk. 12, 2; 
Lowe 1998; Mellor 1998; Simons 2000).
Again, if it is assumed that all times exist in parity, which is the basic 
tenet of the B view of time, then it follows that every state of every physi-
cal system exists in parity with each other, and this requires a perdura-
ntist view of persistence. Perdurance, as I have argued, is incompatible 
with production, and if the B view is committed to perdurance, then the 
B view is incompatible with production. This is a simple consequence of 
Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics (1986a: 202ff). The only view of 
time that will allow a state of a system to cease to exist as it gives rise 
to a new state is the A view of time (my favoured version is presentism). 
Now, since the focus of this book is on causation and not time, I refer to 
my other publications regarding the connection between different views 
about time and different views about persistence, and their connection to 
different views on causation (Ingthorsson 2001, 2002, 2009, 2016).
Two states of affairs that are causally related, in the sense given above, 
will be different states of the very same compound substance, which has 
changed from one state to the other due to the interaction of its parts. The 
production of changes cannot then really be construed as involving an 
external influence on the changing entity (although the parts of that entity 
act mutually and externally on each other), but to influences i nternal to a 
changing compound, or aggregate of substances. That is, on this account, 
causally produced change is always a change within a system.
(P6):  Causally produced change is always internal to a compound 
substance.
4.11  Simultaneous Causation
To characterise causation in accordance with the third law of motion 
not only challenges the ontological priority of the action. It also requires 
us to think of causes and effects as occurring simultaneously. The idea 
is not new, but is controversial even though recently it has been gain-
ing in popularity. Kant accepted that most effects are simultaneous with 
their causes, which caused him some worries about how to understand 
the ontological priority of causes (1787: B233–56), and today this view 
is championed by authors like myself, Michael Huemer & Ben Kovitz 
(2003), and Mumford & Anjum (2011: Ch. 5). Like myself, Huemer & 
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Kovitz appeal to the way physics describes interactions, and Mumford & 
Anjum partly appeal to common-sense examples of the kind Kant sug-
gests, and partly to Huemer & Kovitz’s interpretation of physics. I think 
we are thus in very good agreement. There are plenty of objectors though. 
Bunge’s objection to interaction, previously discussed, is an objection to 
simultaneous causation, and more recently we find Robin Le Poidevin 
(1988) and Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2017) attempting to prove that 
causes and effects cannot be simultaneous, because it would entail that 
things will be in two incompatible states, and/or violate the conservation 
of momentum. Hansson Wahlberg explicitly relates to myself, Mumford 
& Anjum, and Huemer & Kovitz, as well as to Le Poidevin.
Le Poidevin appeals to what he calls the principle of reciprocity, ‘a 
necessary part of any cause is itself affected as a direct result of that 
cause’s bringing about its effect’ (1988: 152), which Jonathan Bennett 
calls the ‘Balance Principle’, i.e. ‘in any fully intelligible causal transac-
tion something gains what something else loses’ (1974: 59), and says 
that this has been part and parcel of the pre-Newtonian mechanics of 
Leibniz and Descartes. Le Poidevin illustrates the consequences of the 
principle for interactions between two objects A and B: ‘For any A and B, 
if A’s being F at time t causes B’s being G at t´ then A is no longer F at t´’ 
(1988: 155). The core idea at play is really that causation is the transmis-
sion of something from an Agent to a Patient, and that the Patient’s gains 
must be equal to what the Agent loses, otherwise something has been 
added out of nothing or completely annihilated (depending on whether B 
gains more or less than A loses). Having that understanding in mind, Le 
Poidevin attempts to show that a contradiction ensues from the idea that 
causes and effects are simultaneous:
Consider the following example of a moving billiard ball A’s striking 
another billiard ball B, which until then was stationary. As a result, 
both balls are in motion. At the moment of the encounter, A’s momen-
tum was MA. After the encounter, A’s momentum is MA* and B’s is 
MB. Clearly, MA* must be less than MA: A cannot have brought about 
movement in B without a reduction in its own momentum (otherwise 
momentum is not conserved). Now A’s momentum at the moment 
of the encounter is a necessary part of the cause of B’s subsequent 
movement. So if cause and effect are simultaneous, then A’s having 
momentum MA must be simultaneous with B’s having momentum 
MB. But if B has momentum MB, then A’s momentum must be MA*. 
So A’s momentum, at the time of the effect, must be both MA and not 
MA. Since this is absurd, causation cannot be simultaneous in this 
case. What happens rather is that at the time of the encounter, A’s 
momentum is MA, and at times thereafter, MA*.
(Le Poidevin 1988: 157–8)
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In short, the argument is that if causes and effects are simultaneous, then 
A must have MA simultaneously with B having MB, yet must also simul-
taneously have lost MA to have caused MB.
Hansson Wahlberg argues in exactly the same way, but instead of 
describing the consequence as a contradiction he argues that it entails 
the doubling of momentum, which is a violation of the conservation of 
momentum:
Now, assume first, for simplicity, that the billiard balls are perfectly 
rigid and that the collision is instantaneous, occurring at an instant 
of time t. Then, if a’s momentum is passed to ball b at t – b acquiring 
the momentum (the effect) simultaneously with a being, for the last 
time, in possession of its momentum – the sum total of the objects’ 
momenta is doubled at t. The consequence is that the law of conser-
vation of system momentum is violated at t.
(2017: 113–14)
My objection is that both are using an example clearly intended to con-
form to classical mechanics, but describe it in terms of the philosophical 
two-place model involving a conception of causes and events as instan-
taneous Kim-style events in which one transmits a quantity to the other, 
which I don’t think is suited to the Newtonian understanding of what 
happens in interactions. That is, we are given MA as the cause, i.e. the 
state of A when it begins to exert an influence on B and are supposed to 
accept that the exertion of influence can be completed instantaneously. 
And we are given MB as the effect, i.e. the result of a change in momen-
tum instead of the change of momentum itself. It is true that the quantity 
of momentum can be calculated for an infinitesimal timepoint, but that 
doesn’t mean that we should understand the exercise of an influence or a 
change in momentum in terms of instantaneous entities. Here I am with 
Glennan (2017) that causal realists must assume causes and effects to be 
activities that take time rather than instantaneous states.
I propose we should understand the interaction as follows. Assume A 
and B have momenta MA and MB at the instant t at which A and B come 
into contact. From that moment on A and B begin to mutually exert a 
force on each other, and simultaneously their respective momenta begin 
to change and continue to do so as long as A and B mutually exert an 
influence on each other. At no point in time is it the case that A and/or B 
have and do not have a given momentum MA*/MB*.
The key thing is to realise that the claim ‘causes and effects are simul-
taneous’ does not mean that the cause and effect are completed instan-
taneously (that only follows if you treat causes and effects as Kim-style 
events). The idea is instead that the exertion of an influence and the 
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production of a change occur simultaneously but over a temporal inter-
val, producing a succession of states (see also Huemer & Kovitz 2003).
Now, while physicists never forget to mention that interacting objects 
mutually exert forces on each other, they primarily explain interactions in 
terms of unidirectional transferences of quantities from one object to the 
other. In accordance with my earlier criticism of the transmission theory 
in Chapter 3, I believe this understanding is ontologically inadequate, 
even though it offers a useful method for calculation that usually isn’t 
misleading. The problem is that it doesn’t generalise to all the cases. It 
only works in cases that intuitively fit to an Agent-Patient interpretation 
but fails in symmetric interactions, such as when two identical billiard 
balls, moving with equal speed in opposite directions, collide head on. 
They compress on collision and are then pushed off again in the opposite 
direction to the one they had before, but neither loses momentum while 
the other gains. Both equally change their direction of motion. How are 
we to understand the change in terms of transference of momentum 
in these cases? We have a choice between thinking that each transfers 
equally to the other (momentum swap) or we assume the interaction only 
results in a change in the direction of respective momenta (or change 
in the quantity in asymmetric cases), but not really that momentum is 
transferred. I think we should let the concept of force do the work it was 
initially meant to do, notably to explain why colliding bodies change 
the momentum of each other, and not offer a double explanation (force 
+ transference). My reason to favour that explanation is that it is sim-
pler and works for the full range of cases, while the transference model 
only works for asymmetric interactions. Now, whether we accept this 
suggestion or not has no consequences for the point that simultaneous 
causation does not really lead to contradictions as long as we accept 
that exertion of influence and changes in state of motion are temporally 
extended phenomena.
Hansson Wahlberg develops another argument. Assuming that causal 
influence cannot be transmitted faster than light, he argues, then it takes 
time for the momentum to transfer across the spatial extension of the two 
combined bodies, wherefore causes cannot be simultaneous with their 
effects, at least if we are dealing with anything larger than point particles. 
So, even if we assume bodies to be rigid and that there is only action 
on contact, then because the momentum must be distributed across the 
whole spatial extension of each object, some of the momentum must 
have some distance to travel—however small—and this cannot happen 
instantaneously. My response is that he is again assuming that causation 
is transference, and that transfer cannot occur gradually. His argument 
poses no problem if momentum is not transferred but only changed as I 
have suggested. But it is not a problem even if we assume transference, 
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if the influence and the change are treated as activities that can occur 
gradually over time. If influence takes time rather than happens instan-
taneously, then there is plenty of time for the interaction to start slow 
and gradually increase as the action is propagated within each object, 
which is actually what happens in non-rigid objects, i.e. why they are 
compressed on contact. The conclusion is that on the interaction view I 
propose, and even on a transmission account that allows influence and 
change to occur gradually, it follows that:
(P7):  Causes are simultaneous with their effects.
4.12  Causation a Form of One-Sided Existential Dependence
It should be noted that in (Ingthorsson 2002) I claimed that causes pre-
ceded their effects in time, even though I also argued that an influence 
and the change it produces happen in the way I describe above, wherefore 
(P7) represents a change in my account. In 2002 I was too conformist and 
wanted to find something that could roughly resemble the cause-effect 
relation depicted by the traditional two-place model. But the result was 
that I did not adequately distinguish my understanding of the mecha-
nism of production (interaction) from my understanding of the relation-
ship between the products of that mechanism, i.e. between the successive 
states of affairs that interactions produce. I now turn to describe the lat-
ter, i.e. what is the relation between the state destroyed in an interaction 
and the state produced by that very same interaction. I believe it is a kind 
of one-sided existential dependence and that it is this relation that has 
traditionally been identified as the causal relation.
Strictly speaking, it is the interaction between the parts of the com-
pound substance that produces a change in the compound from one state 
to another, the states themselves are always products. That is, the inter-
action is the process in which the effect is produced. But, I suggest, the 
relation between any state from which the compound substance changes 
and the state to which it changes, due to the interaction, nevertheless be 
characterised as being one of producer to product, keeping in mind that 
it should only be understood as a relation of origin; one state comes into 
being out of the other. Any given state of a substance, although merely a 
temporary form of the substance, cannot be separated from the substance 
itself; the state cannot exist without the substance. If, as I have argued, 
the state to which the compound substance changes is necessarily con-
stituted by the very same substance as the state from which it changes, 
then the state to which the compound changes is for its existence depen-
dent on the state from which the compound changes, because the state to 
which it changes ‘inherits’ both the substance, and the character, from the 
state the compound changes from.
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The temporally distinct states of any such compound, related as pro-
ducer to product through the interactions of the parts of the compound, 
will then hold a relation of one-sided existential dependence; the state to 
which a compound substance changes is dependent for its existence upon 
the state from which the compound changes, but the state from which 
it changes is not dependent for its existence upon the state to which it 
changes.
(P8):  The state produced by an interaction stands in a relation of one-
sided existential dependence to the state destroyed by that very 
same interaction.
4.13  The Asymmetry of Causation
In light of (P1)–(P8), the so-called causal asymmetry between a cause and 
an effect, which is traditionally formulated as ‘it does not follow from 
“x caused y”, that “y caused x”’, can be given in the following terms: 
if x produced y, y could not have produced x, because that would have 
required y to produce x prior to its own production, which is impossible.
This is a good time to point out a significant difference between my 
view and the perspectival view advocated by Huw Price (1996), who also 
argues that the standard view is biased by agency. I argue that the relation 
between interacting entities should be considered to be symmetrical, but 
the relation between the successive stages of the process of production 
to be asymmetrical. Price argues that the relation between earlier and 
later stages of a process hold a symmetrical relation, i.e. he argues that 
the state which a system appears to have changed from, and the state 
which it appears to have changed to, when its parts interact, really hold 
a symmetrical relation. Or perhaps better, he thinks that such processes 
have no intrinsic direction. Price’s argument is based on the fact that 
the mathematical formulations of the laws of nature in physics are time 
invariant. That is, because it makes no difference to exchange the time 
variable t with its contrary -t, in the fundamental laws of physics, any 
process can be described as going either backwards or forwards in time, 
without violating those laws.
Perhaps accounts of causality that rely only on the aspects of lawful 
connections between types of events in light of the most general formula-
tions of the laws of physics will have to accept Price’s conclusion, but then, 
I think, those accounts are incompatible with the conception of causality 
as involving production in accordance with the genetic principle. If the 
relation between two states of one and the same system is genuinely sym-
metrical, neither could have produced the other. Admittedly, the genetic 
principle imposes no special direction to certain types of  processes—a 
system can evolve from a state of type A to a state of type B, or vice 
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versa—but it excludes that the relation between two token stages of one 
and the same causal process is symmetric. One will have to have come 
into being out of the other, or neither has. They cannot both come into 
being out of the other, because then both would have to exist before the 
other to allow the production of the other. Or, in other words, if a system 
evolves from A to B and back to A, say, when a caesium-133 atom oscil-
lates between two energy states, then we still have a linear succession of 
token states sA1, sB2, sA3, sB4…, of which each state produces the next.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the time symmetry of the general for-
mulation of the laws of physics disappears when you apply them to con-
crete systems, and therefore doesn’t really imply that time is reversible or 
symmetric. In the general formulas, the symbols for quantities are really 
just placeholders for whatever real worldly quantity you want to insert 
when you describe the behaviour of an actual system, and they therefore 
don’t have a direction. Once you insert the quantities representing the 
actual state of the system, they acquire a direction (they are vector quan-
tities). As far as I know, the direction of these quantities is not affected by 
the reversal of the sign of the time variable. Imagine that you describe the 
state of a system at a given time whose parts are moving outwards from a 
centre, and then reverse the sign of the time variable in the equation you 
have, and then predict how that system will develop towards the ‘past’. 
It will expand towards the ‘past’, because your reversal of the time vari-
able does not reverse the direction of the state of motion of the parts of 
the system. This means that the actual process you are describing will not 
turn into its mirror reflection if you reverse the time variable.
In other words, the time symmetry of the laws of physics only means 
that one physical system can evolve from state A to B, that another system 
can evolve from state B to A, and that a system can evolve from state A 
to B, and then back to state A, but it will then really evolve through a 
linear order of successive states 1, 2, 3… An epistemic consequence of this 
is that we cannot tell in which direction the world is evolving merely by 
looking at the internal structure of physical processes. However, it seems 
to me that it is still the case that no matter in which temporal direction the 
world is as a matter of fact going, there is no way to reverse that direction. 
If it is evolving in what we at present identify as ‘backwards’, that is the 
only way it can be evolving (and therefore really is the forward direction).
It is then another question of how plausible it is to think that we could 
be wrong about the direction in which the world is evolving. What do 
we have to assume about the function of our brain to allow it to falsely 
represent the world as developing in the opposite direction from how it 
is actually developing? We can easily imagine such a scenario on a purely 
conceptual level; Martin Amis describes it in the novel Time’s Arrow 
(1992). But can we explain how it really happens on the basis of our cur-
rent knowledge of physical reality? A naturalist should conclude that our 
current physics rules out time reversal.
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4.14  Conclusion
The reciprocity of interactions, as described by modern science, contra-
dicts the assumed unidirectionality of interactions in the standard view, 
and removes the basis for making a distinction between active and pas-
sive objects. If, instead, causal production of change is taken to be the 
result of reciprocal action between parts of an aggregate (or system), 
a relation of one-sided existential dependence can be found to hold 
between the state produced in the aggregate by the interaction of its own 
parts, and the state destroyed by that same interaction. In other words, 
the interaction between the parts of a system destroys a state of affairs at 
the same time as it produces a new state of affairs, the produced state of 
affairs being for its existence one-sidedly dependent upon the state that 
was destroyed.
Thus conceived, the two states of affairs may be logically independent, 
in terms of each being of a certain type, but they cannot be conceived as 
distinct and independent substances. If it is assumed that they are distinct 
compound substances, then the question out of what they are produced 
is left unanswered, or it is answered that they were not at all produced, 
or it is answered that this effect was at least not produced by this cause. 
I   suggest that in order to explain production of changes, and the exis-
tential dependence relation between the change and what produced the 
change, it is necessary to assume that things, or the substance they are 
made of, persist by enduring. Conversely it means that, if endurance is 
abandoned, production must be abandoned too.
When cause and effect are seen to be made of the same substance, it is 
impossible to think that any particular effect could just as well have been 
produced by some other cause than it in fact was. Any attempt to think 
of the effect as having been produced by some other cause will necessar-
ily involve thinking of it as having been produced out of some altogether 
different substance, and therefore as being a different effect. It is still pos-
sible to think that a certain type of effect could have been produced by 
a number of different token causes, but not that a particular token effect 
could have been produced by any other token cause than the one that 
actually produced it.
I hope I have made a good case for the claims that interaction, as I 
have described it, (i) can be conceived to involve production, (ii) involves 
a necessary generic connection between an interaction and its product, 
and (iii) should be taken seriously as a possible hypothesis of the factual 
nature of causality. It is a hypothesis that fits most of the components 
of the common notion of causality, i.e. that causality involves produc-
tion due to causal influence such that the producer and product hold a 
relation of one-sided existential dependence, although it combines these 
components in a somewhat different way than is usual. It also fits certain 
widely accepted metaphysical principles, i.e. the genetic principle and the 
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principle of lawfulness, but requires that the principle of action be substi-
tuted for what may be called the principle of reciprocity. This, I believe, 
is only a minor modification, however, and serves to correct the agency 
bias of the standard view, resulting in a conception of causation that fits 
to current scientific explanations of how changes are produced. My final 
suggestion is thus:
(P9):  Interaction and necessary causal production are the same process.
The general sentiment in contemporary metaphysics is that there is a very 
strong case to be had against the necessity of causal connections (‘CASE’, 
for short). Indeed, even causal realists tend to accept that causation—
although a real and substantial connection—falls short of being neces-
sary (Schrenk 2009; Mumford & Anjum 2011, 2018). To my mind CASE 
consists largely of a collection of straw man arguments that only address 
a conception of causation—which I will call ‘relational realism’—that to 
my knowledge has never been put forward in defence of the necessity of 
causal connections. Indeed, I don’t know of any arguments that address 
the standard view, as I have presented it. In this chapter I will first show 
that the main arguments now comprising CASE cut no ice against the 
standard view, and then argue that the argument developed by Mumford 
& Anjum, which does prima facie appear to address a view much like my 
own, ultimately does not work.
I will not attempt to address every argument ever put forward against 
causal necessity, but enough to cover the main bulk of CASE. As a con-
sequence, I can’t claim to completely vindicate causal necessity, but only 
reveal how overestimated the strength of the arguments against it have 
been. The main bulk of CASE consists of five main objections: (i) Hume’s 
discussion of causation (1739, 1748), which I have already addressed at 
length in Chapter 2, (ii) Anscombe’s criticism of a logically/conceptually 
necessary connection, (iii) Russell’s (1912) problem of action at a tempo-
ral distance, (iv) the family of counterarguments sometimes denoted col-
lectively as the problem of interference and prevention, which has been 
used to criticise both the kind of conditional account of causation that 
J.S. Mill (1843) defended and more recent powers-based conceptions of 
causation (Mumford & Anjum 2011), and (v) the objection that even if 
everything in the actual world happens in accordance with causal laws 
or in virtue of dispositional essences, causation would still fail to be nec-
essary because the laws of nature and/or the dispositional essences are 
themselves contingent (Armstrong 1983; Lange 2004).
I have already discussed Hume’s argument in Chapter 2, arguing that it 
really only argues that there is no logical/conceptual necessary connection 
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between impressions and/or ideas. The question therefore is whether any-
one has argued that this is what causal necessity is, which is what (ii) is 
all about. I won’t address Hume’s own argument any further. I will also 
ignore (v) because its rebuttal requires a more serious discussion of the 
possible worlds metaphysics than is possible here. I will however go some 
way to criticise its applicability to explain causation in Chapter 9, but 
that discussion is not really geared to the problem of causal necessity, 
but the more general question of whether possible worlds metaphysics 
can offer any account at all of causation. That I don’t discuss (v) has no 
serious impact on the discussion of the other objections, since they don’t 
address views that claim validity beyond the actual world.
5.1  Causal Necessity as Logical Necessity
The idea that causation is a kind of logical/conceptual connection has 
been defended by Kant (1787: A189/B233), Hegel (Hegel & Wallace 
1874: 215ff), and McTaggart (1915). At least Kant defends that the con-
nection involves necessity. However, none of them are causal realists, so 
to refute their arguments is not to refute causal realism. Nothing more 
needs be said about that.
It is more relevant to note that Elizabeth Anscombe identifies Hobbes 
as someone who claims that causal necessity is a logical connection, and 
claims that it was his argument that Hume ‘overthrew’ (Anscombe 1971). 
Anscombe bases her appraisal of Hobbes on his claim that when a certain 
total cause is present ‘it cannot be understood but that the effect is pro-
duced at the same instant; and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot 
be understood but that the effect is not produced’ (Hobbes 1656: Ch. 
X, §3). I think Anscombe is too quick to infer from Hobbes’ use of the 
phrase ‘cannot be understood’ that the connection is purely logical or 
conceptual. Hobbes’ epistemology is empiricist, albeit with clear ratio-
nalist overtones. In his view, the senses provide us with knowledge about 
the powers of material objects, and thus knowledge of causes, because 
powers are causes (Hobbes 1656: Ch. I, §4). From our empirical knowl-
edge of these causes we can rationally calculate the effects they produce, 
and, vice versa, the causes from the effects. In light of this, I think it 
would be more charitable to interpret Hobbes as making claims about 
what can/cannot be thought without violating the nature of the external 
material world as it is empirically known to us (or assumed). If we find 
fault with his view, it is with his epistemology and not with his logic.
Someone having read Newton’s Principia in the early 18th century 
could argue like Hobbes that if Newtonian mechanics is accepted as 
a true description of the world, then it cannot be understood, on pain 
of contradicting Newton’s mechanics, but that an object acted upon by 
an external force will change its state of motion in proportion to the 
force applied. We then have a valid nomological-deductive argument, 
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moving from premises established empirically, leading to a conclusion 
that therefore is a posteriori. This is a thoroughly realist approach to 
metaphysical explanation, which has very recently been described by 
Naomi Thompson (2019). In her view, metaphysical explanations are 
subject to epistemic constraints imposed by the context in which a question 
is asked; they are not explanations of what must be the case without 
regard to any concerns except what can or cannot be conceptualised. 
This is the kind of natural necessity, and nothing more, that I have hopes 
of defending, and it seems that this is the kind of necessity that Russell, as 
well as Mumford & Anjum, is criticising.
Hume may well have had Hobbes’ view in mind, but he cannot be 
read as overthrowing it merely by showing a flaw in the logic (the logic 
is valid). He first had to deny Hobbes’ premise that the senses give us 
knowledge of the nature of external objects, thus turning the question of 
causation into a mere conceivability issue; one unrestrained by epistemic 
concerns.
It is noteworthy that Anscombe doesn’t dwell on Mill’s account of 
causation (1843: Bk. III, Ch. V), because he also argues, like Hobbes, 
that from a total cause an effect follows of necessity. Perhaps she realises 
that it isn’t easy to portray Mill as a causal realist, since he explicitly 
claims to ‘make no research into the ultimate or ontological cause of 
anything’ and said that the causes he concerns himself with ‘are not effi-
cient, but physical causes’ (1843: Bk. III, Ch. V, §2). A physical cause, in 
Mill’s view, is an observable physical state of the world; a physical fact. 
One may suspect that Mill believes there are real causal connections, 
in the same way Hume accepts there probably are causal connections 
as soon as he turns his mind away from philosophy. But that doesn’t 
make them causal realists, since they positively deny that causal real-
ism is a viable philosophical project. Basically, Mill suspends judgement 
about the reality of ‘mysterious and powerful ties’ that may or may 
not connect the physical facts. To be specific: (i) unlike Hume but like 
Hobbes, Mill believes experience provides knowledge of physical facts, 
(ii) unlike Hobbes but like Hume, Mill believes experience does not 
provide knowledge of powers, (iii) unlike Hume, Mill believes (his ver-
sion of) the law of universal causation can be inductively justified (Mill 
1843: Bk. III). Importantly, Mill’s belief in the validity of the law of 
universal causation is not based on any belief about the nature of sub-
stantial connections in nature. That disqualifies him from being a causal 
realist, and I am happy to concede that Mumford & Anjum’s argument 
is problematic for Mill.
The bottom line is that none of the thinkers that claim that causation 
is a logical/conceptual connection are causal realists—at least none of 
those that appear in the debate—and so arguments professing to show 
that there is no logical necessity involved do not address causal realism. 
It is a straw man argument.
86 Causal Necessity
5.2  The Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance
In his famous paper ‘On the Notion of Cause’ (1912), Russell attempts to 
deliver a decisive blow to causal realism, and especially its endorsement 
of the law of causality, i.e. the view that causes necessitate their effects. 
Russell thinks the law is incoherent and that the notion of cause should 
even be abandoned. Indeed, he argues that the notion of cause hardly 
ever occurs in the natural sciences. His attack on causal realism has been 
very influential in 20th-century philosophy of causation, perhaps mostly 
by provoking various critical responses to it. Nancy Cartwright (1983) 
criticises him for assuming a much too general understanding of law, 
and Patrick Suppes (1970) points out that it is simply false that the word 
‘cause’ never occurs in the natural sciences.
Anjan Chakravartty offers a particularly interesting criticism (2005). 
According to Chakravartty, Russell is attacking a particular view that 
he clearly thinks is the standard realist account of causation—and his 
argument is indeed a valid refutation of that view—but, Chakravartty 
argues, the view he attacks simply isn’t causal realism proper. According 
to Chakravartty, the ‘standard realist account’ that Russell addresses 
is the account favoured by philosophers in the 20th century who take 
the statements of ordinary language to be the unit of analysis. In ordi-
nary language, causal claims have the general form ‘C causes E’, which 
seems to suggest an understanding of causation as a two-place relation 
between events and/or states. But, as Chakravartty points out, ‘everyday 
descriptions of causal phenomena are ambiguous with respect to the pre-
cise details of causation’ (2005: 15). Once you get down to the precise 
details, it is all too obvious that the two-place relation characterisation 
is not much more than a shorthand description that skims the surface 
of an underlying causal process that gives rise to and connects events 
(Chakravartty 2005).
I believe Russell’s view was received by his contemporary analytical 
philosophers, for exactly the reasons Chakravartty outlines. It fitted like 
hand to glove to the linguistic turn of 20th-century philosophy. However, 
I think more can be said about the way Russell himself arrives at that 
account. I believe it is the result of a particularly ill-conceived fusion 
of the neo-Humean constant conjunction formula and the causal realist 
notion of efficient causation, which Russell falsely believes is the standard 
view.
Russell thinks the philosophical concept of ‘cause’ is a ‘relic of a 
bygone age’ (1912: 1), and that it is unclear what to make of the ‘law of 
causality’, i.e. the idea of a necessary connection between causes and their 
effects. However, remarkably, in his treatment of these ideas, Russell does 
not consult anyone of the bygone age who has explicitly said anything 
about the concept of cause or the kind of necessity meant to connect it to 
its effect. Instead he proposes to find out what philosophers ‘commonly 
Causal Necessity 87
understand by “cause”’ (1912: 2) by looking it up in Baldwin’s Dictionary 
(1901), specifically the entry ‘Cause and Effect’, written by G.E. Moore. 
Russell cites this passage:
Cause and effect […] are correlative terms denoting any two distin-
guishable things, phases, or aspects of reality, which are so related to 
each other, that whenever the first ceases to exist, the second comes 
into existence immediately after, and whenever the second comes 
into existence, the first has ceased to exist immediately before.
(Russell 1912: 2)
The passage bears no sign of anything we can distinctly associate with 
the kind of causal realism I discussed in Chapter 3. Instead we find only 
something that looks like a paraphrase of Hume’s constant conjunction 
formula, which had arguably imposed itself on the way ‘philosophers 
in general’ write about causation at the time Russell and Moore were 
writing, i.e. on philosophers focused on philosophy as analysis of the 
statements of ordinary language. That Russell does indeed think this 
characterisation captures the essence of causal realism comes out clearly 
when he later notes that ‘it would seem that only the later parts [of a 
cause] can be relevant to the effect, since the earlier parts are not contigu-
ous to the effect, and therefore (by the definition) cannot influence the 
effect’ (1912: 5; italics are mine). However, the definition he starts from 
doesn’t say anything about influence and neither does the rest of Moore’s 
entry. Russell simply assumes that the temporal contiguity described must 
have to do with the principle of locality as a constraint on efficient cau-
sation, because he knows causal realism is all about efficient causation.
As I think, Russell starts his characterisation of causal realism using a 
paraphrase of the empiricist conception of causation as invariant regu-
larity between temporally successive events and has already then started 
on the wrong foot with respect to what kind of contiguity is relevant 
for causal realism. He then assumes that causal realists intend influence 
to be exerted from the first event to the second, just as Bigelow, Ellis, 
& Pargetter later assume (1988). As I mentioned earlier, the impor-
tance of temporal contiguity in Hume’s view of things has nothing to 
do with causal efficiency or influence in any sense relevant for causal 
realism. Hume declared the idea of objects exerting influence on each 
other empirically empty; we cannot trace the idea to any impression. For 
Hume, contiguity has only to do with our natural inclination to associate 
in the mind those things that appear contiguous. Causal realism instead 
appeals to spatial contiguity between temporally coinciding objects.
Ultimately, the view Russell attacks is the idea that causation is a two-
place relation between temporally distinct entities, of which the former 
exerts an influence on the latter. I will call this view ‘relational realism’. 
To my knowledge nobody has ever argued in favour of this view before 
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Russell, but as we have seen in Chapter 3, this became the received realist 
view of the 20th century. In slightly better detail, this is Russell’s argument:
 (1) Causes and effects are temporally successive and distinct events (no 
overlap).
 (2) Causes exert their influence on the effect.
 (3) Cause and effect must be temporally contiguous to allow the cause 
to exert its influence, and to ward off the possibility of anything hap-
pening in the temporal gap between cause and effect that could pre-
vent the influence from reaching the effect.
 (4) If the structure of time is continuous, cause and effect cannot be 
contiguous; between the time the cause ends and the time the effect 
begins, no matter how close they are, there will always be an infinity 
of time-points in between.
 (5) The Law of causation is incoherent.
This is what is now known as the problem of action at a temporal dis-
tance, but it should be clear that it is only a problem for the view that 
causation involves the exertion of influence between temporally distinct 
events, which is arguably a view Russell constructs for himself out of 
pieces that do not really belong together. It is a straw man argument.
In Chapters 3 and 4, I have already argued that causal influence has 
always been construed as something exerted between interacting and 
continuously coexisting objects, i.e. whose relation is continuously syn-
chronic, and that view is immune to Russell’s objection because there is 
no temporal gap between the object that acts and the object acted upon. 
Indeed, one of the main reasons Mumford & Anjum favour simultaneous 
causation is because they think it is the only way to avoid the problem 
of action at a temporal distance. My argument here is really that no one 
had really thought of actions as occurring between events, before Russell 
invents ‘relational realism’.
Now, while it is true that the recent resurgence of causal realism in 
the philosophy of causation is meant to represent a return to the older 
standard view, most powers-based accounts still tend to represent causa-
tion as a relation between temporally distinct relata; between powers and 
their manifestations (for instance, Molnar 2003; Bird 2007b), or between 
events composed of particulars with powers (Esfeld 2011). Their views 
are therefore still susceptible to Russell’s argument, and, for the same 
reasons, to the problem of interference and prevention.
5.3  The Problem of Interference and Prevention
Russell’s problem of action at a temporal distance is actually a special case 
of the problem of interference and prevention. His argument is designed 
to show that the general model of causation in terms of temporally 
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successive entities, of which the first exerts an influence on the second, 
cannot in principle exclude that an interference or prevention occurs in 
the unavoidable ‘gap’ between the end of a cause and beginning of an 
effect. The only difference really is that Russell’s argument isn’t formu-
lated in terms of a concrete example, only on a highly abstract temporal 
characterisation of causal connections.
However, the problem of interference and prevention, as it is usually 
formulated, typically refers to a family of concrete counterexamples that 
share the following general form. Given the occurrence of some kind of 
cause C, whose occurrence is supposed to reliably yield an effect E, then 
it seems always possible to assume the presence of some additional item ϕ 
such that it would be the case that E would not follow even if C occurred, 
or, in the case of pre-emption, that even if E actually does follow C then 
it isn’t as a result of C but instead of the additional item ϕ. The argu-
ment presupposes a certain understanding of necessity, notably the kind 
of unconditional necessity of which J.S. Mill spoke:
If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term neces-
sity, it is unconditionalness. That which is necessary, that which must 
be, means that which will be whatever supposition we make with 
regard to other things.
(1843: 339)
This is the type of necessity that Mumford & Anjum take to be relevant 
for causal necessity, and which they use to construe what they call ‘the 
test of antecedent strengthening’; a criterion they think any successful 
account of causal necessity must fulfil:
If A necessitates B, then: If A plus ϕ, for any ϕ, then B.
(2011: 57)
It is important to note that the test is to be applied to particular theories. 
That is, it should be understood as saying that whatever a certain theory 
specifies as a cause C that necessitates a specified effect E, then it had bet-
ter be the case according to that theory that if C happens we always get 
E ‘no matter whatever supposition we make with regard to other things’; 
i.e. the test must be true to the theory being tested both in the kind of 
cause and effect posited, and the kind of interference ϕ added to the situ-
ation. In other words, an argument operating with neo-Humean causes 
and effects, as well as interfering factors, will be irrelevant as a critique 
of a powerful particulars view. And, of course, it will not do to postulate 
as interferences/preventions anything that is actually forbidden by the 
theory in question, say, interferences by a deity, wizards, or other occult 
phenomena (which are forbidden on any naturalist account). A theory 
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can hardly be expected to be impervious to objections invoking phenom-
ena that the theory excludes as unreal.
So, in sum, the problem of causal necessity is this: is there an account 
of causation that can establish that whenever a certain kind of cause C 
occurs, then whatever suppositions we make with regard to anything else 
not already excluded by the theory, the effect E always and invariably 
follows? Today it is taken for granted that for any putative cause C ever 
suggested in the history of philosophy, it has been all too easy to construe 
counterexamples involving some interfering factor ϕ that prevents the 
putative effect E from following.
Over the years different types of counterexamples involving prevention 
and/or interference have come to be roughly divided into four main 
categories: (i) prevention, (ii) pre-emption, (iii) finks and (iv) antidotes. 
Prevention occurs when some factor ϕ in the circumstances in which C 
occurs prevents E from occurring. For instance, suppose that an assassin 
fires a shot and the bullet travels the distance to the victim but is deflected 
out of harm’s way on the very moment of impact, by a second bullet fired 
by another assassin; leaving only a scratch, as a mark of them having 
achieved contiguity. This is supposed to illustrate that C can occur—
the assassin fires a bullet, the bullet travels to the victim and becomes 
contiguous with it—and yet something intervenes to prevent the intended 
effect from occurring.
Pre-emption is when ϕ does not prevent E from following C, but 
prevents C from being the actual cause to E simply by producing E instead 
of C. In that case, ϕ is really another token cause of the same kind as C, 
which competes to produce E, and wins. Consider assassins Duke and 
Drew shooting at the same victim and both hitting the victim in the heart, 
except that Drew is a tad closer wherefore her bullet kills the victim an 
instant before Duke’s bullet arrives (alternatively, renders the victim as 
good as dead). The assumption is that a cause C occurs to completion 
but its designated effect, the death of the victim, is pre-empted by ϕ; 
the victim is already dead or as good as dead. There is a counterfactual 
version of this in which both bullets hit the heart simultaneously, but 
each pre-empts the other in the sense that even if one wouldn’t have hit, 
the other would.
In the case of prevention and pre-emption, the interfering factor is 
external both to the cause and the effect, or, rather, external to the object 
that acts (Agent) and the object that is acted upon (Patient). Finks and 
antidotes, on the other hand, are instead peculiar kinds of interfering 
powers that are intrinsic to the Agent and Patient, respectively. Finks are 
located in the kind of object that counts as an Agent in the standard view, 
and they work their interfering magic by defusing the Agent’s own sup-
posed power to produce a certain effect. Using a suitably modified assas-
sin scenario, consider a bullet fired at a victim and reaching the victim’s 
heart but causing no damage because in addition to having momentum, 
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impenetrability, and velocity (powers to produce death), the bullet has 
the ‘finkish’ power to instantaneously evaporate when coming into con-
tact with striated muscle cells, such as the heart is made of. C.B. Martin’s 
famous finkish live wire—deadly until touched—is another example of 
the same kind (1994). Consequently, the bullet penetrates the outer lay-
ers of tissue, but evaporates as soon as it touches the heart; the victim is 
maimed but doesn’t die.
Antidotes are powers of the Patient either to defuse its own liability 
to be affected by the action of the Agent or defuse the Agent’s power 
to produce an effect in the Patient. Thus, if the victim is disposed to 
instantaneously become perfectly permeable (i.e. ghost-like) when 
coming into contact with a particular metal present in the bullet, then on 
contact the victim becomes ghost-like, and the bullet passes through the 
victim without causing damage. Antidotes to poisons work in a similar 
way, either by directly neutralising the toxic abilities of the poison (e.g. 
active charcoal) or affecting the ability of the Patient to be affected by the 
poison (e.g. calcium channel blockers). Of course, real-life antidotes are 
extrinsic to the Patient and so really preventive factors.
It is indeed very difficult to come up with realistic cases of ‘finks’ 
and ‘antidotes’, since normally we would consider anything that has an 
intrinsic ‘fink’ or ‘antidote’ to already be immune to the action of the 
Agent in question, or unable to act on the Patient in the way required to 
produce the intended effect. An assassination-victim who is intrinsically 
immune to poison will simply not have the power to be poisoned that is 
prevented by a second power of immunity. This is why discussions about 
interference and prevention are full of oddly contrived powers, such as 
becoming perfectly permeable. Sometimes they even invoke magic (e.g. 
Manley & Wasserman 2008: 62) or divine intervention (Reeder 1995: 
143). The supernatural is already excluded by causal realist commitment 
to the genetic principle but let us see how the standard view might 
respond to the more realistic counterexamples.
In sum, arguments invoking cases of prevention and interference aim 
to show that some cause C occurs to completion and yet does not lead 
to E, because some ϕ interferes to stop E from happening, or to make C 
superfluous to the production of E, as in the case of prevention and pre-
emption, or cancel the occurrence of E by making the Agent impotent or 
the Patient impervious.
5.4  The Standard View Response
To my mind, no counterexample ever used to illustrate interference and 
prevention really presents a case where a cause C of the kind accepted 
by the standard view occurs to completion but is being prevented from 
having its effect because of some interfering factor ϕ. Instead they are 
cases where an effect is prevented because the cause is prevented from 
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ever taking place. Indeed, on closer inspection they simply illustrate what 
Hobbes thought was obvious, notably that only the total cause can neces-
sitate anything at all. In either case, the outcome of whatever scenario 
is being described turns out to be the inevitable and necessary result of 
what actually happens. Ergo, every counterexample really turns out to 
be a confirmation of the general schema ‘whenever an Agent A acts in a 
certain way C, on a Patient P, then the outcome is invariably E’, rather 
than a refutation of it.
Take the double-assassin situation as example. Duke’s bullet being 
deflected out of harm’s way by Drew’s bullet is really a situation where 
Duke’s bullet is prevented from actually exerting the kind of influence on 
the victim that would be required to produce a death; we do not really 
have a case of a completed action by A on P being prevented from hav-
ing its intended effect E. It is a case of A being prevented from acting on 
P, and thus it is a prevention of a particular cause C (i.e. the action of A 
on P) from being realised rather than preventing an effect E from being 
realised once C is complete.
In fact, the ‘counterargument’ seems designed to confirm rather than 
refute the standard view, because it really says that whenever a bullet 
A, on collision course with person P, collides with a second bullet B in 
the manner C*, then, necessarily, A and B are deflected away from P 
in manner E*. Pre-emption, finks, and antidotes can be dealt with in 
roughly the same way.
Consider pre-emption. Assassins Duke and Drew simultaneously fire 
their bullets and both hit the heart of the victim, except that Drew is a 
tad closer to the victim wherefore her bullet hits a fraction of a second 
before Duke’s bullet arrives, and kills the victim before Duke’s bullet has 
the chance to do it. I can again object and say that the example assumes 
that the nature of the object acted upon, or the character of the influ-
ence exerted on it, makes no difference regarding the type of cause being 
realised. But, surely, it is one thing for a bullet to act on a living body and 
another for it to act on a dead body (or one that is as good as dead). In 
fact, in the case at hand, the bullet fired by Duke has, of necessity, exactly 
the effect that it would be expected to have if it hit a dead body; it does 
all the damage to dead tissue that it should do. Basically, Duke’s bullet 
never realises the action of hitting a living body, and so never is a bullet 
hitting a living body that is prevented from producing a death. Instead, it 
is a bullet hitting a dead body and accordingly produces a certain kind of 
damage. The only thing that is prevented from being fulfilled is someone’s 
intention or expectation of ‘death-by-the-hand-of-Duke’, which arguably 
is a type of prevention that might be relevant to some form of popular 
narrative of how things unfold, but not to physical causation in objective 
reality. On the standard view I have presented, cases of prevention or pre-
emption do not provide genuine cases of a cause being realised and yet 
failing to produce the effect.
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Someone might worry about overdetermination and the resulting 
threat to the necessity of A’s and B’s action on P. That is, doesn’t the fact 
that P’s death is overdetermined by the actions of A and B mean that 
neither was necessary for the production of death, although each was 
sufficient? I don’t worry about this. To begin with, overdetermination 
only applies to causal reasoning that involves common-sense concepts 
like ‘hit by a bullet’ and ‘death’. If we think of the case on the level of 
determinate physical reality, then one bullet produces one amount of 
physical damage and two bullets produce double that amount; any 
real-life scenario that didn’t comply to this characterisation would be a 
violation of conservation laws. Whatever changes are produced by the 
first bullet will not be a prevention of the effect produced by the latter 
bullet; those changes merely serve to change the state of the Patient in 
time for its interaction with the second bullet and the outcome of that 
interaction will be necessary.
Consider now the finkish case in which a bullet ‘hits’ the victim’s 
heart but causes no damage because the bullet is such that it evaporates 
instantaneously when coming into contact with striated muscle cells. 
Again, if it is assumed, in accordance with the standard view, that 
causation is a matter of one object exerting an influence on other objects, 
and that the outcome is determined by the particular combination of 
powers present, then I can’t see how finks pose any threat at all. A fink is 
simply something that makes an Agent A unable to exert on the Patient 
P the kind of influence required to produce a given effect E, and thus 
prevents (or, rather, excludes the possibility of) the realisation of a cause 
C required to produce E rather than preventing the realisation of E once 
C is realised. It is only if we assume that the world is an aggregate of 
local matters of fact where nothing exerts an influence on anything else 
that a bullet being fired and becoming spatio-temporally contiguous 
with striated muscle cells can count as a cause running its course to 
completion. But that is a peculiarly neo-Humean conception of causation 
that is irrelevant to causal realist concerns.
What about antidotes? If the victim is disposed to instantaneously 
become perfectly permeable when coming into contact with the par-
ticular alloy of which the bullet is made, and then does actually become 
permeable when they touch, then this is not a case where the exertion of 
the type of influence that typically produces a death is prevented from 
having its intended effect; it is a case of A being unable to exert that 
particular type of mechanical influence on P that produces death, and 
instead, necessarily, exerts the kind of ‘magical’ influence that makes P 
perfectly permeable. Given that P is such that it becomes perfectly per-
meable when coming into contact with the particular alloy of which A is 
made, then, necessarily, when A touches P it makes P become perfectly 
permeable and therefore unaffected by the mechanical powers possessed 
by A.
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Both finkish and antidotal cases obviously presuppose that it is indi-
vidual powers that necessitate, i.e. that the necessary causal connection 
is assumed to hold between exertion of individual powers and their par-
ticular manifestations. As we have seen, the standard view does not say 
this; it insists it is only the sum total of powers in the interaction that can 
necessitate. To look for causal necessity in the connection between indi-
vidual powers and their manifestations is arguably to confuse the issue of 
causal necessity with the question of whether powers have dispositional 
essences. I deal with that problem in Chapter 8.
Some readers may worry that surely two Agents can act in exactly 
the same way on the same kind of Patient and yet produce different 
results. One example would be Duke punching a sandbag to make it 
swing, and Drew punching the sandbag in exactly the same way without 
making it swing, because only in the latter case is Mr T there to steady 
the bag. However, there is no problem here unless you require—like the 
empiricists do—that the cause results in a particular spatio-temporally 
observable behaviour or event; the observable correlate of bag swinging 
from position A to B. To require such a thing is a peculiarly empiricist 
prerequisite; it is a refusal to engage in talk about unobservables, or 
theoretical entities generally. Rationalists can accept that both punches 
produce identical effects even though that may not be obvious to an 
observer. In physical terms, both punches produce an identical change 
in the sandbags’ linear momentum—which is typically represented in 
classical mechanics by a vector quantity using the symbol p—from p to 
p*. The difference between the two scenarios is that immediately after 
Drew hits her sandbag and changes the sandbag’s momentum from p to 
p*, there is a subsequent exertion of an oppositely directed force by Mr 
T, that changes the sandbag’s momentum again (from p* to p). In Duke’s 
case, on the other hand, there is no such subsequent action and the change 
in linear momentum is therefore realised in the form of motion from A to 
B. To repeat, in both cases the linear momentum changed from p to p*, 
which means that in both cases a punch resulted in the same effect, even 
though it was not visible for an observer.
We can use Newton’s cradle to illustrate further the real but invis-
ible manifestation of change. The cradle contains five metal balls sus-
pended by strings to lie contiguously in a straight horizontal plane (and 
we assume they are perfectly aligned and balanced). If the ball at one end 
of the line is lifted up and released, it will swing down to hit the adjoin-
ing ball but the only visible change in the cradle is the movement of the 
ball on the opposite end, which will swing up and back to again hit the 
line of balls, of which the only visible result is again a movement of the 
ball on the opposite end. A causal realist will say that even though no 
change is perceived in the three balls in the middle, they still undergo a 
change in their intrinsic properties, notably in their linear momentum 
(from p to p*), and that a succession of interactions takes place along the 
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line of balls. The only way to interfere with this succession of interaction 
is to introduce another Agent that influences the cradle in such a way as 
to prevent some other influence from taking place. But it is impossible 
to prevent an effect from an already exerted influence, without violating 
conservation laws.
To my mind, then, the standard view can deal with the counterexam-
ples provided under the heading ‘prevention and interference’; provided 
we think that (i) the necessary link holds between, on the one hand, an 
exertion of a particular type of influence of a particular type of Agent on 
a particular type of Patient, and, (ii) the resulting change be allowed to 
include unobservable changes in the intrinsic properties of things, such 
as a change in the linear momentum of an object in the absence of an 
observable movement.
5.5  Interference and Prevention in Powers-Based Causation
I have so far argued that the standard view can deal with counterexam-
ples where it is assumed that individual external objects (simple preven-
tion and pre-emption), or individual factors, or powers, intrinsic to the 
objects involved (finks and antidotes), interfere and/or prevent the effi-
cacy of the actions of individual Agents or powers. However, Mumford 
& Anjum have also addressed the question of whether the total set of 
powers involved in an instance of causation could necessitate an outcome 
(2011: Ch. 3). At first blush, their argument may seem to address a total 
cause conception of the kind I am promoting. But this is not the case. 
They characterise the total cause merely in terms of the obtaining of a 
set of powers, in a way that ignores the manner in which the powers are 
exerted in an interaction between powerful particulars. That makes quite 
a difference.
Mumford & Anjum argue that if a given effect E is assumed to be the 
necessary result of a combination of a set of powers, say [p1, p2, p3, p4], 
then—for it to pass the test of necessity—whenever powers [p1–p4] obtain 
we should always get E no matter what other factor ϕ obtains with them. 
I acknowledge that, as a matter of empirical fact, this is not the case. If 
[p1–p4] obtains we get E, but if [p1–p4 +ϕ] obtains, we get E*. Their argu-
ment is logically valid. I just find that it doesn’t address the standard view, 
and as far as I know, the view they address has never been defended.
Admittedly, Hobbes writes that an entire cause is the ‘aggregate’ of 
all the powers of the interacting objects, which could be interpreted as 
a characterisation of causes merely as a certain combination of pow-
ers. However, one will then have to neglect Hobbes’ repeated claims 
that it is the body of the Agent that acts upon the body of the Patient, 
albeit in virtue of possessing various powers (Hobbes 1656: Ch. IX, 
§§1–4, 8). Obviously, what Hobbes has or hasn’t said isn’t really par-
amount here. We can just appeal to the empirical fact that the way 
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powers are distributed between interacting entities is important for the 
production of an outcome, not just the collected presence of powers at 
a place and time.
The standard view states that causes are interactions between power-
ful particulars; not the mere obtaining of a set of powers. It matters for 
the characterisation of the cause at hand to which particulars the powers 
[p1–p4] belong. An interaction between particulars A and B where the 
powers [p1–p4] are distributed as A[p1, p2] vs. B[p3, p4] is a different kind 
of cause than an interaction where the same set of powers [p1–p4] are 
distributed as A[p1, p3] vs. B[p2, p4] (A has p3 instead of p2, and B has 
p2 instead of p3). Therefore, one cannot argue without further qualifica-
tions that, for powers-based causation to be necessary, whenever powers 
[p1–p4] are present one must always get E. One has to consider how the 
powers are distributed between the particulars.
Let us go through this in detail. Consider an interaction (⇔) between 
two particulars A & B with each a set of powers [p1, p2…], which then 
produces (⊃) an outcome E:
 A[p1, p2] ⇔ B[p3, p4] ⊃ E. (1)
According to the standard view, this is one kind of interaction and so a 
particular type of cause leading to a certain effect, E. And it is different 
from the following interaction in which the same powers are present, but 
distributed differently between the particulars to produce the effect E* (A 
has p3 instead of p2, and B has p2 instead of p3):
 A[p1, p3] ⇔ B[p2, p4] ⊃ E*. (2)
So even in different cases where we have the same powers present, we 
may not get the same effect if they be distributed between the particulars 
in different ways. Furthermore, neither (1) nor (2) are instantiated in the 
following interaction where we have [p1–p4] + an additional power ϕ:
 A[p1, p2] ⇔ B[p3, p4, ϕ] ⊃ E**. (3)
The last interaction is not an instance in which either (1) or (2) occurs, 
but are somehow interfered with by ϕ; it is a different interaction, and 
so a different cause producing a different effect. Either ϕ is a part of the 
interaction, in which case the only thing that is prevented is the occur-
rence of causes of kind (1) and (2), or ϕ is introduced after or during the 
interaction, and in either case it comes too late to prevent the manifesta-
tion of an exertion of influence that has already taken place. Remember 
that the standard view takes causation to be a continuous process of 
mutations that continues as long as the objects are exerting an influence 
on each other. At any point in that process an exertion of influence will 
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have an immediate result, but interfere at any given point and the pro-
cess morphs into another process through the addition of a participating 
powerful particular; one that will necessarily evolve a certain way.
Really, if we take into account the distribution of powers among inter-
acting particulars, then the only way to introduce an additional power ϕ 
to the set of powers [p1–p4] is either by introducing an additional external 
particular, C, bearing the power ϕ, as in the case of simple prevention and 
pre-emption discussed earlier, or we introduce ϕ as already belonging to 
the Agent and/or Patient, in which case we have finkish and antidotal 
cases all over again.
I can’t see a way to interfere or prevent anything on this model. The 
only thing that could make interactions of this kind anything less than 
necessary is if we already postulate that the individual powers are slightly 
indeterminate in their contribution to an interaction. This seems to be 
what Mumford & Anjum mean in calling powers tendencies. However, 
their argument in favour of treating powers as tendencies is the argument 
that I have just discussed, notably that sets of powers do not necessitate 
any particular outcome because something can interfere with their 
production of effects.
It is possible that Mumford & Anjum do not think of their view as 
motivated by the interference and prevention argument alone, but rather 
see a theoretical advantage in the idea of a tendential modality in itself. 
After all, they claim that even in situations where ‘there is nothing that 
prevents the effect from occurring, but still, it need not occur’ (2018: 
18). As Stathis Psillos remarks in his review of Mumford & Anjum’s 
most recent book, What Tends to Be, this move ‘seems to pile a new 
mystery on the old’ (Psillos 2019), notably of explaining how it could be 
that an influence is being exerted but nothing happens even if nothing is 
interfering.
Psillos speculates whether they are modelling the modality of tenden-
cies on phenomena like radioactive decay; at any moment the atom has 
the tendency to decay—and nothing is there to prevent it from  decaying—
and yet it may not decay. Psillos is worried that idea turns on a problem-
atic view of the probabilistic nature of decay, which I think is a valid 
worry. Indeed, one can worry about more than the probabilistic aspect 
of decay. If one thinks decay is a spontaneous non-causal phenomenon, 
because it is not triggered by an interaction between the atom and any 
other powerful particular, then it isn’t causal at all. If one instead thinks 
that we are dealing with an atom that has the power to decay, but doesn’t 
because it isn’t exercising the power, then we don’t have a case where a 
power is being exerted without producing an effect, but a case where a 
power isn’t exerted.
Anyway, if we confine ourselves to interactions between powerful par-
ticulars, then Mumford & Anjum’s tendential modality seems to allow 
for the possibility that two billiard balls could collide and fail to exert 
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their powers on each other, or, that even if they do exert them, they don’t 
change each other’s state of motion because they fail to exert their pas-
sive power to change state of motion. To my mind, that would be rather 
mysterious.
5.6  Causal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus Clause
I think it is important to point out that the powerful particulars view 
really amounts to an account of unconditional necessity without appeal 
to ceteris paribus clauses. This is because it includes in the notion of cause 
the components that others take to be mere conditions; the conditions 
that must stay the same to secure the connection between C and E. The 
ceteris paribus clause is meant to cover all these allegedly non-causal 
conditions. I think it follows from my argument above, that we don’t 
have to add a ceteris paribus clause to exclude the presence of any addi-
tional item ϕ that could interfere or prevent, because the presence of any 
such additional item would only constitute a failure of the obtaining of a 
certain kind of cause C rather than the prevention of an effect, and con-
stitute the obtaining of a certain other kind of cause C*, which inevitably 
gives E*.
5.7  Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued (i) no causal realist has argued that causal 
connections are logically necessary, (ii) the problem of action at a tem-
poral distance addresses a view that has never been defended, but was 
merely Russell’s mistaken conception of causal realism, and that the pow-
erful particulars view is immune to the problem, (iii) that the problem 
of interference and prevention similarly addresses only relational real-
ism while the powerful particulars view is immune to it, and (iv) that 
Mumford & Anjum’s version of the problem of interference and preven-
tion addresses a view of causes as sets of powers that has never been 
used to defend causal necessity, and that the powerful particulars view is 
immune to their arguments too. The conclusion must be that CASE does 
not amount to a serious challenge to the necessity of causal connections.
In Chapter 2 I introduced the distinction between characterising and 
explaining features of reality, arguing that neo-Humean accounts of cau-
sation only strive to characterise, while causal realist accounts strive to 
explain, all the while being compatible with neo-Humean characterisa-
tions on the level of description. Causal realist and neo-Humean accounts 
only disagree in so far as proponents of neo-Humean accounts of causa-
tion also explicitly endorse neo-Humean metaphysics, i.e. the view that 
there are no substantial connections in reality that could explain how 
causation appears in experience. I also claimed that extant accounts of 
the persistence of compound entities only characterise and do not explain. 
The only explanatory account of persistence I know of—that the world 
ultimately consists of permanent simples—only explains the persistence 
of simples. Now it is time to deliver on the promise of a causal account 
of the persistence of compound entities. Indeed, I think it also offers an 
explanation of the constitution of compound entities in contrast to main-
stream accounts that merely characterise the relationships between the 
parts of constituted compounds (for an overview, see Wasserman 2018; 
Varzi 2019).
I think there are very obvious causal aspects to the constitution and 
continued existence of compound entities, especially in light of the sci-
entific image of the world. Just consider the explanations given in sec-
ondary education physics and chemistry of the physical bonds that hold 
compound objects together, say, how elementary particles constitute 
an atom through continuous interaction. Physics, chemistry, and biol-
ogy simply do not depict the entities they study as things that passively 
continue to exist as long as nothing destroys them; they continuously 
and actively preserve themselves through the interaction of their con-
stituents. However, in philosophy it is rare to see anything more than a 
passing reference to the possibility that there might after all be something 
causal about persistence, except among proponents of process ontology. 
However, it is assumed that substance and process ontology are rival and 
incompatible views. I’ll return to that question in Chapter 7.
6 Constitution and Persistence
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6.1  The Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and 
Persistence
Constitution is typically regarded as a non-causal phenomenon. So, for 
instance, there is no reference to anything causal in the entry ‘Material 
Constitution’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Wasserman 
2018). One rare exception is Karen Bennett (2017). Bennett objects to the 
received view that what she calls ‘building relations’ are non-causal (such 
as grounding, composition, determination, realisation, and constitution). 
According to her ‘there are particular building relations that are partially 
defined in causal terms, and there are even building relations that only 
obtain diachronically, in virtue of causal facts’ (2017: 2). I agree with this 
claim, but I also think that she doesn’t specify the kind of causal account 
needed to substantiate that claim.
The idea that persistence might be causal occurs more frequently, but, 
again, usually in process ontology. Whitehead takes persistent entities to 
be processes, i.e. a sequence of temporally ordered stages, each of which 
undergoes ‘concrescence’—a transition from potentiality to actuality—
and the concrescence of each stage causally triggers the concrescence of 
the next (Emmet 1992). Peter Simons observes that the persistence of 
things seems to be dependent on the processes taking place in the thing 
and suggests we should think of persistent entities (or continuants, as 
he calls them) as dependent on a base of occurrents that stand in causal 
relations to each other (Simons 2000). Simons intends his view to be an 
alternative to the endurance and perdurance views, which he thinks are 
flawed because neither addresses the explanatory gap between the per-
manence of simples and the constitution and continued existence of com-
pounds. Now, while I agree with Simons about the flaws of the endurance 
and perdurance views, I don’t like the idea of process as a structured 
series of stages or occurrences either. As I have previously argued, the 
stage view of process reduces change either to variation between stages—
a problem it shares with perdurantism (see Ingthorsson 2001, 2009)—or 
to concrescence of stages, i.e. transitions from potentiality to actuality, 
which I think inevitably violates the genetic principle. I will discuss the 
nature of processes in Chapter 7.
Salmon also thinks persistent objects are causal processes but denies 
that this commits him to an event ontology of process (1984: 139ff). 
However, Salmon really doesn’t give an account of what a process is, nor 
does it seem possible to apply his account of causation in terms of propa-
gation and interaction to the continued existence of processes. It rather 
seems that persistence, i.e. the ability to propagate a mark, is constitutive 
of causation rather than vice versa.
The general lack of attempts to make something of the causal aspects 
of constitution and persistence—outside process ontology—can plausibly 
be explained by the fact that the mainstream definitions of the notions 
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of causation, persistence, and constitution present them as prima facie 
incompatible. Causation is understood as a diachronic relation between 
distinct relata—one event being the cause of another—and thus as an 
external relation. Indeed, the concept of non-causal spontaneous change 
is typically understood as one that happens in the absence of an external 
cause, like the decay of unstable particles. Persistence is also understood 
as a diachronic relation, but one holding between an object and itself, 
and thus intrinsic to the persistent thing. This may be the main obstacle 
to a causal account of persistence. If we are looking for the cause for the 
persistence of an object, we are not looking for an external compulsion; 
if an object persists, it does so of its own accord. Finally, constitution is 
typically understood as a relation between a whole and its parts and is 
traditionally taken to be a relation that can hold at any given time, i.e. 
synchronically. Consequently, it is a relation that is intrinsic to the consti-
tuted object but still not a relation of identity. In sum, tradition dictates 
that causation is a diachronic relation between distinct relata, persistence 
a diachronic relation between an object and itself, and constitution a syn-
chronic part-whole relation. Against this background, to offer a causal 
account of constitution and persistence will require us to think differently 
about one or more of these notions. Here I explore what happens if we 
accept the interaction view presented in Chapter 4.
6.2  Characterisations
Persistence is typically characterised as something existing for more than 
a moment, which isn’t an explanation of why anything persists at all, or 
why things persist for a short or long time. The notions of endurance and 
perdurance do not explain either why something endures or perdures; 
they just characterise persistence in ways conceptually compatible with 
the constraints of the A vs B view of time. According to the A view, all 
objects are only in the present but it allows what is present to change, 
wherefore things can come to exist at many times by passing from one 
time to another. According to the B view, time does not pass, and all 
times exist in parity, wherefore objects cannot pass through time and 
must therefore extend through time, having different parts existing at 
different times (Ingthorsson 2009). Similarly, mereology doesn’t tell us 
what makes p be a constitutive part of some whole w, but only illustrates 
the formal relations between p and w and any other parts of w, once it 
is assumed that p1, p2, p3… are constituents of w (for an overview, see 
Varzi 2019).
It bears mentioning that Kit Fine’s ‘Aggregative’ and ‘Monster’ objec-
tions to mainstream accounts of constitution (1999: 62–3) boil down 
to the claim that they don’t explain constitution; that they treat com-
pound objects as mere aggregates, and therefore can’t really tell true uni-
ties from mere aggregates. This allows us to create ‘monstruous’ entities 
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like the sum of Cleopatra, a slice of ham, and the sum of all objects that 
merely existed before or after the existence of a particular ham sandwich. 
Indeed, Fine’s account in terms of what he calls ‘embodiments’ is in some 
ways an attempt to provide an explanatory account, and he thinks it is 
roughly Aristotelian (Fine 1999). However, since Fine’s ‘embodiments’ 
are primitive sui generis relations between a whole and its parts, they are 
only explanatory in the same sense the attribution of ‘permanence’ to 
fundamental particles is an explanation of persistence. The fact that con-
stitution applies to compounds and not simples, i.e. not to fundamental 
entities, raises the question of whether this strategy really is warranted for 
compounds. Furthermore, it is an account that doesn’t obviously connect 
‘embodiments’ with the scientific explanation of how elementary par-
ticles make up atoms, atoms make molecules, etcetera. If not for anything 
else, if an account of constitution in terms of interaction works, it has the 
advantage over Fine’s account of not being sui generis, and clearly links 
our philosophical views with the theories and findings of science. For a 
critical discussion of Fine’s account, see Kathrin Koslicki (2008: 75–89).
The distinction between unities and aggregates is central for the issue 
of constitution. A unity is a collection of entities that bear a substan-
tial relation to each other, such as the particles in an atom, atoms in a 
molecule, molecules in an alloy, or even the parts of an automobile. An 
aggregate, on the other hand, is a collection of entities that do not stand 
in any substantial relation to each other, such as the various deserts on 
the planet, or the cars parked in a given car park at a certain time. They 
amount to no more than the mereological sum of its parts. The existence 
of an aggregate is dependent upon the existence of each and every part, 
but the existence, qualities, and behaviour of the parts are not dependent 
upon the existence of the collection. In a unity, the parts are qualitatively 
modified as a result of becoming a part of the unity, and their behav-
iour is partly determined by the whole of which they are parts, but they 
also contribute to determine the behaviour of the whole. An example is 
the way the rotation of the Earth along its axis and around the sun is 
continuously influenced by the sun, moon, and other planets, and, vice 
versa, the presence of the Earth in the solar system affecting the behav-
iour of the system. Obviously, one cannot hope to explain the persistence 
of aggregates in terms of interaction, since by definition there are no sub-
stantial connections between the parts of an aggregate, and interaction is 
a substantial connection. We may have better luck with unities.
The objects we ordinary identify as objects, like tables, billiard balls, 
and persons, not only appear to us as unified wholes, but are accounted 
for scientifically as collections of parts bound together by physical bonds 
that all count as interactions in the way I describe them in Chapter 4. 
That is, ordinary middle-sized objects are compound substances consti-
tuted by parts bound together by continuous interaction. A brick is a 
unity of parts and it can in turn be a part of an aggregate whose parts 
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interact, e.g. when the brick collides with a window. In this example, the 
unity of the brick is preserved but the unity of the window is destroyed. 
In ‘Causal Production as Interaction’ (Ingthorsson 2002) I maintain that 
the aggregate whole of brick and window also persists through an inter-
action, but this is not something it does because of the interaction, rather 
in spite of the interaction. The aggregate whole persists because of the 
‘existential inertia’ it borrows from the simple substances that are its 
fundamental parts. Whether any unity contained in that aggregate sur-
vives as well—say, the brick—is decided by how well the unity succeeds 
in preserving its structure.
6.3  A Causal Account of Constitution and Persistence
To accept interaction as a fundamental feature of causation is to admit 
that the ontological category of causation is bigger than causal realists 
previously thought. Most importantly, it allows us to include in the cat-
egory of causation all the interactions that take place between the con-
stituent parts of objects, and which are already understood as the bonds 
that glue those parts together to form a unity. Interactions explain consti-
tution and persistence as two sides of the same coin; they bond the parts 
together to constitute an object, and they preserve the unity over time. 
Persistence basically is the temporal dimension of constitution.
Interactions have not been considered causal before, because they were 
perceived to lack what the standard view postulates to be an essential 
feature of causation: external compulsion. Now, in a sense, interactions 
do not really lack external compulsion since interacting entities do act 
on other entities. It is only from our ‘middle-sized dry goods’ perspective 
that whatever happens invisibly between distinct parts inside an object 
strikes us as happening in the absence of external compulsion, and indeed 
as happening in the absence of any visible compulsion.
It actually turns out that there is really very little for me to do, 
vis-à-vis a causal account of constitution and persistence, once interac-
tions are accepted as causal, except to point out that this is how objects 
are already understood to be constituted by their parts and why they 
continue to exist over time, i.e. persist. The standard model of physics 
describes how our physical reality is built up of simple elementary par-
ticles that interact with each other to constitute compound entities (for 
reference, see Donoghue, Golowich, & Holstein 2014). Quarks interact 
strongly to constitute protons and neutrons. Protons and neutrons in 
turn interact via the nuclear force (derivative of strong interaction) to 
constitute atomic nuclei, and the nuclei interact electromagnetically with 
electrons to constitute atoms. None of these compounds—protons, neu-
trons, nuclei, atoms—are static and unchanging, but dependent for their 
stability, i.e. continued existence, on continuous and dynamic interac-
tions between the component parts. Atoms are more complicated than 
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presented here (including various weak interactions between the particles 
of the standard model), but this is enough for our present purposes.
Going up to the level of molecules, they are constituted by chemi-
cal bonds. There are ionic bonds, which involve electrostatic attraction 
between charged ions, and covalent bonds which involve two atoms shar-
ing electrons. Again, these bonds—just like those between the constituent 
parts of the atoms—are thoroughly dynamic and yet, provided they are 
stable, still maintain a certain status quo of whatever system they work to 
constitute. I will not attempt to characterise in more detail the nature of 
this dynamic equilibrium on the atomic level. I don’t think I can provide 
a concise enough description that is both theoretically correct and easily 
understood by those readers who, like me, don’t have an expert knowl-
edge of either physics or chemistry. Instead I will illustrate the dynamic 
equilibrium using an object we are all roughly familiar with, namely the 
solar system.
The solar system is a compound constituted by a collection of bodies, 
held together by the interactions taking place between them. I’ll confine 
the model to just sun and planets for the sake of simplicity. It has per-
sisted for millions of years and will continue to persist for millions more. 
However, the solar system is never the same between any two points in 
time; it is continuously changing in a way that serves to preserve the sys-
tem. Unless the planets were moving in their orbits as they currently are, 
the solar system would quickly collapse; too fast and they will gradually 
escape the gravitational pull of the sun, too slow and the sun will swal-
low them. Indeed, the current equilibrium is actually only so stable as to 
put off the inevitable end beyond any timescale we need worry about. 
The planets are ever so slightly moving away from the sun, and the moon 
moving away from Earth.
In Chapter 7, I will argue that objects like the solar system, as well as 
any relatively stable material system exhibiting the same dynamic equi-
librium, count as a process, if we by ‘process’ mean any persistent entity 
for which change is essential for its continued existence. However, I will 
argue that this does not detract from their status as substances in the 
Aristotelian sense (to be distinguished from the modern analytic concep-
tion of substance).
6.4  Problems?
There are two questions that arise here. First, how can objects be dif-
ferentiated, if, as physics dictates, everything is always interacting gravi-
tationally with everything else in the universe? The answer is that we get 
a differentiation in terms of the strength of unity of a compound, which 
varies by the strength of the type of interaction involved and the overall 
stability of the system. The four fundamental types of interactions that 
obtain in the world are the strong and weak interaction, which obtain 
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at close range between the constituents of an atom, and gravitation and 
electromagnetic interaction which are more long range. Each of these are 
of different strengths, and thus allow us to differentiate between different 
physical systems that will display a different kind of unity depending on 
the interactions by which they are constituted. The gravitational interac-
tion between the Earth and the moon is strong enough to cause tides, but 
not enough to really disrupt the cohesion of the Earth as a unitary whole. 
Then again, the ionic and covalent bonds between water molecules are 
strong enough to explain the cohesion of water, but at room temperature 
water has little or no effect on the cohesion of our bodies since the cells 
of our skin are bonded together much more strongly than the molecules 
of water. I take this differentiation to fit the way science already differ-
entiates between entities. To be sure, this way of differentiating between 
unities is messy. We really get a very intricate hierarchy of partly overlap-
ping systems, but that is a conclusion that seems to fit our observations 
of the world we live in.
Second, does my account answer the special composition question, i.e. 
does it specify under what conditions something composes something 
else? I won’t delve deep into that question. I don’t actually think I provide 
a new account of constitution, except in so far as I offer a way to under-
stand the way constitution is already understood in the sciences, as being 
a causal phenomenon. What I can say is that I think this is an account 
of constitution that has an advantage over Fine’s embodiment account, 
and one that provides a more fine-grained account of what Bennett calls 
‘diachronic building’.
6.5  Concluding Remarks
I think I have now given at least the outlines of a causal theory of 
constitution and persistence. If causation is interaction, then every 
stable compound constituted by interactions between its parts is caus-
ally constituted. Persistence merely represents another side of the same 
coin, notably how long the system thus constituted is preserved by the 
same interactions that constitute it. The length will partly be decided 
by how intrinsically stable the system is, i.e. how well it is able to 
uphold itself over a period of time in which it does not interact with 
other systems, and in part by the absence of interactions with other 
systems. For instance, while a crystal glass is intrinsically stable, it is 
easily shattered by interactions with other things. Such a glass may 
last for a shorter time than something less stable if it is unfortunate 
enough to interact in a destructive way with something, but longer 
than sturdier things if it is lucky enough to avoid a tumble and a fall. 
We then have an explanation not only of how compound entities are 
causally constituted but also of why they persist for longer or shorter 
periods of time.
In Chapter 6 I stated that the conception of constitution and persistence 
that I present there implies that compound objects are to be considered 
processes, if by ‘process’ we mean any entity for which change is essen-
tial for its continued existence. Furthermore, I claim that they can still 
be considered substances. This contradicts received wisdom according to 
which substance and process ontologies are contrary and incompatible 
views. Here, in Nicholas Rescher’s words:
Process philosophy diametrically opposes the view—as old as 
Parmenides and Zeno and the Atomists of Pre Socratic Greece—that 
denies processes or downgrades them in the order of being or of 
understanding by subordinating them to substantial things.
(Rescher 2012)
However, like Albert William Levi (1958), I find it less than perfectly clear 
just what the relevant opposites are. For one thing, as Rescher himself 
points out, what unites philosophers of process is more an opposition 
to substance ontology rather than a common view on the nature of pro-
cess (Rescher 2012). And, for another, it is not clear that all metaphysi-
cal systems that make use of the notion of substance share the features 
process ontologists ascribe to substance ontology. Levi indeed says, ‘it is 
not easy to find in either Bergson or Whitehead criticisms which specifi-
cally controvert the relevant sections of Aristotle’s Metaphysics’ (1957: 
750). Rescher implicitly recognises this as well, because even though he 
characterises process philosophy as diametrically opposed to substance 
philosophy, he includes Aristotle as a ‘key figure in the history of process 
philosophizing’ (1957: 11). So, what exactly is this conception of sub-
stance to which process ontology is opposed?
7 Substance and Process
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7.1  Substance Ontology
The term ‘substance’ is a philosophical term of art, which covers all kinds 
of sins. Here I will only delve as far into the details of the issue of sub-
stance as is necessary to clarify the contrast between substance and pro-
cess ontology, and in particular for identifying which versions of each 
view stand a chance of being compatible with each other. For a more 
complete overview, see Robinson (2020).
One sense of understanding ‘substance’, which is possibly obsolete, is of 
whatever is considered the most fundamental entity out of which every-
thing else is made. According to this use, processes are the substances 
of process ontology. It seems clear that the dispute between process and 
substance ontology is about the nature of the most fundamental entities, 
in which case this sense of ‘substance’ is irrelevant to elucidate the kind 
of opposition process ontologists have in mind.
Contemporary views on ‘substance’ are of a certain kind of funda-
mental entity, and they are all popularly believed to be closely con-
nected to the kind of entities that Aristotle picked out using the term 
‘ousia’, i.e. persistent entities that exhibit a certain unity. These are 
what we ordinarily call ‘things’ like sticks, stones, and teacups. We 
can ignore the complication to do with the distinction between nat-
ural unities and artefacts, which, although important to understand 
Aristotelian metaphysics, is not a concern in modern metaphysics 
(although it should be). It is with this focus on ‘things’ that process 
ontologists think we can begin to see a contrast between substance and 
process ontology. The idea is that substance ontology assumes that the 
fundamental constituents are whatever remains fixed and unchanged 
in an ever-changing world, while processes are ever-changing. Two 
questions arise. First, is it fair to think of Aristotelian hylomorphism 
in terms of our ordinary notion of ‘things’? Second, do substance and 
process ontologists really disagree about which of the entities that 
appear to us in our everyday conceptual scheme are more fundamental 
than the other? I think not.
If we begin with the latter question, then the answer is clearly no. 
Everyone agrees that teacups are more fundamental than a tea party, 
atoms are more fundamental than teacups, and elementary particles more 
fundamental than atoms. Process ontologists just insist that teacups and 
atoms are processes, and that even when we get down to the elementary 
particles of the standard model, they too are processes rather than sub-
stances. So, the disagreement is not about which entities are fundamental, 
but about the nature of what everybody regards as fundamental. The real 
disagreement is whether the most fundamental entities are dynamic or 
static, and process ontologists think that substance ontology makes these 
entities out as being inherently static. But are substances really static on 
all accounts? A good place to start answering that question is to have 
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a look at what Johanna Seibt calls the paradigm of substance ontology 
(1996), which I think is the clearest statement to date of what contempo-
rary substance ontology amounts to, from the perspective of contempo-
rary process ontology.
7.2  The Paradigm of Substance Ontology
What Seibt dubs the paradigm of substance ontology is the result of an 
attempt to break up the seemingly irresolvable dispute between the endu-
rantist and perdurantist approaches to persistence (2000). She finds both 
approaches to be inadequate but also that proponents of each view seem 
incapable of fruitfully addressing each other’s concerns in order to resolve 
the issue. Seibt follows Ramsey’s advice in solving these kinds of situa-
tions by searching for implicit assumptions that might hamper the treat-
ment of the issue. Such implicit assumptions can become embedded in the 
presuppositional depth-structure of the debate and go by unnoticed. The 
idea is that if these presuppositions are brought to light, it becomes clear 
how they govern and constrain the construction of ontological theories. 
Seibt concludes that the debate on persistence is marred by a number of 
presuppositions derived from substance ontology, and which prevent us 
from considering other alternatives:
Even those contemporary ontologists who drop the traditional talk 
about substances still import the presuppositions of the traditional 
paradigm; even in ontologies whose basic entities are events, tropes, 
or state of affairs, the presuppositions of substance ontology are still 
operative. Substance-ontological presuppositions enter into the very 
formulations of ontological problems and restrict the space of pos-
sible solutions.
(1996: 143)
Seibt proposes that, within the regional ontology of existence in time (i.e. 
persistence), there are at least five such presuppositions, which I para-
phrase in the following way:
 (1) A theory of persistence is a theory of the existence in time of things 
or persons; things and persons are the paradigm examples of persis-
tent entities, and therefore such entities as processes, events, heaps, 
masses, and collections are neglected.
 (2) What exists is exhausted by concrete individuals and/or abstract enti-
ties; abstract entities are not changes, and do not change, but indi-
viduals persist and undergo change.
 (3) The idea of enduring entities is not a theoretical construct; it is 
the way we ‘naturally’ intuit persistent entities, as opposed to the 
Substance and Process 109
theoretical construct of perdurance, wherefore the burden of proof 
lies heavy on the perdurantist.
 (4) The principle of subjecthood; persistence through change requires a 
logical subject of which it can be said that it has a property before a 
change which it has not after; a-is-F-at-t1 and a-is-G-at-t2 represent 
a change iff a-at-t1 is identical to a-at-t2.
 (5) The state analysis of change; change is to be analysed in terms of 
differences between times in the states of a logical subject; a change 
consists in a-being-F-at-t1 and a-being-G-at-t2, respectively.
Seibt argues that it is the presupposition that only substances can be the 
logical subjects of persistence and change that is the obstacle preventing 
the discussion moving on. For instance, she notes, all changes that involve 
the annihilation of the logical subject have traditionally been rejected as 
real changes, because it has been thought that changes require the persis-
tence of the logical subject. Seibt then proposes a process ontology as a 
possible way to move on.
Now, I agree with Seibt that these presuppositions are at work in many 
contemporary discussions about the nature of change and persistence. 
For instance, Hugh Mellor argues that if an animal is blown to smither-
eens that event is not a change, because the animal, the logical subject of 
change, doesn’t survive (1998: 97). However, I don’t think this paradigm 
of substance ontology really captures the essence of Aristotelian substance 
ontology, nor do I think process ontology offers a solution to the prob-
lem of persistence and change. Consider that Aristotle does allow cre-
ation and destruction of logical subjects to be a change; it is a change in 
the underlying substance that composes the object that modern thinkers 
identify as the logical subject, say, the biological material that constitutes 
the animal. As I see it, her critique is only relevant to those that think of 
substance more broadly as something that sustains properties but which 
has no intrinsic structure or nature. Let me call that the modern analytic 
view of substance. It is a conception of substance from which most things 
Aristotelian have been abstracted—in particular, the structure so typical 
of hylomorphism is absent—but is still popularly believed to have its ori-
gin in Aristotle for reasons probably lost in history. In its most extreme 
form this modern analytic view of substance is expressed as: ‘Something 
must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a quality 
or a relation. And this is Substance’ (McTaggart 1921: §67).
Within the modern analytic view, there is then a controversy about 
whether substance should be thought of as a ‘thin’ particular, i.e. as some-
thing that sustains the properties but which doesn’t include the proper-
ties, or a ‘thick’ particular, i.e. as the property bearer with its properties 
included. Neither view tells us how the substance unites the properties, 
and both views assume that the identity of the particular is grounded in 
the qualities that it sustains. It is the latter, as we will see, that leads to 
110 Substance and Process
such conundrums as the problem of temporary intrinsics (Ingthorsson 
2001, 2009, 2016), and which leaves us with a static conception of sub-
stance whether or not we embrace endurantism or perdurantism, or the 
A or B view of time. So, I actually think (3) plays very little part, and 
I think a sixth presupposition is at play; that the identity of a substance 
is grounded in its qualities.
Now, it is true that not everyone assumes that the identity of a sub-
stance is grounded in its qualities. There is the option of thinking that 
particulars have a primitive haecceity, a thisness, that defines their iden-
tity regardless of which properties it has. This allows us to think of the 
particular as persisting through changes remaining numerically the same, 
thus avoiding the problem of temporary intrinsics. However, I find that 
so few endorse a haecceitic conception of identity today that it is unnec-
essary to dwell on the option. Furthermore, the haecceitic conception 
does not explain either how a collection of parts constitutes a unity, or 
why that unity continues to exist over time and to preserve a structure 
through continuous changes, wherefore it has little interest to anyone 
whose concern is to explain the dynamic features of reality. With that 
said, I put the haecceitic view to one side. I will not argue it is unintel-
ligible but try only to present an alternative that is more appealing.
Let us return to the conception of substance as something that sustains 
properties and whose identity is determined by those properties, and deal 
with the choice between a ‘thin’ vs. ‘thick’ conception. For my present 
concerns, the distinction is of no consequence as long as the identity of 
the particular is still assumed to be grounded in its qualities. Arguably, to 
reject that assumption is to opt for the haecceitic conception that I have 
just taken off the table. For the sake of simplicity, I therefore proceed 
assuming that whatever I say about the conception of a ‘thick’ particular 
applies equally to the ‘thin’ conception.
The notion of a thick particular fits very well with the five presupposi-
tions that make up the paradigm of substance ontology, especially the 
state analysis of change; a particular is something existing at a certain time 
having a certain property, i.e. ‘a-is-F-at-t1’. And it is intuitively appealing 
as long as we avoid thinking about the thick particular as a persistent and 
changing entity. The problem is that the principle of subjecthood and the 
state analysis of change together with Leibniz’ Law (representing the idea 
that identity is grounded in the qualities) inevitably generate a contradic-
tion (in what follows F and G represent incompatible properties):
 (1) The principle of subjecthood; a-is-F-at-t1 and a-is-G-at-t2 represent a 
change iff a-at-t1 is identical to a-at-t2.
 (2) The state analysis of change; a-is-F-at-t1 and a-is-G-at-t2, respectively.
 (3) Leibniz’ law; if a (a=a-at-t1) and b (b=a-at-t2) are identical (a=b), they 
have all properties in common.
 (4) Problem of temporary intrinsics (from (1)–(3)); a is both F and G.
Substance and Process 111
David Lewis’ solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics is to adopt 
a perdurance account of persistence, i.e. to assume that ‘a-at-t1’ and 
‘a-at-t2’ are distinct temporal parts of a temporally extended compound 
a, which is both F and G, but only in so far as one part of a is F and 
another part is G. The argument doesn’t really show that nothing can 
endure. It just shows that enduring things cannot change on pain of 
contradiction, given the truth of the premises. However, once you have 
(allegedly) shown that endurance is incompatible with change, endur-
ance has really lost its raison d’être and perdurance comes across like 
the most generalisable account of persistence in light of the empirical 
observation that things appear to have different properties at different 
times.
Now, as I have argued elsewhere (2001, 2009, 2016), it is important 
to point out that the argument spelled out above actually needs another 
premise, which is the assumption that all times exist in parity:
Principle of temporal parity; no time is ontologically privileged, 
everything at all times is equally existent and real.
This principle, which is the cornerstone of the B view of time, blocks 
the possibility of resolving the problem of temporary intrinsics in the 
way Aristotle does, notably to argue that a can well be F at one time 
and G at another, because the difference between a-being-F-at-t1 and 
a-being-G-at-t2 is not just a question of difference between two qualita-
tive states, but a going out of being of a-being-F and coming into being 
of a-being-G. Indeed, Lewis accepts that presentism, the view that only 
the present exists, avoids the problem of temporary intrinsics, but he 
also dismisses presentism as a view he just cannot take seriously (1986a: 
202ff); the principle of temporal parity is part of the presuppositional 
depth- structure that he takes for granted.
The upshot of all of this is that if we accept (1)–(4) + temporal parity 
then a can only endure if it remains unchanged, and every change has to 
be reduced to variation between parts. Either way, we have just arrived 
at a concept of substance that is static and unchanging, i.e. either as the 
unchanging enduring particular, or as the unchanging collection of tem-
poral parts of a perduring particular.
I think we are now in a position to better understand Rescher’s claim 
that substance ontology either denies processes or degrades them by sub-
ordinating them to substances. There are two views that deny processes 
and both consider change to be illusory, or at least deny that anything 
comes into or goes out of being; everything simply exists. On the one 
hand there is the Parmenidean view that there is only one thing (or sub-
stance), and that all diversity and difference in time and space, not just 
change, is mere appearance. On that view there is no change, hence no 
process. However, as far as I know, no one defends this view today.
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On the other hand, there is the view that there is diversity (many sub-
stances dispersed in space and time) and difference in their qualitative 
states (including between times), but no real change. No entity comes 
into being or goes out of being, nor do they change the qualities they 
have or relations they bear to other substances. This includes all ontolo-
gies that combine a B view of time with a single category trope ontology 
or any kind of perdurantism (including stage theory and Kim-style event 
ontology). In other words, this is neo-Humean metaphysics.
The view that accepts the reality of processes but degrades them by 
making them subordinate to substances is the view that processes are 
changes in persistent things, i.e. they are changes in substances or activi-
ties of substances (Munsat 1969; O’Shaughnessy 1971–72; Emmet 1992). 
However, although I think this view is fairly widely held, its proponents 
hold it in a state of ignorance concerning the implications of the presup-
positions that go into the modern analytic view of substance, and often 
without taking any explicit position on the nature of time or whether 
they hold an endurantist or perdurantist view of persistence. They just 
assume it makes good sense to think of every successive state of an object 
as an ‘event’, roughly a Kim-style construction of a particular having a 
certain property at a certain time, but then an entity that is dependent 
on the substance that constitutes the state. Emmet is an exception. She 
realises the dangers of that kind of event ontology.
I find it difficult to offer any meaningful criticism of the view that takes 
processes to be changes in substances, because I find that the proponents 
of this view are typically assuming a modern analytic conception of sub-
stance as just something that sustains properties and seem unaware of 
any of the problems I outlined above. I will instead simply ask: is there no 
alternative? Aristotelian hylomorphism seems to be a promising option.
7.3  Aristotelian Substance Ontology
The Aristotelian view is clearly the best candidate for a reconciliation 
of substance and process, once we dispel the myth that the modern ana-
lytic view, even in its ‘thick’ version, is Aristotelian. Aristotelian scholars 
will tell you that the closest one can come to a concept of something 
that sustains properties in Aristotle is that which the Scholastics called 
prima materia, which is something that can only potentially exist with-
out properties (Johansson 1989/2004: 27; Byrne 2018: 120–31: Sentesy 
2020: 300). The idea that substance can be identified with prima materia 
ignores the fact that prima materia is a substance only in virtue of some 
unifying principle that gives it a certain function; only a unity of form 
and matter is properly speaking a being (ousia).
Now, this is not the time to go into the intricacies of Aristotelian hylo-
morphism, i.e. the details of how Aristotle portrayed the inner structure 
and workings of a substance. That is a subject that requires its own 
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book-length study (or an entire series of books). Let it suffice to say 
that several modern authors claim to revive hylomorphism, for instance, 
Johnston (2006), Koslicki (2008), and Lowe (2011), while Aristotle-
scholars like Marmodoro (2013) are questioning the Aristotelian lineage 
of their ideas. Perhaps the only thing that these authors have in common 
with each other and with Aristotle is the rough idea that substances have 
a unifying structure. However, as Johnston observes, the challenge has 
been to provide an account of what kind of structure gives the kind of 
unity that is characteristic of the things we identify as substances:
What it is for this hydrochloric acid molecule to be is for this positive 
hydrogen ion and this negative chlorine ion to be bonded together. 
[…] The idea that each complex item will have some such canoni-
cal statement true of it might be fairly called ‘Hylomorphism’. For 
it is the idea that each complex item admits of a real definition, or 
statement of its essence, in terms of its matter, understood as parts or 
components, and its form, understood as a principle of unity.
(Johnston 2006: 658)
What I have argued is that, in the scientific image, all bonds between 
every component part of any compound are characterised as inter-
actions, wherefore it seems natural to suggest that interaction is the 
principle of unity we have been looking for. I have explained how we 
can think of interactions as a causal phenomenon and pointed out that 
the unities that are thus causally constituted persist in a thoroughly 
dynamic fashion. Now, obviously my suggestion does not converge 
with Aristotle’s ideas, because I am abstracting from scientific theories 
he did not have access to, but the dynamic aspect is at least compat-
ible with what both Kosman (2013) and Sentesy (2020) argue, nota-
bly that Aristotle is moving towards an account of being as activity in 
Metaphysics.
I think we can see the dynamic aspects of Aristotelian substances with-
out going into the details of his hylomorphism merely by looking at the 
way the Aristotelian tradition has typically characterised substances (as 
opposed to explained). The following seven claims represents a more 
or less complete list of these characteristics (for reference, see Loux 
1998:107; Hoffman & Rosenkrantz 1997: 2–3):
 1. Substances have attributes without themselves being attributes.
 2. Substances are contingent beings.
 3. Substances are spatio-temporal beings.
 4. Substances are capable of change.
 5. Substances are persistent beings.
 6. Substances are independent beings.
 7. Substances can affect each other.
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These claims require some clarification. The first can be interpreted as say-
ing that substances sustain properties but are separate from them, but only 
if one ignores everything said about the inner structure that provides the 
unity of form and matter. It could perhaps be formulated more precisely 
as: substances have attributes but cannot be reduced to mere attribute.
The second claim relates to the idea that things come into and go out 
of being, indicating that their existence is by no means a necessary affair. 
This may appear to contradict the sixth claim, that they are indepen-
dent entities, i.e. the claim that every substance exists independently of 
any other substance, because if something comes into being it must be 
brought into being by something else that preceded it. However, it is 
relevant to distinguish between what could be called synchronic and dia-
chronic dependence. Any particular substance is contingent in the sense 
that it comes into and goes out of being, and as such it is diachronic-
ally dependent on (i) a previously existing ‘material cause’, i.e. a por-
tion of matter capable of alteration, and (ii) an ‘efficient cause’ which 
provokes a change in that portion of matter, thus bringing a new unity 
of form and matter into being. However, once in existence, substances 
have an intrinsic nature independently of the nature of other synchronic-
ally existing substances (which, according to the A view of time, are the 
only substances that exist). A person can continue to exist and be the 
person she is even if her entire family is destroyed (especially if she is 
unaware of this fact). A statue can survive the levelling of the city it has 
adorned. However, substances are not so autonomous as to the existence 
of other substances as to be unaffected by them when they interact. The 
contingency of substances is reflected not just in their coming into being 
but also in their destruction. Any substance can be destroyed by the influ-
ence of other substances. The independence of substances is thus clearly 
conditioned by causality; no substance comes into being without a cause, 
and no substance is immune to the causal powers of other substances that 
can change and/or destroy them. This conditionality of independence by 
causality is what constitutes the contingency of being. Independence is 
further related to persistence, because persistence is on the one hand a 
consequence of existential independence, but on the other is similarly 
conditioned by causality. The persistence of an object begins when it is 
created by a cause and ends by its destruction by a cause. Change is then 
related to most other claims. Change is an alteration in the properties of 
a persistent substance, produced by the influence of another persistent 
being. It is also the creation and/or destruction of a substance. The spatio-
temporality of substances is a claim that is less obviously connected to 
other claims. It has mainly to do with the idea that time and space are 
boundary conditions upon all being but is also related to the idea that 
substances are contingent beings that can affect each other and thus share 
a common realm of existence. The spatio-temporality of substance is thus 
indirectly related to all other claims.
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It is at this point we must observe that, while substances are contin-
gent, prima materia is not. Well, it is controversial whether Aristotle really 
meant to attribute permanence to prima materia itself, since it is some-
thing that cannot exist on its own, or only to say that the total amount 
of substance can neither increase nor diminish. Particular unities of form 
and matter can be created and destroyed, but they can only be created 
by altering an already existing substance, and only be destroyed by being 
transformed to another kind of substance. It is in the persistence of sub-
stances when their attributes go out of existence, that makes substance 
more basic than attributes. It is because of the permanence of substance 
that change is not creation out of nothing, nor the annihilation of things.
Now, while the above characterisation of substances clearly implies 
that substances are dynamic in the sense that they can change, it is not as 
clear that they must continuously change. Mark Sentesy (2020) makes a 
convincing case for saying that Aristotle was at least moving towards a 
conception of substances as essentially activities. That is, not merely as 
objects possessing active powers, but as entities in which their potential 
is continuously being actualised. That is all well and good, but it is an 
account that still doesn’t bring Aristotle into harmony with the theories 
and findings of modern science.
Ultimately what I want to take away from this section is that the 
Aristotelian conception of substance is at least not obviously of some-
thing static and unchanging that merely sustains properties, but of some-
thing that can both change and survive that change. It is designed to 
answer the question of how things can always be different and yet be the 
same, thus fusing the Heraclitan and Parmenidean points of view. The 
modern analytic view ends up saying that they cannot be different and 
yet the same, which is kind of Parmenidean. And, as I will now explain, 
extant views on process end up saying that everything is always different 
and never the same, which is the Heraclitan opposite.
7.4  Process Ontology
The literature on process philosophy covers a wide field, not all of which 
is pertinent to the discussion in this chapter, which focuses on the objec-
tive nature of persistent material objects. First, there are discussions 
that don’t revolve so much about the place of process/substance in the 
order of being but only in the order of understanding. I exclude from 
this discussion views/arguments that profess to be making ontological 
claims solely on the basis of claims about the status of our conceptual 
scheme or of the language in which this conceptual scheme is expressed. 
If our knowledge of objective reality is fallible, as it is generally assumed 
to be, the actual status of our current conceptual scheme, and the lan-
guage we use to express that scheme, is not a good guide to how reality 
actually is.
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Alternatively, our conceptual scheme may be the product of irrational 
and random evolution. There is no guarantee that a product of evolution 
correctly captures the fundamental structure of reality, as opposed to sim-
ply being instrumentally useful in an anthropocentric way. Therefore, to 
show, say, that the concept of substance is at present basic to our under-
standing of the world does not constitute a decisive ontological argument 
in favour of the view that material objects are as a matter of fact basically 
substance-like, not process-like. It is possible that the notion of process 
may be conceptually subordinate to the notion of substance, given the 
present status of our conceptual scheme, and of the language in which 
this conceptual scheme is expressed, while material objects may in actual 
reality basically be processes.
For similar reasons I also exclude discussions about processes within 
the philosophy of mind, in so far as they promote process as a basic entity 
for reasons having to do solely with the characteristics of thinking and 
reasoning. Thinking and reasoning, in fact anything mental, is generally 
assumed to be of a very different kind than anything physical. It is at least 
generally assumed to be very difficult, even impossible, to draw any con-
clusions about the mental from considerations about anything physical, 
and vice versa. Such conclusions tend to be supported by arguments to 
the point that there really are no genuinely mental entities (that they are 
reducible to physical entities), or that there really are no physical entities 
(physical reality merely being a figment of the mind).
Process philosophy, then, is a doctrine that promotes process in a 
broad sense but cannot be treated as a single theory about the nature of 
processes. After all, it is considered to include ideas of process as basically 
physical (Whitehead 1929), as basically organic (Bergson 1910), and as 
basically psychological (James 1890). And, besides the mainstream view 
of processes as a series of events or occurrences (which on its own har-
bours different accounts), there are those that deny that the notion of 
process commits to an ontology of events or occurrences (Salmon 1984: 
139ff; Seibt 2000). Rescher, indeed, admits that process philosophy is not 
so much a developed doctrine at all, but rather a projected programme 
(2000: 21). He nevertheless presents process philosophy, very tentatively, 
as a doctrine inclined towards certain basic propositions:
1. Time and change are principal categories of metaphysical under- 
standing,
2. Process is a principal category of ontological description,
3. Processes are more fundamental, or at any rate not less fundamen-
tal, than things for the purpose of an ontological theory
4. Several, if not all, of the major elements of the ontological reper-
toire (God, Nature as a whole, persons, material substances) are 
best understood in process terms.
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5. Contingency, emergence, novelty, and creativity are among the funda-
mental categories of metaphysical understanding. 
(Rescher 2000: 5–6)
Note, firstly, that none of the propositions concern the nature of processes; 
they declare (i) what are the basic categories of metaphysical understanding, 
according to process ontology, i.e. time, change, contingency, emergence, 
novelty, creativity, and process, or (ii) declare the explanatory advantages 
of process ontology. Only the latter may appear to be in opposition to 
Aristotelian substance ontology, but only if we find that a particular con-
ception of process actually contradicts Aristotelianism. Aristotelianism 
also includes time and change as essential to our understanding of the fun-
damental structure of the world, and holds that the world contains con-
tingency, emergence, novelty, and creativity. The question is, do process 
philosophers account for these notions in a different, or a better way?
Process philosophers do, for instance, claim that a process continuously 
creates itself, i.e. that there are internal causal relations between the stages of a 
process. While the persistence of substances is not predominantly explained 
in causal terms, substance ontology is no stranger to the idea, notably what 
W.E. Johnson calls immanent causation (1924). Dorothy Emmet acknowl-
edges internal causation (1985), and Hoffman & Rosenkrantz claim that 
the relationship between the parts of compound objects is causal (1997). 
So, writers on both sides acknowledge this feature too.
What is clearly disputed is whether entities that have hitherto been 
understood in substance terms are better understood in process terms, 
which is of course the central issue in settling the question as to whether 
processes are more fundamental than substances. But, in addressing this 
issue, we need to get clearer on the sense in which things should be under-
stood as processes.
I think we can express the standard account of process in a very similar 
manner to that in which I spelled out the Aristotelian view of substance 
earlier on:
 (1) A process is a complex of temporally ordered stages or phases.
 (2) The stages or phases involve becoming—a transition from potential-
ity to actuality.
 (3) The stages or phases are distinct.
 (4) A process is mereologically homeomerus—each stage is itself also a 
process.
 (5) Has a temporal structure—each stage has connections with the future 
and the past.
 (6) The stages are systematically linked to each other, either causally or 
functionally.
 (7) The stages are generically linked—each stage originates from a previ-
ous stage and is the source to a later stage.
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It is striking that only one of these features clearly contradicts the account 
of process that substance ontologists like Dorothy Emmet offer (1992), 
notably that the stages of the process are distinct. She thinks that pro-
cesses are changes in substances or activities of substances, which mani-
fest themselves like a complex of temporally ordered stages that each 
involve becoming and are in a way homeomerous in so far as the change 
in the substance is continuous. Furthermore, they have a temporal and 
systematic structure and are generically linked. Indeed, the reason they 
are not distinct is because they are different changes in the same sub-
stance, which is what explains the generic link. The claim about distinct-
ness is also one of the main features of the standard view of process that 
Salmon (1984), Seibt (2000), and Nicholson & Dupré (2018) reject.
The question for me is whether process ontologists are able to plau-
sibly explain the generic link between stages without resorting to the 
notion of a common constituent, of something being preserved from one 
stage to the other, i.e. of something resembling the concept of substance. 
Without a notion of some kind of common constituent, process philoso-
phy seems to be committed to claim that the stages are absolutely dis-
tinct. Christopher Austin makes a similar point, when discussing recent 
attempts to develop a process ontology for biology, notably that their 
rejection of everything ‘substantial’ jeopardises their viability (2020).
Now, it is a worry that, with the exception of the standard view I 
present above, explicit alternative accounts of process are actually very 
scarce. The alternative accounts amount to no more than rejections of the 
notion of substance—well, a rejection of the modern analytic view—and 
an appeal to empirical facts about the dynamic nature of the phenomena 
studied by the natural sciences. In the recent volume Everything Flows, 
the closest we get to a characterisation of what a process is amounts to 
an inclusion or exclusion of theses (1)–(7) above (Nicholson & Dupré 
2018: 11–13). They say that processes ‘are extended in time: they have 
temporal parts’ and ‘depend[s] on change for [their] occurrence’ and that 
it is ‘a mistake to suppose that processes require underlying things, or 
substances’. Instead, they take reality to be ‘constituted by processes all 
the way down’, which is to say that they hold ‘change, or better dynamic-
ity, as fundamental or primitive’ and that ‘like time itself, it is continuous’ 
(which is why they reject the Whiteheadian account). What emerges very 
clearly is that the motivation for thinking about the world in terms of 
processes is the empirical observation that all the entities of the biological 
realm are in continuous change. This is a naturalism which I approve of 
very much. However, I think there is a risk that the opposition to sub-
stance is based on a flawed dichotomy, which takes its departure from 
a mistaken identification of the notion of substance with the modern 
analytic view.
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7.5  The Problem of Process Ontology
I’ll begin by outlining the problems of process philosophy by address-
ing Whitehead’s view, and then ask whether alternative views fare any 
better. I will answer no. It should be noted that I rely on the exposition 
of Whitehead-expert Dorothy Emmet (1992), and not Whitehead’s own 
writing which is notoriously obscure. According to Emmet, Whitehead 
portrays a process as a succession of distinct stages, phases, or events, 
each of which involve becoming, or ‘concrescence’, as Whitehead dubs it; 
a transition from potentiality to actuality. The concrescence of each stage 
triggers the concrescence of the next.
The problem is that if the stages of a process are strictly speaking dis-
tinct entities, i.e. contain no common constituent, every new concres-
cence is a transition from potentiality to actuality of a distinct entity. We 
must then wonder about the ontological ancestry of each stage before 
it undergoes concrescence. It cannot exist as a potentiality in the pre-
ceding stage, because that would mean they are not, properly speaking, 
distinct. The options I can see are (i) that each stage comes into being 
out of nothing, i.e. invokes absolute becoming, or (ii) requires that all 
the stages in the history of the universe exist as potential beings from the 
beginning of time, and which then become actual in a temporally ordered 
fashion (much in the fashion of a Leibnizian predetermined order), the 
concrescence of one triggering the concrescence of the next. The latter 
view could be illustrated, by analogy, to the sport of lining up dominoes 
in intricate patterns and then flipping one of them to watch them all 
fall down in an ordered sequence. The finished construction of lined up 
dominoes represents reality at the dawn of history, entirely made up of 
pure potentiality; the potentiality of the falling of each piece. The falling 
down of a domino would correspond to the moving from potentiality to 
actuality of the state of lying down, the concrescence in Whiteheadian 
terms, while the push of each falling domino (of each concrescence) 
on the next, would be the causal/generic link, corresponding to what 
Whitehead called transition.
The domino analogy is flawed, because in our imagination we are giv-
ing ourselves actual dominoes that are actually standing up, containing 
the potentiality of falling, and therefore the conception of one falling 
domino acting on another is really a conception of an actuality acting 
on another actuality. We have to imagine the standing dominoes as pure 
potentiality, and that once something becomes actual—i.e. the domino is 
lying down—it can influence a pure potentiality. If every stage is causally 
connected to the next, but distinct from it—the concrescence of one stage 
causing the concrescence of another distinct stage—then a causal realist 
must be prepared to accept that an actuality can exert an influence on 
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a mere potentiality that is not grounded in any actuality. Furthermore, 
there is the difficulty that the concrescence of a stage partially overlaps 
the transition relation between stages (the domino still falling while it 
is beginning to push the next one to it), and therefore the stages are not 
strictly speaking temporally distinct, and the difficulty of what it is that 
pushes and what is being pushed when it is claimed that the process is the 
pushing and being pushed itself.
The Aristotelian view, on the other hand, depicts the transition from 
potentiality to actuality as occurring from a potentiality which is latent 
in an existent substance that at that time actually has a determinate and 
occurrent nature. A brick hits an actually existing window to provoke a 
transition from an actual and occurrently determinate state of the win-
dow to a state that previously was only potential in the actual state of 
the window: the state of breaking. On this view there are no pure poten-
tialities, only potentialities inhering in actualities. And if we move on 
to my interaction model, then the parts of a unity are continuously act-
ing on each other to provoke a transition from potentiality to actuality 
in each other, but a potentiality residing in entities that already exist as 
actualities. The planets of the solar system are at any given time actually 
striving outward, but their course is continuously being adjusted by the 
gravitational pull and away from that outward motion. The potential for 
changing their state of motion resides in the actual state of motion they 
already have. The result is a continuous change in the state of motion that 
results in an orbit that serves to preserve the unity of the solar system. We 
can trace that kind of continuous modification of the behaviour of every 
part of everything down to the level of elementary particles. And yet the 
Aristotelian account allows us also to say that still something remains 
the same through all these changes. In the end we are of course forced to 
give up the notion of the preservation of the logical subject and say that, 
ultimately, ‘something’ is conserved. But that is already allowed in the 
original Aristotelian view. And typically this ‘something’ is something we 
are unable to individuate in the ordinary sense, much like we are unable 
to individuate electrons or energy. What reasons can we have for accept-
ing this view? In the past the motivation has been that the alternative 
is to accept creation ex nihilo, which for millennia has been considered 
tantamount to magic. That is motivation enough for me.
It worries me that philosophers seem all too willing today to accept 
creation ex nihilo. For instance, Neil Williams responds to Judith Jarvis 
Thomson’s complaint against creation ex nihilo in the following way:
Not only is it not obviously false, it does not seem false at all. What 
is wrong with a picture of the world as recreated at every moment? 
What can one possibly point to as evidence that this is not the true 
story?
(Williams 2019: 2014)
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The most straightforward answer is that the arguments in favour of 
accepting what Mario Bunge calls the genetic principle (1979: §1.5.2), 
and Craig Dilworth calls the principle of the perpetuity of substance 
(1996: Ch. 2) is that every observation and theory in the natural sciences 
confirm it, and that it has therefore become a methodological principle. 
The conservation laws of physics are the most recent manifestations of 
these principles, and they act as methodological principles in research. 
Without them, physics would be fumbling in the dark. In high energy 
physics (and elsewhere), it is essential to keep track of the conserved 
quantities, in what is described as a ‘tiresome book keeping exercise’ 
(Mishra 2013: 116) in order to be able to justify the validity of your 
findings. Also, to be able to backtrack to mistakes and errors that can 
have occurred. In contrast, creation ex nihilo is typically regarded as an 
untestable notion. If you accept it, why wouldn’t you accept magic and/or 
more generally the supernatural?
7.6  A World of Processes/Substances
The main argument today in favour of process ontology comes from the 
observation that every persistent unitary entity that we scrutinise dis-
solves on closer inspection into a myriad of processes and reveals itself to 
have vague borders. The sun is a giant mass of churning hydrogen, con-
tinuously undergoing fusion reactions to produce helium with the emis-
sion of tremendous amounts of energy. Indeed, those reactions are part 
of what makes the sun (relatively) stable. Furthermore, there is no clear 
border as to where the sun begins and ends.
On the scale of ordinary middle-sized dry goods, things that to the 
naked eye appear completely inert, say, a billiard ball, is made up of 
atoms that essentially are tiny dynamic systems of interacting parts. The 
dynamic nature of things is more out in the open in the domain of biol-
ogy. Our bodies are self-regenerating systems in which a multitude of 
processes are continuously in progress. We may think that digestion is 
a process carried out by the intestines, which to us look more like ‘sub-
stances’ (in the modern analytic sense), but when we look at the intes-
tines, they are a churning mass of cells and enzymes and capillaries, etc. 
The cell is in turn a similar system of various parts with different func-
tions, and they too turn out on closer inspection to be systems, etc.
However, to decide whether the change or the persistence of a sys-
tem is more fundamental we need to carry this reduction through to the 
fundamental level, and then the empirical buck stops at a dead end. The 
standard model of physics is our best empirical theory yet about the most 
fundamental entities of the universe, and it is typically represented as 
containing 28 different elementary particles. However, ‘elementary’ is 
taken to mean that they have no measurable internal structure, which in 
turn is taken to mean that it is unknown if they are composed of further 
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particles (Braibant, Giacomelli, & Spurio 2012). The ultimate point is 
that empirical science is at any given point unable to definitely deter-
mine that we have reached rock bottom. We may, for instance, wonder 
whether the fact that physics has calculated (and for some, confirmed) 
the decay rate of these elementary particles can be a reason to think that 
they cannot really be ‘elementary’ in the philosophical sense of ‘indivis-
ible’; they seem to be able, in theory, to transform into something else. 
However, given what the standard model says today, does it convey a 
message of the elementary particles being nothing but activity? It seems 
to me that the answer is indecisive. Plenty of elementary particles have a 
very short lifetime. The muon has a decay rate of approx. 2.1×10−6 sec-
onds (Beringer et al. 2012). However, the proton, which is a compound 
composed of three quarks, has a calculated lifetime of 1.67×1034 years 
(Bajc, Hisano, Kuwahara, & Omura 2016). In other words, it has a life-
time of approximately 16 billion trillion trillion years. In comparison, the 
universe is currently at 13.8 billion years. That is pretty stable.
Now, what to make of all of this? My own methodological position 
is that we should take the findings and theories of the empirical sciences 
seriously and should strive to construe metaphysical models that are not 
only compatible with them in the sense of ‘do not contradict them’, but 
also clearly connect with them. I think my account of causation in terms 
of interaction delivers on that goal. I think it also explains why every 
compound entity we pretend to understand scientifically is an entity for 
which change is essential, resulting in a temporally structured series of 
temporary stages that are causally connected. I take this to tick enough of 
the process ontological boxes to substantiate the belief that we should take 
‘change, or better dynamicity, as fundamental or primitive’ (Nicholson & 
Dupré 2018: 13) and that it is compatible with the claim ‘that the living 
world is a hierarchy of processes, stabilized and actively maintained at 
different timescales’ (Nicholson & Dupré 2018: 3). However, the explan-
atory value of also assuming that through the continuous change there 
is something preserved, strikes me as being too great to give up on. Also, 
I take the existence of entities that can persist for 16 billion trillion tril-
lion years as quite a decent anomaly for the claim that nothing is stable. 
Given that pretty much everything in this world contains a sizeable quan-
tity of protons that remain stable over time, do we not have reason to 
assume that at least something in the world is pretty darn stable?
Is the position I sketch ultimately a substance or process ontological 
position? I am happy to leave that open for further discussion, but it is 
at least not a modern analytic view of substance, nor is it a view of pro-
cess that denies every notion of a common constituent that in some sense 
remains stable (NB, stable, not static) over time. Indeed, there are plenty 
of philosophers out there who have come to the conclusion that the tradi-
tional dichotomy between substance and process, and endurance and per-
durance, is outdated and that we need to take a fresh look at the nature of 
the basic constituents of nature (see, for instance, Meincke 2019).
The philosophical dispute about the nature of powers is best understood 
against the background of what has for some time been the dominant 
view of properties generally. Armstrong calls it the ‘British empiricist’ or 
‘British analytic’ view (2005: 312), but I will call it the modern ana-
lytic view of properties (MAP) because it belongs to the same conceptual 
framework as the modern analytic view of substance that I introduced 
in Chapter 7. According to MAP the determinate state of reality is 
grounded—on the most fundamental level—in causally inert and self-
contained qualities (Black 2000), while powers are, at best, second-order 
properties that either supervene directly on regularities in the pattern of 
fundamental qualities, or have their basis in regularities determined by 
laws of nature. The idea that properties divide into two mutually exclu-
sive types—non-dispositional qualities (sometimes called ‘categorical 
properties’) vs. non-qualitative dispositions—of which the qualities are 
more fundamental than dispositions, is what is known as the categorical/
dispositional distinction (C/D distinction).
Today, neo-Aristotelians are challenging MAP, arguing that powers can 
be fundamental but disagreeing about whether or not to reject the C/D 
distinction. Some friends of powers indeed insist that ‘any decent theory 
of dispositions should preserve this fundamental distinction’ (Ellis & 
Lierse 1994: 34) and many enough find the view that properties can be 
both quality and power ‘totally incredible’ (Armstrong 2005: 315). My 
goal is to explain why the distinction should not be preserved, and why 
the identity of quality and power is totally believable.
8.1  Preliminary Remarks About My Treatment of Powers
I have so far avoided any discussion about the nature of powers, even 
though powers are fundamental to the view I propose. This is because 
my discussion about causation doesn’t really hinge on any particular con-
ception of powers, but also because a discussion of the nature of powers 
requires a book-length study of its own. In fact, I doubt a discussion of 
powers really adds much at all to what this book has already said, but 
8 Powers
124 Powers
it would be an omission not to say at least what kind of powers I think 
fits with the view of causation I advocate. However, my discussion won’t 
really engage in the subtler details such as you find in Molnar (2003), 
Bird (2007a), and Livanios (2017).
In fact, perhaps the main reason I discuss powers is that I think it would 
be a missed opportunity not to strike the iron while it is hot and continue 
my illustration of how neo-Humean thinking has influenced contempo-
rary causal realism, not only with respect to the nature of causation but 
also the nature of powers. For instance, the reason so many friends of 
powers stick to the dispositional analysis of powers is to a great extent 
due to the empiricist conviction that the nature of unobservable pow-
ers must be accounted for in terms of how they indirectly turn up in 
experience, in the form of observable changes in observable/measurable 
qualities, or in our everyday lived experience. I believe that once those 
influences are laid bare, they will no longer appeal (as much) to the causal 
realist as reasons to maintain the categorical/dispositional distinction and 
it will be easier to accept that properties can be both qualities and powers; 
i.e. powerful qualities. Now, I have no hopes about proving that proper-
ties actually are both qualities and powers, but only to strengthen my 
previous claim that we can think of them in that way (Ingthorsson 2013).
8.2  Different Views of Powers
Now, while an understanding of the contemporary debate about powers 
ultimately hinges on a historic retrospect of the rise of empiricism which 
ultimately gives us neo-Humeanism, it is best to first offer a brief overview 
of the disagreement among causal realists today. On the one hand there is 
the pure powers conception, according to which powers and qualities are 
mutually exclusive types of properties—as tradition dictates—but which 
denies that powers must be grounded in such qualities. The proponents 
of this view can be called purists. Purists take the nature of powers to be 
exhausted by their ‘dispositional essence’, something they construe as a 
relationship to whatever the power is able to bring about, their ‘manifesta-
tion’. That is, they accept the dispositional characterisation of powers. On 
this view, powers are really nothing but a relation to something that has not 
yet come to be (wherefore powers are often thought of as a mere potential-
ity that has not quite yet come to be). Qualities, on the other hand, are con-
strued as having a self-contained and intrinsic nature that is not essentially 
related to anything in particular. Consequently, powers are ‘pure’ by only 
having a dispositional essence while qualities are ‘pure’ by lacking a dis-
positional essence (Ellis & Lierse 1994; Molnar 2003: Ch. 3; Bird 2007a: 
Ch. 5). Purism divides again into dualism and monism. Dualists accept the 
existence of pure qualities alongside pure powers on the fundamental level 
(Ellis & Lierse 1994; Molnar 2003: Ch. 10), while monists hold that all 
fundamental properties are pure powers (Bird 2007b).
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The dissenting view is that we can make sense of fundamental proper-
ties neither as pure powers nor as pure qualities, but must understand 
them as both, i.e. as powerful qualities (Martin 1997; Heil 2003; Jacobs 
2011; Ingthorsson 2013). However, it is admitted that the ways we con-
ceptually understand properties as powers and qualities, respectively, 
aren’t obviously compatible. The challenge then is to explain why they 
must be both, despite appearing incompatible, or to find a way to concep-
tually reconcile them. My focus is on the latter.
Very briefly, I will first challenge three ideas supposed to support MAP. 
First, the idea that qualities are observable and therefore knowable, while 
powers are mysterious theoretical posits. Second, the idea that Hume’s 
treatment of causation really shows that what an object is like is con-
tingently connected to what it can do. Third, the idea that Locke’s view 
about properties supports the idea that only qualities are properly speak-
ing in the objects while powers are only in the mind, which then is taken 
to support the idea that powers can at best be higher-order properties 
grounded in the categorical qualities. Finally, I will argue that our grasp 
of geometrical properties like shape is a rare example of where our grasp 
of quality and power goes hand in hand. The trick is then to explain why 
our grasp of geometrical properties is exceptional, and why we should 
still infer from that exceptional case that all natural properties are both 
quality and power.
8.3  Are Qualities Observable?
Nelson Goodman gives a very eloquent statement of what used to be the 
received view about properties, notably that only qualities are observable 
and thus knowable, and consequently ontologically basic because they can 
easily be thought of as intrinsic and fundamental properties of objects:
Besides the observable properties it exhibits and the actual processes it 
undergoes, a thing is full of threats and promises. The dispositions or 
capacities of a thing—its flexibility, its inflammability, its solubility— 
are no less important to us than its overt behaviour, but they strike 
us by comparison as rather ethereal. And so we are moved to inquire 
whether we can bring them down to earth; whether, that is, we can 
explain disposition-terms without any reference to occult powers.
(1954: 40)
Once powers are accepted as epistemically dependent on qualities and 
can only be characterised in terms of changes in the observable quali-
ties, it invites the thought that they are also ontologically dependent and 
therefore properties that cannot be fundamental.
However, problems have emerged in this popular view to the degree 
that a survey of the literature reveals an array of conflicting statements: 
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(i) qualities are observable and thus knowable (Goodman 1954: 40), (ii) 
qualities are unobservable and in principle unknowable (Lewis 2007; 
Sparber 2009: 141–2), (iii) qualities are needed to make sense of pow-
ers (Ellis & Lierse 1994; Armstrong 1997; Ellis 2010), and (iv) we can 
only make sense of qualities in contrast to powers, as properties that do 
not have a dispositional essence (Armstrong 2005; Bird 2007a: Ch. 4.1). 
What is going on?
The reason for this confusion, I believe, is that ‘observable’ means dif-
ferent things in different conceptual frameworks. Qualities may come 
across as observable if we take our unit of analysis to be our everyday 
lived experience, in particular if the focus is on the explanation of state-
ments in natural languages, and naively understand whatever appears 
in our awareness as ‘what we see’. Also, if we endorse direct realism and 
assume that in perception we are directly acquainted with the object 
itself; that it is not mediated by phenomenal qualities. But if we believe 
conscious experience is a product of the senses in response to a stimula-
tion by external objects, there is a problem. The problem can be formu-
lated as a combination of what George Sparber calls the argument from 
humility and the argument from quidditism (Sparber 2009: 141–9), 
which work against MAP and in favour of fundamental powers.
It is important to note that I make no effort to prove indirect real-
ism. I am merely pointing out consequences of holding certain views in 
an attempt to elucidate a framework in which it is possible to think of 
properties as both qualities and powers. I don’t aim to prove that every-
one must think of them that way. However, I also believe that to point 
out such consequences has considerable force in the controversy I am 
addressing, because most of those engaged in the issue do accept some 
form of indirect realism. If you, dear reader, are an indirect realist, you 
have reason to pay attention.
Returning to the arguments Sparber identifies, if experience is pro-
duced by the senses in response to external stimuli, then powers are the 
only natural properties that can stimulate the senses to give rise to expe-
riences. We now have two ways to argue for the same conclusion, first, 
from humility:
The argument from humility. If phenomenal qualities represent the 
properties that gave rise to them, then the only kind of properties 
represented in experience are powers. If the only properties we can 
know are those represented in perception, the only properties we can 
know are powers.
The argument aims to show that neo-Humeans, in so far as they accept 
indirect realism, put the cart before the horse; it is the concept of caus-
ally inert quality that is a theoretical posit whose nature cannot be 
known, which is inferred from observable powers. Alternatively, that 
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neo-Humeans are assuming that natural qualities of external physical 
objects resemble the phenomenal qualities they are acquainted with in 
perception, only to realise they cannot explain how such qualities affect 
the senses. In this light, an ontology of powers appears to have an advan-
tage, at least from an indirect realist perspective. Indeed, Lewis accepts 
the force of the argument and endorses Humean humility; he admits that 
the nature of the properties that make up the mosaic of local matters of 
fact cannot even in principle be known (Lewis 2007).
Second, from quidditism:
The argument from quidditism. If phenomenal qualities do not rep-
resent the powers that immediately gave rise to them, but instead the 
qualities that ground the power that can affect the senses, then the 
contingency of the connection between the causally inert qualities 
and the powers they ground means we cannot know whether the 
phenomenal quality that is the product of the exercise of powers cor-
rectly represents the quality.
The conclusion really is that the nature of neither qualities nor powers 
can be known.
Now, given this result, one may wonder why the notion of pure quality 
still has such a strong hold on the philosophical community. I think it is 
because the argument from observability isn’t the only reason qualities 
are found to be ontologically fundamental. There is an a priori argument 
that appeals to everyone, but it works its magic implicitly because the 
philosophical community seem oblivious of the influence it exerts.
8.4  A Priori Reason for Qualities Being Fundamental
Lurking in the presuppositional depth-structure of most ontologies, I 
think we can find what could be described as a proto-idea of what it 
is to be a fundamental property and which explains the popularity of 
the purist distinction between qualities and powers, and why so many 
believe that powers cannot be fundamental. We are dealing with a cluster 
of very general characteristics popularly used to describe fundamental 
properties (seldom all at once), notably being simple, first-order, indepen-
dent, intrinsic, monadic, objective, actual or occurrent, and determinate. 
Indeed, dispositional essentialists like Molnar believe that pure powers, 
if fundamental, must have these characteristics (Molnar 2003: Ch. 2.4). 
I am sure every reader recognises them, but let me spell out the intercon-
nections between them:
Simple—Fundamental properties must be simple, because if a property 
is a combination of properties it is dependent on those other prop-
erties and hence not fundamental.
128 Powers
First-order—Fundamental properties must be first-order (they must 
be properties of a particular rather than properties of a property) 
because if they were a property of a property, they would be depen-
dent on other properties and hence not fundamental.
Independent—Simple, first-order, fundamental properties must be 
ontologically independent, i.e. can be instantiated independently of 
the instantiation of other property instances. If they could not be 
instantiated independently of other property instances, they would 
be dependent on other properties and hence not fundamental.
Intrinsic—Fundamental properties that are simple, first-order, and 
independent will also be intrinsic to their bearers; they will be 
instantiated in an object independently of anything external.
Monadic—Fundamental properties that are simple, first-order, inde-
pendent, and intrinsic must be monadic or non-relational, that is, 
they can be instantiated in ‘one place only’ (which is arguably just a 
different way to express independence).
Objective—If fundamental properties are ontologically independent of 
other things then their nature and existence must also be indepen-
dent of what we happen to believe about them; they are objective.
Actual/Occurrent—If an object is the bearer of a fundamental prop-
erty then there are no two ways about it, it actually has it right 
then and there, which is arguably the same as saying that it has it 
occurrently.
Determinate—Things have at any given time (actually/occurrently) 
a fully determinate nature. A red object is never indeterminately 
red, but surely always has a surface colour with a determinate hue, 
lightness, and chroma.
I will use the term BASIC as shorthand for properties that are simple, 
first-order, independent, intrinsic, monadic, objective, actual/occurrent, 
and determinate. Remember that the point is not to establish that BASIC 
is a true characterisation of fundamental properties. The point is to illus-
trate how this proto-idea leads philosophers to the conclusion that pow-
ers cannot be fundamental properties, i.e. BASIC. It is because powers 
have been understood as relations to manifestation properties in accor-
dance with the dispositional analysis, and thus as neither monadic, intrin-
sic, nor independent.
We can now appreciate that proponents of pure powers vs. powerful 
qualities face different challenges. The purist needs to show how a prop-
erty whose nature is exhausted by a relation to a manifestation property 
can be BASIC. In particular, how can they be independent of other prop-
erty instances? Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, this is what creates an 
unresolved tension in Molnar (2003) and Bird’s (2007a) characterisation 
of powers (Ingthorsson 2015), because although they want powers to be 
a relation to other properties they also want them to be intrinsic to their 
Powers 129
bearers. Molnar’s solution is to argue that powers have a kind of physical 
directedness that is analogous to the directedness of intentional states—it 
doesn’t require the existence of what it is directed towards—while Bird 
argues that they are related to possibilia, which do not need to be instan-
tiated for the power to be directed to them.
The proponents of powerful qualities face the challenge of how to por-
tray a property that plays a distinct causal role without its nature thereby 
being constituted by a relation to a manifestation or determined by the 
nature of the manifestation. This is a challenge when the philosophical 
community predominantly conceives of the very idea of a causal role in 
terms of a relation to a manifestation, wherefore the lack of a relation to 
an outcome is understood as a lack of a nature.
Now, I have elsewhere offered a more fine-grained discussion of the 
concept of BASIC properties and its implications for the regress of pure 
powers (Ingthorsson 2015). Now it is time to further undermine the con-
ceptual integrity of MAP, by arguing that in addition to the problem 
with the observability of qualities, contemporary realists, whether neo-
Humean or anti-Humean, cannot really appeal to Hume to support the 
separation of quality from its causal role.
8.5  Hume’s Separation of Quality and Causal Role
The idea that qualities are causally inert ultimately derives from Hume’s 
analysis of causation (1739: 69–176). At the heart of the analysis is what 
Hume considers a principle, namely that ‘there is nothing in any object, 
consider’d in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion 
beyond it’ (1739: 139 [Hume’s emphasis]). The objects he refers to are the 
objects of perception, which are the only things he thinks are present to 
the mind. Indeed, he thinks the content of our minds reduces to impres-
sions and the ideas derived from impressions. There are no abstract ideas, 
nor ideas about how things really are, as opposed to what they appear to 
be like. He is pretty explicit about this:
Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and 
since all ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the 
mind; it follows, that ‘tis impossible for us so much as to conceive 
or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions.
(1739: 67)
The upshot of all this is that there is nothing in the content of a per-
ception of an object that allows us to infer how that object will appear 
in future perceptions; for instance, how it will change if becoming con-
tiguous with another object. That is, there is no conceptual connection 
between an impression/idea of how an object of perception occurrently is 
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and how it may appear in future (what it may do). Furthermore, Hume 
appeals to the problem of induction to show that we cannot compensate 
for that absent conceptual connection by appealing to our past experi-
ence that whenever property F has so far appeared, then G has followed. 
In his view, ‘even after the observation of the frequent or constant con-
junction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning 
any object beyond those of which we have had experiences’ (1739: 139 
[Hume’s emphasis]). It is from this argument we are meant to draw the 
conclusion that qualities (what the object is like) are only contingently 
connected to a causal role (what the object can do). Such a conclusion 
will follow if we apply what can be called the ‘test of separability’, the 
idea that what can be separated in thought is also separated in reality.
The realist must be careful here. Hume didn’t argue that we could 
separate the qualitative characteristics of natural properties from their 
natural causal role, did he? He said that we cannot infer from the char-
acteristics of the phenomenal qualities we are acquainted with in percep-
tion anything about other phenomenal qualities we are not perceiving. 
So, what Hume argues is that all phenomenal qualities are conceptually 
‘loose and separate’ and we cannot even form the idea of natural qualities 
that are different and separate from these phenomenal qualities. Hence, 
we cannot really conclude on the basis of this argument that, because the 
phenomenal qualities present to us at different times are loose and sepa-
rate, then somehow this establishes that natural qualities are only contin-
gently connected to a causal role. We should rather say that we cannot at 
all conceive of natural qualities and their causal roles in nature. In other 
words, the argument is useless for anyone wanting to make claims about 
objective reality, because it really says such claims are null and void.
In order not to be unfair to empiricism generally, it is important to 
make a sharp distinction between empiricists like Hobbes (1656) and 
Locke (1689) who thought experience gives knowledge about an exter-
nal reality, and anti-realists like Berkeley (1709) and Hume (1739), who 
thought we can only know what is in the head. A similar distinction is 
found between realist and anti-realist neo-Humeans. Realist empiricists 
only insist that all our knowledge about the external world be based on 
experience, while anti-realist empiricists insist that because our knowl-
edge can only be built from the material provided by the senses we can-
not know anything about the external world. This is a distinction that 
isn’t consistently drawn in the philosophical community, wherefore real-
ist empiricists make use of arguments that really only work for the anti-
realists, and likewise within the neo-Humean community.
The result that what an object looks like in perception is only contin-
gently related to our conception of what it is capable of doing should not 
be a surprising result for any indirect realist who accepts that the con-
tent of perception does not as a general rule represent the true nature of 
the property as it is in the object. And they don’t arrive at this conclusion 
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from reading Hume, but from accepting empirical findings about per-
ception. Indeed, I take it that we generally rely on science to provide 
knowledge about what objects are really like, as opposed to what they 
appear to be like. Indirect realists believe that, when we see an object as 
red, our senses are representing a property to us in a way that doesn’t 
really do justice to the surface properties of the object. To begin with, a 
sensation of red does not tell us anything about the ability of the surface 
to absorb and reflect light, which is what science tells us is responsible 
for the object appearing red. But the indirect realist has therefore no 
reason to think that the actual properties of the atoms on the surface 
are only contingently related to their ability to absorb and reflect light 
of certain wavelengths. It is only when we have come to some under-
standing of what the properties of the object are really like as opposed 
to what they appear to be like that we can consider whether the object’s 
qualitative state is distinct from what it can do. Here is where we look 
to science for guidance, and it seems to me that the way the sciences 
describe the qualities of objects identify those qualities with what the 
objects can do. As far as I can tell, this is, in extreme paraphrase, the 
reason Alexander Bird denies that powers are quiddities (Bird 2007a). 
I agree wholeheartedly.
8.6  The Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific Image
Let us consider an example of how science characterises a basic property 
of a basic entity, i.e. a simple property of a part that has no further parts: 
the negative charge of an electron. Charge comes in multiples of smallest 
units (it is quantised), and the electron carries exactly one such unit, e-. 
Now, is charge a quality or power? It is clear that physics describes the 
nature of charge only in terms of what its bearer can do. Charge is under-
stood as a property that makes the bearer experience (in a non-phenom-
enal sense) either an attractive or repulsive force in the vicinity of other 
bearers of either negative or positive charge. We have no phenomenal 
qualities that represent the nature of this property to guide our under-
standing. We can think of two billiard balls repelling each other and scale 
it down in our imagination to fit interactions between electrons. But that 
would not be a conception of what it is to be charged, only of the con-
sequence of an interaction between charged particles. Consequently, we 
cannot conceive in such terms what it would be to be negatively charged 
when the bearer is not repelling or attracting.
Indeed, the potential behaviours (or manifestations) that science attri-
butes to any charged particle are heterogeneous. Any charged particle has 
the potential to change the state of motion of itself and any interacting 
particle in a nearly indefinite number of determinate ways, depending on 
the sign of the charge of the other particle, as well as the kinetic energy 
and direction of motion of both particles. This is why Coulomb’s law, 
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which describes electric charge, has a scalar and a vector form; the sca-
lar form giving only the magnitude of the charge individually, while the 
vector form gives both the magnitude and the direction of the change in 
state of motion depending on the charge and initial values of the physical 
properties of the particles involved (Griffiths 1998: 59). Still, charge is 
clearly described as a BASIC property of its bearer even at times when the 
bearer is not exerting it. It is indeed a relativistic invariant.
Is it then a quality or a power? Charge is understood only in terms 
of its power-bestowing features, and it is still characterised as a simple, 
first-order, independent, intrinsic, monadic, objective, actual/occurrent, 
and determinate property of any particle, even when it isn’t interacting 
with any other particle. Charge fits the formal characteristics associated 
with BASIC properties, even though its unique essence—that which dis-
tinguishes it from other intrinsic properties—is clearly specified in terms 
of what the bearer can do. But what it can do is not one thing, it is the 
totality of mutations allowed by Coulomb’s law, given the determinate 
values of the variables of the interacting particles. Indeed, the heterogene-
ity of what the bearer can do is clearly down to the heterogeneity of inter-
actions that it can partake in, not to a heterogeneity of its intrinsic nature.
Should we say the electron has an infinity of powers, each one cor-
responding to the possible determinate manifestation of a change in the 
state of motion of an interacting particle? Bird seems to suggest something 
like this, when he insists that each fundamental power must have a single 
manifestation (2007a: 21–4). I think that is extravagant, in the Occamian 
sense. Why postulate many, when one is enough? My suggestion is that 
we treat charge as a way of being that we cannot fully conceive of as it is 
in itself, but allow that we can come close to such an understanding by 
charting what difference it can make to have such a property, and then 
we denote that way of being with a sign with a symbolic function: e-. The 
most important thing to consider is that the specifications of what the 
bearer of charge can do (the variations of its ability to attract vs. repel) 
are not constitutive of the unique essence of that property but are instead 
specifications of what we know about the consequences of interactions 
between particles with that nature. Like Martin (2008) and Heil (2003), 
I think these specifications have an epistemological import only.
Esfeld & Sachse have made a more concrete suggestion of how to 
understand negative charge which is interesting to relate to, namely 
that the manifestation of the dispositionality of electric charge is not the 
attraction or repulsion of the opposite or same charge, but the spontane-
ous generation of an electromagnetic field (2011: Ch.2). It is an interest-
ing suggestion, but the notion of single powers spontaneously manifesting 
something is problematic in its own right, and then there is the problem 
of how to generalise the suggestion, both to other examples of possible 
spontaneous generation of a manifestation by a single power, such as the 
decay of a muon into a gluon and neutrino, respectively, and to the case 
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of shape. A ball manifests shape, and in virtue of that shape interacts with 
its surroundings in various ways, similar to the way an electron interacts 
with its surroundings to produce a variety of outcomes. But should we 
say a ball has the power to spontaneously generate shape? It is possible 
that, in the fact that charge is fundamental while shape of a ball is not, 
we have a relevant difference.
However, it is a matter of controversy whether these phenomena really 
involve spontaneous production of a manifestation by a single power. 
The answer arguably depends on the theory you choose to describe the 
phenomena. For instance, the decay of a muon can only be treated as 
spontaneous in so far as the muon is treated as a simple particle without 
any internal structure up until it decays. The fact that the muon decays, 
producing three particles, makes you wonder if it really is an elemen-
tary particle exempt in the epistemic sense that its internal structure is 
unknown. If it is treated as an unstable compound, then the decay can 
be interpreted as the outcome of the interaction between its parts. In 
the case of fields, the question is whether to treat charge as a simple 
property of an electron (classical model), or as a power of a particle that 
spontaneously generates a field (a mix of classical and quantum models), 
or to treat the particle as an excitation in a field (quantum field theory). 
In the latter case, the field is not generated by a power, it is the bearer 
of the power to attract or repel. So, the question of whether there are 
particular powers that spontaneously manifest something on their own 
and not mutually with other powers has to do with questions that have 
to be settled within physics. One could argue in a similar vein to Galen 
Strawson (2008: 271–2) that since, in this case, no matter what model 
we chose, we cannot understand the electron, the charge, and the ability 
to attract/repel, as separate from each other, then the distinction between 
them is only conceptual and doesn’t reflect an ontological distinction. 
This would fit nicely in with my suggestion that we have to accept that 
we cannot fully conceive of the electron as it is in itself, but allow that we 
can come close to such an understanding by charting the various aspects 
that seem inseparable from it.
Esfeld & Sache’s suggestion is, I think, very close to this in spirit, but 
does actually cater to the idea that the nature of a power must be thought 
of as identical to a separate manifestation. The idea is that charge is a 
power that spontaneously manifests a field, but is still different from the 
field. Aren’t we again back in the conception of powers as ‘nothing but a 
relation to a manifestation’?
Now, as I said, I am not out to decisively prove one way or another, 
only to suggest a way in which we can think of quality and powers as one. 
For a more detailed discussion of the problem, see Livanios (2017: Ch. 2). 
And there are in fact a great number of properties that very plausibly are 
wholly characterised or picked out in terms of what they do and yet are 
considered to be determinate properties that characterise the object as it 
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is in itself. Indeed, for the type of theoretical entities discussed above, this 
is the rule rather than the exception (Thompson 1988). A particle can 
be described as having a determinate rest mass that remains invariant 
between frames of reference in relativistic physics. You cannot get much 
closer to describing something as it is in itself at a given time. And yet, 
there is no understanding of what mass is, of its essence, except in terms 
of what an object with mass can do. But the point is that the consequences 
of the exertion of the power in some particular circumstances must not be 
made equivalent to the unique essence of that power, any more than we 
should make the nature of an effect constitutive of the nature of the cause.
Interestingly, I don’t think I am presenting you with a new position 
on the subject. I think this is exactly the view Locke spelled out for us, 
contrary to popular belief. The popular belief is based on Berkeley and 
Hume’s misrepresentation of what Hume calls ‘modern philosophy’, for 
which Locke is a main figure, notably that secondary qualities are only 
in the mind.
They who assert that Figure, Motion, and the rest of the Primary 
or Original Qualities do exist without the Mind, in unthinking 
Substances, do at the same time acknowledge that Colours, Sounds, 
Heat, Cold, and suchlike secondary Qualities, do not.
(Berkeley 1709: §10)
Hume similarly claims that modern philosophy takes secondary qualities 
to be ‘nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv’d from the operation 
of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the 
objects’ (1739: 226).
8.7  Locke’s Powerful Qualities View
Today, the acceptance of the C/D distinction is generally associated with 
the rise of British empiricism, which is sort of right, but it shouldn’t be 
traced to Locke. I think it is clear that Locke had no notion of a distinc-
tion between causally inert qualities and non-qualitative dispositions. 
Rather he assumed properties were both qualities and powers in one 
sweet package. I think his view is of interest to the modern reader, which 
I paraphrase in the following way:
 (1) The material world is made up of corpuscles that individually have 
primary qualities, and which constitute compound objects that in 
addition acquire secondary and tertiary qualities that are grounded 
in the primary qualities of the simple corpuscles.
 (2) Both primary and secondary qualities are in the object.
 (3) Both primary and secondary qualities can be sensible, i.e. both give 
rise to ideas of sensation when they affect the senses.
Powers 135
 (4) All qualities, whether primary, secondary, or tertiary, are powers.
 (5) The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is not 
between objective and subjective qualities, but between fundamental 
and higher-order qualities in objects.
 (6) The objective vs. subjective distinction is not a distinction between 
qualities in the object and ideas of sensation in the subject, but 
between those ideas of sensation that correctly vs. incorrectly repre-
sent the qualities of the object.
 (7) Ideas of sensation of the primary qualities are epistemically objective 
because they represent those qualities as they really are in the object, 
while the ideas of secondary qualities are epistemically subjective 
because they do not represent the secondary qualities as they really 
are in the object.
 (8) The intellect can infer the presence of a third kind of insensible 
power/quality, on the basis of the observed changes in the sensible 
qualities but cannot conceive of it independently of the changes in 
the sensible qualities.
 (9) Insensible tertiary qualities really are in the object.
Claim (i) is uncontroversial, but (ii) contradicts Berkeley and Hume, and 
today the philosophical community is divided on this point. I take it that 
Berkeley and Hume’s opinion about Locke’s views on primary and sec-
ondary properties is currently the popular view. It is how the primary-
secondary distinction is typically presented in textbooks (for instance, 
Baggini & Fosl 2010: 124). However, Locke scholars agree with my claim 
(for instance, see Heil 2003:80; Uzgalis 2020: §2.2). Admittedly, Locke 
says that the secondary qualities are ‘nothing in the objects themselves but 
power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities’ and 
goes on to say about the third kind of powers that they are ‘barely powers’ 
(1689: 49). The modern reader who endorses the categorical/dispositional 
distinction may be tempted to interpret these claims as reductive. However, 
to read them in that way contradicts the following claims in which Locke 
explicitly claims that primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities are really in 
the object (NB. when Locke writes ‘subject’ he is talking about the subject 
of predication, i.e. the object, and not the perceiving subject):
Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of 
perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power 
to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein 
that power is.
(1689: 48)
Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of 
white, cold [secondaries, RI], and round [primary, RI], the power to 
produce those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; 
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and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call 
them ideas: which ideas, if I speak of sometimes, as if in the things 
themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in the 
objects which produce them in us.
(1689: 49)
To these may be added a third sort which are allowed to be barely 
powers though they are as much real qualities of the subject, as those 
which I to comply with the common way of speaking call qualities, 
but for distinction secondary qualities.
(1689: 49)
[porphyry] has, indeed, such a configuration of particles, both night 
and day, as are apt from the rays of light rebounding from some parts 
of that hard stone, to produce in us the idea of redness, and from 
others the idea of whiteness: but whiteness or redness are not in it at 
any time, but such a texture, that has the power to produce such a 
sensation in us.
(1689: 53)
As far as textual evidence goes, this is pretty clear. Locke clearly takes pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary qualities to be real qualities of objects that 
are present in them even when they are not actively producing any effects 
or sensations, albeit qualities that are grounded in a base of corpuscles 
possessing primary qualities.
Locke’s claim that ‘primary qualities of body, which I think we may 
observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, motion, 
or rest and number’ (1689: 49) shows that he takes primary qualities 
to be sensible, i.e. powers that give rise to ideas of sensation. That is, 
both primary and secondary qualities are powers. Combined, the cited 
passages show that Locke didn’t think the distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities is a distinction between objective and subjec-
tive qualities, but between fundamental and higher-order qualities. The 
secondary qualities are structural properties, properties the corpuscles 
cannot have individually, and thus cannot be reduced to mere primary 
properties (even though they can only exist in so far as corpuscles form 
a compound).
If we turn to the objective vs. subjective distinction, then this appears 
very clearly as a contrast between different sensible ideas of quality, not 
between property in object vs. idea of property in the mind. In Locke’s 
view, the sensible ideas of primary qualities resemble the qualities and are 
thus objective in an epistemic sense (1689: 51). The content of the idea 
of sphericity represents a spherical object like it actually is, and similarly 
the idea of a solid. These ideas, while being in the mind, are not biased 
by the working of our senses; they do not misrepresent what the object 
Powers 137
is really like. However, the sensible ideas of secondary qualities do not 
resemble the secondary qualities they represent. An object appears red 
but has in reality a surface texture that absorbs some wavelengths of light 
and reflects others. The sensible idea of red is in the mind, and it does not 
represent the object as it is independently of the mind. Ergo, it is subjec-
tively biased. But it represents a ‘texture’ of the object that it has even in 
the dark (like porphyry), but which the senses leave us ignorant about. 
The objective vs. subjective distinction applies only to the epistemic sta-
tus of ideas in the mind.
Admittedly, when Locke says that whiteness or redness are not in the 
object, it may seem like a rejection of secondary properties. However, 
Locke is arguably saying that the phenomenal quality of the sensible idea 
that represents the quality does not resemble what the object is really 
like, and nevertheless the idea represents the quality. Representation 
works without resemblance, as is generally the case with symbols. The 
word ‘banana’ symbolises and denotes the familiar fruit, but the word 
does not resemble the fruit; the word ‘ndizi’ does the same job for those 
who know Swahili. Similarly, the mathematical symbols of the laws of 
physics represent certain properties and relationships without bearing 
any resemblance to the phenomena they represent; mass doesn’t look 
like ‘m’. The phenomenal quality of red symbolically represents and 
denotes a certain surface structure, but without informing us what that 
surface is actually like. Consider that no experience of red informs us 
that a red surface is made out of atoms that absorb and emit light of 
certain wavelengths.
Now, even though our sensible ideas of secondary qualities do not 
resemble the quality itself, they are still ‘adequate’ in Locke’s view. That 
is, to see that one object is red and another blue tells us they are different, 
and that is of enormous practical value even when we don’t know what 
the objects are actually like. It allows us to distinguish edible juniper ber-
ries from poisonous yew berries.
What arguments can be mustered for the epistemic objectivity of our 
ideas of sensation of primary properties? In the eyes of modern readers, 
Locke only gives the rudiments of an explanation (1689: 54–6). It boils 
down to saying that the content of our ideas about the primary quali-
ties allows us to understand how they influence the senses to produce 
the corresponding sensible ideas about them. We can understand how an 
object which is solid makes an impression on our senses to produce an 
idea of solidity, but we cannot understand how a distant yellow object 
affects our senses to produce a sensible idea of yellow. Locke’s rudimen-
tary idea points in the right direction but needs to be adapted to our cur-
rent knowledge of the world. The explanation we can give today of why 
an object looks yellow is that the object emits photons and they impinge 
on photoreceptors in the retina, and … wait! Haven’t we embarked on 
an explanation of how the sensible idea of yellow is produced, invoking 
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primary properties such as solidity, motion, etc. but never the quality of 
being yellow?
The idea is really that if we ask the sciences why an object appears 
to be yellow, then the phenomenal quality of yellow doesn’t enter the 
explanation. There is a discrepancy between the appearance of an object 
as yellow in experience, and the scientific explanation of why the object 
appears yellow. In fact, it isn’t clear how science actually explains why 
the causal chain of influences ends up as yellow, or green, or red, or some 
other colour. Nevertheless, we are able to objectively discern, using mea-
suring equipment, the refraction pattern of surfaces and conclude that it 
doesn’t coincide with what we subjectively report. Hence, we have rea-
sons to doubt the objectivity of the sensible idea. However, if you ask 
the sciences why a billiard ball appears to be spherical, they will answer 
that, while we do have to take into consideration how our sensory appa-
ratus works, ultimately it appears thus because it is spherical. We can 
even support that conclusion with measurements with radar, ultrasound, 
laser, and more, to show that in this case the senses are not misleading 
us. All available means to determine the shape of the billiard ball will 
come to the same conclusion: the ball is spherical. Perception and science 
agree in the case of shape, and there is no conflicting evidence to make 
us doubt the accuracy of the perception. Well, obviously we sometimes 
get shape wrong, but we can also understand under what conditions we 
get it wrong and how we deviated from the truth. But with colour we are 
wrong (or rather ignorant) all of the time about the surface properties 
of objects, even in the most ideal circumstances. I think we have here a 
plausible example of a conception of quality in which quality and power 
fit perfectly well together. If this is right, we have a counterexample to the 
idea that, while we can understand the nature of qualities in a single act 
of perception, we can only understand their power in terms of condition-
als that say what the object will do in certain conditions.
8.8  Properties and Conditionals
The distinction between qualities and powers is often drawn by saying 
that ascriptions of powers, but not of qualities, entail certain kinds of 
counterfactual conditionals (Carnap 1936)–; Goodman 1954; Mumford 
1998; Choi 2008). Hugh Mellor (1974) objects, saying that ascriptions 
of qualities also entail conditionals. For instance, ‘a is a triangle’ entails 
‘if its corners were counted the answer would be three’. However, even 
though it is admitted that qualities also entail conditionals, our under-
standing of the quality in question seems to be independent of our under-
standing of any such entailment, while our understanding of a power 
appears to be dependent on our understanding of the entailment. We 
are able to understand what it is to be a triangle without knowing that 
its angle sum, if measured, is 180°. But we cannot understand what it is 
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to be fragile without understanding that a fragile object would break if 
struck smartly. In this case, the conditional appears to provide the defin-
ing features of the power—what it is—while for qualities the conditional 
only spells out a consequence implied by the defining features that we 
are already acquainted with and understand. We understand a priori of 
actually counting that a triangle has three corners, but we do not under-
stand what it is for something to be fragile a priori of experiencing some-
thing breaking easily. This implies that we somehow understand powers 
only through the conditionals, but that we have some other independent 
means to understand qualities. Note now, that the only qualities we can 
pretend to understand in this independent way are the ones we can per-
ceive. It is only those features of reality of which we have sensible ideas, 
such as colours, smells, shapes, etc., that we can pretend to understand 
independently of any conditional that might be given. None of the prop-
erties discovered and described by science, but which we have no corre-
sponding perception of, can be understood independently of conditionals 
of some sort.
However, it is also the case that of all the different sensible ideas we 
have, very few of them allow us really to infer much about the behaviour 
of the object we perceive to have the quality. We can perceive the smell of 
a wine, but what can we infer from that about the behaviour of the wine 
except how it will affect us? Spatial properties, the kind of properties on 
which perception and science agree, are an interesting exception. Shape is 
the best case there is for the identity of qualities and powers. We can argu-
ably understand from our grasp of shapes, a priori of testing any particu-
lar shape, that a key fits in the appropriate lock in a way that no key with 
a different shape will do; we understand that a leaden ball dropped onto a 
pillow will make a hollow corresponding to whatever shape the ball hap-
pens to have. Indeed, Ingvar Johansson argues that we can ‘intuit […] a 
kinematics of mechanisms in the same way as we can intuit some truths in 
Euclidean geometry’ (1997: 411). His point, I take it, is that Archimedes 
didn’t have to build an Archimedean screw to know it would work. He 
could see that it had to work merely on the basis of the visual representa-
tion of the geometry of the mechanism. If this is true, then we have in our 
grasp of shapes, a grasp of how quality and power go hand in hand. That 
is perhaps why engineering is such a successful and practical discipline.
Counterexamples have been given to show that shapes do not have a 
causal role, but they are inconclusive. For instance, Jonathan Lowe has 
suggested in conversation that a spherical soap bubble does not thereby 
have the power to roll on an inclined plane, which it should if its spheric-
ity bestowed on it a distinctive causal role. Also, that regions of empty 
space have a shape but do not thereby influence anything in any distinc-
tive ways.
The soap bubble is problematic for the purist who thinks powers are 
necessarily tied to particular manifestation properties, but not for the 
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powerful qualities view. Adherents of the latter will say that, while the 
property contributes in the same way always, it will produce different 
outcomes depending on what it is interacting with on a given occasion. 
Take a standard ball from a pinball machine and submit it to a range of 
experimental conditions, say, testing it on a range of different automated 
pinball machines with a range of surfaces, including magnetic and sticky 
toffee surfaces. The shape of the ball will in each of these conditions con-
tribute to the outcome, but the ball will not behave the same because dif-
ferent powers will be jointly contributing in each case. Furthermore, it will 
behave differently in each condition compared to balls with a different 
shape (all other properties being equal); the difference will be down to the 
difference in shape. Replace the pinballs with soap bubbles with different 
shapes and the soap bubbles will behave very differently from the pinballs, 
mostly for reasons having nothing to do with their shapes, but the differ-
ence between the behaviour of spherical and non-spherical soap bubbles 
would be down to shape if that were the only difference in properties.
As for the empty sub-regions of space, they simply are not distinct 
objects that bear property instances of any kind independently of the rest 
of space, and so should not be expected to have any distinct causal pow-
ers of their own.
8.9  The Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting Powers
Although an answer is already hinted at in §6, I should address explic-
itly the idea that, while an object always has determinate and occurrent 
qualities, its powers are somehow indeterminate until the moment they 
manifest some particular outcome. This is a consequence of the idea that 
the nature of a power is determined by the particular manifestation it 
brings about and it isn’t until the manifestation actually occurs that the 
power reveals its determinate nature. The ‘reveal’ is then identified with 
the instantiation of the power. So, how can we think of unmanifesting 
powers as determinate property instances? Exactly like we think of an 
electron as having a particular charge even when it is not exercising that 
property to change the state of motion of anything. And exactly like we 
think of a ball as being spherical and having the ability to roll, even 
though it is not actually rolling down an incline. The trick is merely to 
accept, as realists have always done, that properties/objects have a deter-
minate nature independently of what we see or measure. Admittedly 
there are problems with this view on the quantum physical level. I pro-
pose we withhold judgement on whether the indeterminacy postulated 
to obtain on the quantum level really applies on any level above that 
until we understand the implications of quantum physics better. Indeed, 
philosophers of the past who have advocated the C/D distinction have 
not appealed to the indeterminacy of quantum physics. And, if what I 
have argued above is on the right track, then the trouble of attributing a 
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determinate nature to powers also applies to qualities. Either it applies to 
both or neither. As far as I see, we have no reason to regard the perceived 
manifestation of a power as being constitutive of its nature, any more 
than we have a reason to regard phenomenal qualities of experience to be 
constitutive of the nature of the physical qualities they represent.
Martin and Heil admit that we might need to understand a power in 
terms of the particular manifestations it contributes to produce—they 
call them ‘typifying manifestations’ (Heil 2003: 81)—but they warn us 
against identifying the power with them or taking them to be consti-
tutive of the BASIC nature of the power. In the end we must consider 
every manifestation as an indirect indication of the presence of a prop-
erty whose nature we must try to grasp by abstraction from its various 
manifestations.
8.10  Active and Passive Powers
Having addressed the influences of neo-Humeanism at some length, I 
return to questions about the neo-Aristotelian conception of pow-
ers, notably that some powers are active while others are passive, and 
that powers collaborate only in particular types of active-passive pairs, 
to mutually manifest something. The power to heat teams up with the 
power to be heated to heat up the object that can be heated. The power 
to dissolve teams up with the power to dissolve to dissolve the object 
with the latter property. This idea of active and passive powers fits to the 
description of interacting objects as active and passive.
Now, I have already addressed the flaw in the idea that there are objects 
that only act but are not acted upon (Agents) and those that only receive 
an influence but do not act back (Patients). My argumentation there 
appealed to the scientific image, and I think that is also pertinent here. To 
my mind, our ordinary everyday view of the world as divided into active 
and passive components dissolves under the microscope of science. Let us 
consider the case of water dissolving salt, which Anna Marmodoro has 
explicitly used to criticise my characterisation of interactions as symmet-
rical (2017). According to her, there is reciprocity between water and salt, 
both influence each other, but there is also asymmetry, because while the 
water dissolves the salt, the salt does not dissolve the water. My reply is 
that this only works if we stay in the confines of our everyday conceptual 
scheme, and even then it is problematic. So, for instance, we are typically 
faced with situations in which we add small amounts of salt to a large 
amount of water, say, adding salt to the pasta water. But someone who 
has worked in a saltfish factory (like I have) and seen rain pouring down 
for hours on mountains of salt to no visible effect, has to wonder what 
happened to the water. Was it perhaps separated molecule by molecule 
to bind to the salt molecules? Would we perhaps have a concept of ‘salt 
dissolving water’ if we had experiences like that more frequently?
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Furthermore, the asymmetry of the interaction between water and 
salt only makes sense if we attribute the power to dissolve/be dissolved 
to large quantities of water or salt. However, if we consult science on 
what this power really is, it tells us it has to do with the properties of 
individual molecules and not water or salt in bulk. Water molecules 
are polarised and therefore interact either with the Na+ or Cl- in salt 
crystals, depending on which way it is ‘pointing’ on contact. Whether 
the interaction results in the dissociation of the Na+ and Cl- depends on 
whether the ionic bonds in the crystal are stronger or weaker than the 
attraction to the water molecules. The dissociation will continue only 
as long as individual water molecules can interact with individual NaCl 
molecules. These interactions are each individually perfectly reciprocal. 
However, they are also invisible to the eye, wherefore the only thing 
we see is salt disappearing from sight. Arguably, how we construe what 
actually happens is pretty much due to the limitation of our senses.
Does this mean that there is no distinction between active and passive 
powers? My thoughts on this subject have not taken a definite shape. 
It seems clear that my criticism of the distinction between active and 
passive substances does not change the fact that we do have to make a 
distinction between how an object affects other objects, and how it reacts 
to the influence of others, but I am less certain whether this requires two 
distinct categories of properties, or whether we can allow a single prop-
erty to be an ability both to act and be acted upon. I lean towards the sec-
ond option. Hence, I do not fully agree with Hansson-Wahlberg (2019) 
who argues that the category of passive power is superfluous, in so far 
as he attempts to get rid of the category of passive power without saying 
what serves the role passive powers have traditionally played. He argues 
that once we have agreed that water has the power to dissolve sugar 
it adds nothing to postulate that the sugar possesses water- solubility. 
I disagree, first, because he assumes that we attribute such properties as 
‘sugar- dissolving’ and ‘water-soluble’ to water and sugar, which would 
mean that water has distinct properties for dissolving sugar, salt, bread, 
etc. Surely there is but one property the water has, namely that the water 
molecules are polarised and this is what makes it such an effective solvent 
for a range of substances. Note that ice does not dissolve as well, because 
in ice the water molecules are too strongly bonded to each other to effec-
tively interact with salt, sugar, bread, etc. So, something has to explain 
why water does not have the same effect on everything, and that role 
is played by the properties of the object that is subject to the influence. 
Admittedly, Hansson-Wahlberg doesn’t reject categorical properties, so 
it is possible that he thinks that all we need are active powers and then 
categorical properties. For someone like me who thinks all natural prop-
erties are powerful qualities, this option is not available.
As I said, my thoughts on this subject are only beginning to take 
shape but let me illustrate how one could possibly argue that all natural 
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properties, once we have properly understood them, are at the same time 
active and passive. Consider inertia, which is typically understood as a 
passive power, i.e. a body’s ability to resist changes in the state of motion. 
Interestingly, Newton thought it ‘may be considered both as resistance 
and impulse’ (1686: Def. III). It is a passive resistance ‘in so far as the 
body, for maintaining its present state, withstands the force impressed’, 
but it is an active power to influence other objects ‘in so far as the body, 
by not easily giving way to the impressed force of another, endeavours to 
change the state of that other’ (1686: Def III). We have to consider that 
inertia is an intuitive concept, which is typically quantified in physics in 
terms of mass and/or momentum. And the more you think about it, the 
less clear are the distinctions between the three concepts. The American 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2020) explains that the 
mass of an object is the ‘measure of its inertial property or how much 
matter it contains’. One can wonder whether ‘inertia’ and ‘matter’ rep-
resents the power vs. quality of ‘materiality’, in accordance with how 
that distinction is drawn in MAP, while momentum is a quantification of 
the amount of power in relation to amount of matter + state of motion. 
After all, momentum is defined, roughly, as mass x velocity. The interest-
ing thing, however, is that the momentum of an object a both determines 
the force a exerts on another object b, when they interact, and is a prop-
erty that changes in proportion to the quantity of the force b exerts on 
a, which in turn is proportional to the quantity of force a exerts on b. 
Momentum is active and passive at the same time, i.e. something that 
simultaneously affects and is affected. We have a similar situation with 
respect to other properties tied to mass, such as gravitation. All massive 
bodies experience and exert gravitational forces, and that results in con-
tinuous changes in the momenta of the gravitationally interacting bodies, 
if only in their direction.
Whether it is feasible to generalise this suggestion across the board, so 
that every fundamental property be understood as something that can 
affect and be affected, in some way or another, is not something I can 
answer in this book. We can consider it a matter for further research that 
will have to include physicists. However, if it is feasible, I can anticipate it 
having some implications for what is called the problem of fit.
8.11  The Problem of Fit
The problem of fit is the puzzle of why powers only seem to team up 
with particular other powers and not with every power. Traditionally, 
it appeared that the fit was always between an active power with a pas-
sive power. However, I think we need to seriously consider whether this 
is how things really work or whether it is merely a feature of our ordi-
nary conceptual scheme, generated by our fairly superficial perception of 
the world of ordinary middle-sized dry goods. Because, in the disparity 
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between our everyday conceptual scheme and the scientific image, it is 
not just that the apparently asymmetric interactions between different 
kinds of powers are explained by science to be symmetric interactions, 
but arguably also, to a great extent at least, interactions between the 
same kind of powers. The water and salt molecules do not interact in 
terms of different types of powers, but in terms of interactions that are 
all electrostatic. Billiard balls exert forces on each other in virtue of their 
respective momenta. Particles repel or attract in virtue of charge. In the 
scientific image, it appears that like power responds to like. If that is the 
case, the answer to the problem of fit is that objects interact in so far as 
they possess the same powers. However, again we have come to a point 
in the development of this view that is in its infancy, and I leave it at that.
8.12  What Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars?
As I have argued, it is the powerful particular that exercises influence 
and which is influenced, rather than the events in which the particular is 
involved. I could therefore be interpreted as taking side with substance 
causation over event causation (but see qualification below). However, 
contemporary powers-based accounts are typically either silent on the 
role of the particular bearing the powers, or explicitly argue that it is the 
powers and not the particulars that are doing all the work (Mumford & 
Anjum 2011; Buckareff 2017). My position is the reverse; that it is the 
powerful particular, rather than the powers of the particular that do the 
work, even though of course the particulars exert different kinds of influ-
ences depending on what kinds of powers they have. The difference may 
seem minuscule but matters for our understanding of the inner structure 
of a persistent entity, and for any attempt to tie together our understand-
ing of causation, persistence, and change.
In my view, a power—like any property—is just the way an object is, 
and powers aren’t the kind of entity that can be independently engaged 
in an activity, nor are they entities that can change. To say that an object’s 
momentum is doing something to another object’s momentum, while the 
object that has the momentum isn’t doing anything, seems like a category 
mistake. In saying this, I don’t think I differ much from other writers that 
have argued in favour of substance causation, i.e. the position that par-
ticulars can be causes, such as Lowe (2008), Helen Steward (2012), and 
Ann Whittle (2016). We agree the particulars and not their powers are 
doing the work. However, my view is that interactions—not  particulars— 
are causes although I view interactions as mutual exertion of influence 
between particulars rather than between powers. To clarify, Lowe, 
Steward, and Whittle understand causation more along the standard 
view and therefore understand interactions as unidirectional actions, and 
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consequently think that one of the interacting objects is doing the caus-
ing, while the other changes.
The argument that contemporary writers appeal to for the primacy of 
powers is based on the same observation that Hobbes once made, namely 
that it appears that particulars exert an influence not merely because they 
are particulars but because they have certain powers. In Hobbes’ words: 
‘the agent hath its effect precisely such, not because it is a body, but 
because such a body, or so moved’ (1656: Ch. IX, 3). However, we would 
do well to observe that Hobbes doesn’t really draw the conclusion that 
we must therefore regard powers as entities that can in themselves exert 
an influence. He consistently continues to write that it is the Agent that 
acts on the Patient and not that a power acts, even though they act and are 
acted upon in virtue of possessing certain powers. To insist that powers 
are somehow separate and independent from their bearers seems to rely 
on the acceptance of the modern analytic conception of substance, and 
the deficits of that view are spelled out in Chapter 7. On the Aristotelian 
view of substance, properties are the way an object is, rather than a sepa-
rate entity that is somehow coupled to the object. So, even if an object 
acts in a certain way not merely in virtue of being a bearer of powers, but 
because it has this or that power, it doesn’t automatically mean that the 
power is the right kind of entity to act.
Another problem with powers-based accounts that ignore the role of 
the particulars is that they fail to connect explicitly to questions about the 
proper subject of change and to issues about persistence. This is admira-
bly put into focus by Williams (2019: Ch. 8), although I do not agree with 
Williams’ favourable views on perdurantism and even creation ex nihilo. 
But I do agree with him that, to properly connect powers-based accounts 
to traditional disputes about change and persistence, we have to address 
the role played by particulars.
The fact that the role of the particular is largely ignored in the litera-
ture has serious repercussions. For instance, it leads C.B. Martin to use a 
flawed analogy—the two triangles example—to illustrate his view, which 
in turn allows Mumford & Anjum to interpret that analogy as proof that 
Martin is not presenting us with an alternative view of causation but as 
an alternative to causation, i.e. not a view of causation at all (Mumford 
& Anjum 2015b). Martin’s example of two paper triangles that together 
‘mutually manifest’ a square when put side by side is meant to illustrate 
the contrast between his and other views on mutual manifestations:
You should not think of disposition partners jointly causing the man-
ifestation. Instead, the coming together of the disposition partners is 
the mutual manifestation: the partnering and the manifestation are 
identical. This partneringmanifestation identity is seen most clearly 
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with cases such as the following. You have two triangle-shaped slips 
of paper that, when placed together appropriately, form a square. It 
is not that the partnering of the triangles causes the manifestation of 
the square, but rather that the partnering is the manifestation.
(Martin 2008: 51)
To be sure, it is an ill-chosen example. The triangles can form a square 
without exerting any influence on each other at all, and without produc-
ing any intrinsic changes at all in each other, and thus without becoming 
a unitary entity. It is an example of a mere Cambridge change. If Martin 
is not guilty of simply choosing a bad analogy, Mumford & Anjum are 
right to understand him as advancing what they call a ‘compositional 
view’, in which powers come together to constitute a mutual manifesta-
tion rather than producing genuine changes in anything (Mumford & 
Anjum 2015b).
Now, I find it difficult to reconcile this ‘compositional’ understand-
ing with Martin’s overall view but admit that it is not easy to decisively 
refute it. But it does at least seem reasonable to say that if the bearers of 
powers had a more protruding role in the discussion about powers, it is 
unlikely that Martin would have been tempted to use the example. At the 
very least, he would have realised that his readers would be wondering 
whether he actually thinks causation is a mere Cambridge change, and 
explicitly address that worry. The fact that he uses the example without 
addressing the worry leads me to think that the triangle example only 
signifies a bad day at work. All he wants to say, I think, is that powerful 
particulars come together to jointly influence each other and that as they 
influence each other they change to give rise to the effect; that is one sense 
in which you can say that the coming together is the mutual manifesta-
tion. The following passage can support that interpretation:
In coming to a new account of cause–effect, one should put the 
matter in the active voice in terms of the manifestings of the mani-
festations of the disposition in its reciprocatings with its reciprocal 
disposition partners as active partnerings with mutual manifestings. 
That is cause–effect redesigned and improved.
(Martin 2008: 4)
The passage is a mouthful, I’ll give you that, but it is not easily reconciled 
with Mumford & Anjum’s interpretation of the two triangles passively 
merging to manifest a square.
Indeed, I find that Mumford & Anjum are also guilty of not taking 
into account the role of the particular, wherefore they too become guilty 
of using a flawed analogy—the vector model—to illustrate their view of 
causation. They suggest we can illustrate powers-based causation using 
vector arrows situated in what they call a ‘quality space’ (2011: Ch. 2), 
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building on a suggestion by Lombard (1986). The term ‘quality space’ 
is meant to capture the idea that a change in an object is always with 
respect to some or other property, and that an object always changes 
from one determinate qualitative state to another determinate state by 
passing continuously through the intermediary states. An object which 
accelerates from an initial velocity v1 to a final velocity vn will acceler-
ate through all the intermediary velocities v2, v3, v4 … before reaching 
vn. We can thus think of any specific qualitative state as occupying a 
position on a continuum of adjacent determinate states, that continuum 
being thought of as the dimension of change for that quality (how it can 
potentially change). The vector model thus represents the dimensions of 
change of the sum total of (causally relevant) properties located at a given 
spacetime point during a causal interaction.
The quality space can be either one, two, or three-dimensional; each 
dimension representing a spatial dimension. In a one-dimensional qual-
ity space, the locus of the powers—their position in spacetime—is rep-
resented with a vertical line, and vector arrows pointing either left or 
right represent the potential dimension of change of each power, towards 
some or other manifestation property in the given situation. In a three-
dimensional quality space, the locus of the powers in spacetime is repre-
sented with a dot in a 3D coordinate system, and the power-vectors point 
outwards in all directions from the dot.
The flaw of the one-dimensional model is that it cannot be used to 
illustrate that in a real-world interaction the powers belong to at least 
two different objects. Consequently, it depicts causal interactions merely 
as a nexus of co-present powers that can change along a given dimen-
sion regardless of how the powers are distributed between the objects 
involved. Really, like the parallelogram used in classical mechanics, the 
one-dimensional vector model can only accurately represent the forces 
operating on one object at a time. It is therefore not really a model of an 
interaction, but only of one side of an interaction.
The three-dimensional model could possibly be used, because it allows 
the introduction of multiple loci of powers from which arrows emanate 
representing the dimensions of potential change. Mumford & Anjum 
never do that, and explicitly express that they think it makes no practical 
difference to use the one-dimensional model for the sake of simplicity 
(2011: 45). Since they only use the one-dimensional model, my point 
about the flaw in the analogy is still valid.
The moral is: don’t forget about the particular in your account of causal 
interactions. After all, any account of causation that aims to explain how 
causes produce effects in a manner that accommodates the moral of the 
genetic principle—that production is never coming into being out of noth-
ing or complete annihilation—must clarify the role of the continuants, 
because only they are able to persist through an interaction to provide the 
raw material out of which a new state of affairs comes into being.
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8.13  Concluding Remark
The upshot of it all is that I think the conviction with which the philo-
sophical community, by and large, stick to the C/D distinction and MAP 
is built on a rather shaky ground, and that power and quality really aren’t 
as conceptually incompatible as tradition dictates. The case for MAP is 
shaky because it relies on the conviction that qualities but not powers 
are observable, that Hume’s argument can be used to support a realist 
acceptance of MAP, and that Locke, and therefore the united front of 
British empiricism, stands behind MAP. If I am right, the only thing that 
really supports MAP is the incompatibility of the proto-idea of funda-
mental properties as BASIC and the popular relational characterisation 
of powers, and the fact that the relationship between the objective nature 
of objects and the way they are represented in experience is complicated. 
However, it also seems to me that the indirect realist, who regards the 
manifest image with scepticism and contrasts it to the scientific image, 
can arrive at a conception of properties as powerful qualities. I have 
argued that there is one class of properties on which the manifest and 
scientific images coincide—shape—and that here we can conceptually 
reconcile the powerful and the qualitative. My suggestion is that we can, 
by analogy, assume that the same really holds for other properties but 
that we are confined to a more abstract and symbolic understanding of 
them because of the limitations of our perception.
Now, readers may wonder whether I really have touched upon what 
many believe is the core subject of the debate about powers: do powers 
have dispositional essences? They will find it difficult to connect my dis-
cussion, for instance, to what Livanios writes on the issues (2017: Ch. 6). 
Well, it should however be clear that I don’t believe we should think of 
such essences as determined by a single manifestation, or even by the 
variety of manifestations that a power can mutually manifest. My sug-
gestion is simply that they have powerful qualities. Such qualities are in 
some sense essences, i.e. there is something it is like to have the quality, 
and that essence will determine the way the object will affect and be 
affected. But it is not the same kind of dispositional essence that has so 
far been discussed within the neo-Humean framework.
In Chapter 2, I discussed neo-Humean accounts of causation, arguing 
that they cannot aim to explain causation but only to characterise it. 
Furthermore, I argued that the standard view explains causation in such 
a way that it agrees with all the neo-Humean accounts about how cau-
sation appears to us (and they with each other). That is, there is overall 
agreement on the level of characterisation. The point should be further 
elaborated but I find little space to deal with the range of neo-Humean 
views in a single book. I have therefore singled out counterfactual theories 
of causation (CTCSs) for further scrutiny, because, I believe, they enjoy the 
widest following in the philosophical community generally. The point is to 
show that philosophers find CTCs appealing partly because, like all neo-
Humean accounts, they agree on the level of characterisation with the stan-
dard view, and partly because the followers of CTCs just aren’t clear on the 
implications of the various ontologies that CTCs are supposed to be com-
patible with, not even with the implications of neo-Humean metaphysics.
9.1  The Appeal of CTCs
Philosophers seem to find CTCs appealing for three main reasons. First, 
many find a brute intuitive appeal in the idea that counterfactuals are 
connected to causation in a way that makes them apt to explain causa-
tion. Second, CTCs are perceived to offer the promise of explaining the 
unclear notion of causation, in terms of the (allegedly) clearer and better 
understood notion of counterfactual dependence. Third, CTCs are popu-
larly believed to be usefully applicable pretty much regardless of one’s 
ontological commitments. The latter really boils down to the perceived 
utility of possible world semantics as a ‘powerful conceptual tool for con-
structing philosophical arguments and for analyzing and developing solu-
tions to philosophical problems’ (Menzel 2017: §2.2.4). The idea is that 
this tool works for everyone regardless of their ontological commitments.
I disagree on all three scores and find the philosophical discussion about 
the professed advantages of CTCs to be strangely one-dimensional. First, 
I cannot identify any prima facie reason to think that causation can be 
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explained in counterfactual terms, but plenty to think that causation can 
explain counterfactuals. A handful of very simple examples are enough to 
show that our acceptance of counterfactual claims is typically determined 
by our (presumed) causal knowledge and not the other way around. 
Indeed, for millennia, the dominant philosophical view has been that the 
nature of causation entails the counterfactual dependence of effects on 
their causes. Indeed, it still part and parcel of the scientific view of the 
world that natural phenomena do not happen haphazardly but are deter-
mined by the properties of whatever entities are involved. A  uniformly 
moving body will change its state of motion if, and only if, it is acted 
upon by another body, from which it follows that ‘if it hadn’t been for the 
action of A upon B, B wouldn’t have changed its state of motion’. This 
way of thinking about natural changes goes back to Aristotle and has 
arguably entered our everyday conceptual framework, and that explains 
why we now think there is an intuitive link between causal and counter-
factual claims. However, it implies that causation explains counterfactual 
dependence rather than the other way around.
As for the promise of explaining causation in terms of an allegedly 
much better understood notion of counterfactual dependence, this hinges 
on the conviction that the construct of ‘possible worlds’ really is the 
powerful conceptual tool that it is hyped up to be, and that it really 
does deliver an explanation of counterfactual dependence that is inde-
pendent of, or prior to, our understanding of causation. Here we find 
many dissenting voices. It has been argued that most counterfactuals are 
in fact false, because the world just isn’t determinate enough to make 
such definitive statements as ‘E only if C’ true (Hájek 2014). Others claim 
the construct of possible worlds is hopelessly unclear because it relies on 
primitive, undefined, and, more importantly, indefinable notions such as 
‘accessibility’ (Sowa 2006) and ‘overall comparative similarity’ (Morreau 
2010); notions that are even less clear than causation. Stephen Barker has 
argued that counterfactuals cannot be about possible worlds (2011), and 
Jonathan Jacobs has argued that to flesh out the meaning of causal claims 
about what happens in this world by talking about other possible worlds 
is just to change the subject (2010). Finally, Marcus Arvan has argued 
that the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals is flawed because it 
cannot handle certain metaphysical and/or epistemological possibilities 
that it should be able to handle, such as the possibility that this world is 
just a computer simulation (Arvan 2016).
Indeed, far from being ontologically versatile or neutral, I find that very 
few ontologies, if any at all, make sense of the idea that counterfactual 
dependence is more fundamental than causation. For instance, no ontol-
ogy that posits substantial connections between cause and effect seems to 
have any reason to make use of the construct of possible worlds, except 
perhaps as a useful heuristic for making explicit the consequences of 
what we already presume to know about those substantial connections. 
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However, in that case it is the substantial connection that explains/grounds 
the counterfactual claim, and not the other way around, wherefore the 
heuristic value has nothing to do with ontology. Indeed, like Hájek, I even 
find reasons to doubt that neo-Humean metaphysics can ground causal 
claims on counterfactual dependence (see Sections 9.5–9.7).
It is important to keep in mind throughout that CTCs pull in different 
directions as to what it involves to ‘explain causation’; directions that do 
not necessarily coincide but are rarely kept cleanly apart (see Hájek 2014, 
for a more detailed discussion). Some proponents of CTCs only aim for a 
‘good old-fashioned conceptual analysis of causation—a detailed expla-
nation, that is, of how our ordinary concept works’ (Collins, Hall, & 
Paul 2004: 30), while others are more ontologically ambitious and offer 
a substantial ontology of possible worlds in which counterfactual depen-
dence is more fundamental than causation. There is no guarantee that 
our ordinary concept is true, or even ontologically deep, wherefore we 
must evaluate separately the purported fruitfulness of CTCs for the elu-
cidation of ordinary concepts (which I discuss in Sections 9.2 and 9.3), 
and as an ontological theory (which I discuss in Sections 9.4–9.7). To be 
ontologically serious, CTCs must present a model of reality—some pos-
sible worlds construct—whose fundamental principles make counterfac-
tual dependence more fundamental than causation.
It is not easy to separate the two directions in which CTCs are pulling, 
especially since some thinkers go sometimes in one direction and some-
times in the other. For instance, Lewis only aims for an account of the 
ordinary concept in (1973a), but his modal realism is surely ontologically 
serious (1986a). However, as Brian Weatherson observes (2014), since 
hardly anybody accepts Lewis’ modal realism, the question arises as to 
what other kinds of ontologies would serve the same purpose for those 
thinkers who still want to be ontologically serious. I argue that they are 
at least much fewer than popularly believed.
There is arguably a third direction, also not cleanly kept apart from 
the other two, namely the study or construction of a purely formal 
language of possible worlds. Indeed, the definitions of ‘counterfactual 
dependence’, ‘comparative similarity’, and ‘nomic dependence’ are often 
enough treated as mere stipulations about what they mean in the for-
mal language, and criticism of them—guided by concerns about their 
application to ordinary language and to the world—are then shrugged 
off as misunderstandings of the conceptual framework. Such responses 
are in place if the goal is simply to construe a formal language without 
any concern for its relevance for the way we think and speak or to what 
the world is really like. However, if it is meant to explain the ordinary 
concept or some feature of reality, then such criticism cannot be shrugged 
off so easily. I only address whether CTCs can be deployed to clarify the 
ordinary concept or for more ontologically serious tasks, which is why I 
ignore the purely formal approach.
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9.2  Counterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains 
Counterfactuals?
Proponents of CTCs often appeal to an intuition that causation and 
counterfactuals are connected in such a way as to make counterfactuals 
apt to explain causation:
The philosophical importance of counterfactuals stems from the fact 
that they seem to be closely connected to the concept of causation. 
Thus it seems that the truth of the above conditional [if Suzy hadn’t 
thrown the rock, then the bottle wouldn’t have shattered] is just 
what is required for Suzy’s throw to count as a cause of the bottle’s 
shattering.
(Collins 2007: 1127)
The discovery of that intuitive link, thus suggesting CTCs, is popularly 
attributed to Hume, following a suggestion by Lewis (1973a: 556). Here 
is the relevant passage from Hume:
we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where 
all the objects, similar to the first are followed by objects similar to 
the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, 
the second never had existed.
(Hume 1748: §VII)
Why did nobody pick up on Hume’s alleged counterfactual idea for 200 
years? According to Collins, it simply wasn’t feasible until Stalnaker and 
Lewis made certain advances in our understanding of counterfactual con-
ditionals (Collins 2007: 1127). One can question the characterisation of 
what Lewis and Stalnaker did as advances in our understanding. What 
they arguably did was to create an entirely new conceptual framework 
where the term ‘counterfactual dependence’ was defined internally to that 
framework but whose application to the ordinary conceptual framework 
or to reality is entirely unclear.
The attribution of the discovery to Hume is so widespread today that 
even causal realists accept it (for instance, see Maudlin 2004; Broadbent 
2007; Mumford & Anjum 2011: 149). And yet it is plainly wrong. The 
connection between causation and counterfactual claims has been at the 
heart of the causal realist tradition for a very long time but then in a man-
ner that grounds counterfactual claims in causation, not the other way 
around. Consider Galileo, Hobbes, and Spinoza a century before Hume:
A cause is that which put [placed], the effect follows; and removed, 
the effect is removed [sic].
(1612: cited in Drake 1981: 217)
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An entire cause, is an aggregate of all the accidents both of the Agents 
[…] and of the Patients, put together: which when they are supposed 
to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced 
at the same instant; and if any of them be wanting, it cannot be 
understood but that the effect is not produced.
(Hobbes 1656: Ch. X, §3)
From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the 
other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an 
effect can follow.
(Spinoza 1677: I, axiom III)
They all present causation as entailing the counterfactual dependence of 
effects on their causes: no effect but for the cause. Indeed, the main dif-
ference is that Galileo, Hobbes, and Spinoza have a semicolon before 
completing their statements while Hume puts a full stop in the middle.
A more plausible reading is that Hume was stating the contemporary 
view before he went on to criticise it but made a blunder regarding punc-
tuation. This explains why he thinks he is describing one view in two dif-
ferent ways. Lewis’ reading only raises questions. Why would Hume offer 
two definitions of causation only to present an account that has little to 
do with either of them? Hume’s own view is not that causation is a real 
constant conjunction, from which it follows that ‘E only if C’. He argues 
we are psychologically primed to draw an invalid inference about a con-
stant conjunction from a limited number of observations. The further 
inference that ‘E only if C’ would be equally invalid. As far as we know, 
he said, anything can follow from anything.
My reading also explains why Hume never gave a counterfactual 
analysis himself. The lack of a necessary connection between cause and 
effect entails the lack of a counterfactual connection between them. For 
Hume, what is popularly perceived as a counterfactual relation would 
really boil down to the irrational belief that some generalisations are true. 
Such generalisations can even be true as a matter of brute fact, if indeed 
C is always followed by E, and E never happens unless C does. However, 
nothing is needed to make it be so in a neo-Humean reality.
The objection has been raised that the passages from Galileo, Hobbes, 
and Spinoza do not really contain any counterfactuals and so imply noth-
ing about a causal theory of counterfactuals. My answer is that we are 
talking about a link between causation and a kind of dependence that is 
today popularly labelled ‘counterfactual dependence’. The linguistic con-
struct we call ‘the counterfactual conditional’, i.e. ‘if C had not occurred, 
E would not have occurred’ is one handy way to express the nature of 
that dependence, but it is not the only way. So, I am not claiming that you 
find a causal theory of the linguistic construct, but that there has existed a 
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causal theory of the existential dependence of effects on their causes that 
the linguistic construct is meant to express. The only phenomenon rele-
vant for CTCs is the relation between cause and effect which proponents 
of CTCs say should be understood as Hume stated it, namely ‘if the first 
object had not been, the second never had existed’ (Hume 1748, §VII).
The ‘New Hume’ interpretation, i.e. that Hume is a realist about causal 
powers and causal necessity (for overview, see Read & Richman 2007), 
changes nothing for my argument. If he is, it is still false that Hume sug-
gested that counterfactuals could explain causation.
The fact that the connection between causation and counterfactuals is 
explicit and clear in the causal realist tradition shouldn’t be a surprise. 
Bunge paraphrases the core idea of causal realism—which he traces back 
to Aristotle—as: ‘if C happens, then (and only then) E is always pro-
duced by it’ (Bunge 1979: 47), which entails the counterfactual claim ‘if 
C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’. Now, I do not doubt 
that counterfactual reasoning is an important part of causal reasoning. 
However, the question here is whether such reasoning really clarifies any-
thing about the fundamental nature of causation or whether it presup-
poses an understanding of causation. In the latter case, counterfactual 
reasoning only serves to spell out our causal knowledge but does not add 
to it.
Obviously, the truth of a causal theory of counterfactuals hinges on the 
truth of causal realism. The above only amounts to saying that if causal 
realism is true, it offers a clear understanding of the connection between 
causation and counterfactuals; it entails that counterfactual dependence 
is grounded in causation. What remains to discuss is the contrary claim 
that if it is assumed that casual realism is false—that causal connections 
are contingent—is it possible to ground counterfactual dependence on an 
ontology of possible worlds? I think not.
It should be noted that the term ‘counterfactual dependence’ is widely 
used in philosophy but rarely defined, and the definitions that do exist 
are problematic. Lewis, for instance, states that E is counterfactually 
dependent on C iff the following two sentences are true: (i) if C were 
to occur, then E would occur, and (ii) if C were not to occur, then E 
would not occur (Lewis 1986b: 242). The problem is that both sentences 
represent some fact as dependent on some other fact, and yet neither 
sentence is referring to an existent fact. Consequently, while the defini-
tion may appear intuitively to make good sense as specifications of the 
circumstances under which a counterfactual is true, on closer reflection 
the ontology of those circumstances is deeply problematic, because they 
involve a commitment to negative facts. Lewis’ modal realism does not 
contain negative facts. He would have to say that the surface grammar of 
‘were’ and ‘would’ in the definition above is misleading; they don’t really 
indicate what wouldn’t happen if something else doesn’t happen but must 
somehow be indicative of facts in a reality constituted by a plurality of 
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worlds. The circumstances that have to obtain in such a reality, to make 
the above-mentioned sentences true, are the following: a) it is the case in 
all possible worlds closest to ours, that when C occurs E also occurs, and 
b) it is not the case in any possible world closest to ours that E occurs 
without C occurring also. I remain uncertain whether b) truly is a non-
negative fact, but what is certain is that Lewis’ ontology cannot allow 
expressions like ‘were’ and ‘would’ to be understood as statements about 
mere possibilities. They must be statements about facts obtaining in some 
subset of worlds that exist in parity with ours. On this understanding, he 
is not committed to negative facts but only to a plurality of worlds.
Although many proponents of CTCs are averse to modal realism, 
not everyone is so toward negative facts. Marc Lange talks about the 
truthmakers for counterfactual conditionals as contrary-to-fact ‘facts’ 
(Lange 2009: 47) but doesn’t explicitly specify what they are. They can’t 
be what he calls ‘categorical facts’ because they are concrete instantia-
tions of categorical properties. And they can’t be concrete instantiations 
of categorical properties in a possible world since Lange rejects modal 
realism. Plausibly, they are abstract primitives that are meant to serve 
the same truthmaking function as categorical facts do in regard to state-
ments about concrete matters of fact. However, since such truthmakers 
are abstract entities manifesting a relationship between what doesn’t hap-
pen if something else doesn’t happen—i.e. relationships that by defini-
tion are never concretely manifested—they do look like negative facts. If 
this is right, Lange understands ‘counterfactual dependence’ as a relation 
between abstract primitives. Ergo, if causation is grounded in counter-
factual dependence, then concrete causal phenomena are grounded in 
abstract entities.
Having now presented the causal explanation of counterfactual depen-
dence—and drawn attention to the ambiguity of the term ‘counterfactual 
dependence’—we should ask whether the connection between causation 
and counterfactual dependence really presents itself to people in a way to 
make counterfactuals seem particularly apt to explain causation rather 
than the other way around.
9.3  The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual 
Dependence
How intuitively plausible is it that we ordinarily understand the mean-
ing of causal claims in terms of the truth-conditions of counterfactual 
claims? For my part, I doubt that anyone will accept any counterfac-
tual as true unless they believe they know the underlying causality. The 
claim ‘I wouldn’t have gotten a jackpot on the one-armed bandit if I 
hadn’t tapped it three times on the side and stomped hard once’ will 
be considered mere superstition, unless we know there is a mechanism 
inside the machine that has to be triggered by tapping and stomping to 
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produce three aces in a row. The same goes for claims involving the heal-
ing potency of homeopathic concoctions, say: ‘I wouldn’t have survived 
cancer if I hadn’t drunk extremely diluted amounts of ginger’. Only those 
who accept the causal powers of homeopathic concoctions will accept 
the claim. Someone who feels ignorant about the connection will remain 
agnostic.
Consider a plausible counterfactual: ‘if there hadn’t been lightning 
there wouldn’t have been thunder’. Do we first believe that there would 
be no thunder without lightning and therefore infer that lightning is the 
cause of thunder, or do we believe that lightning is the cause of thunder 
and therefore there will be no thunder without lightning? Note that the 
counterfactual is only true if we first stipulate that the thunder of which 
we speak is the sound produced by lightning, or, in other words, if we 
define thunder as the sound caused by lightning. The counterfactual is 
false if we allow ‘thunder’ to also include sounds from explosions, land-
slides, and earthquakes. Conceptually, the connection depends on the 
stipulation of a causal link.
Bear in mind that it was not always believed that there would be no 
thunder without lightning. It was a scientific discovery that lightning is 
an atmospheric electrical discharge that produces a shockwave in the air, 
which we in turn perceive as thunder. The pagan Scandinavians believed 
that lightning and thunder were two correlated effects of a common cause: 
the spark and sound, respectively, produced when Thor went berserk with 
his hammer. On that understanding there may well have been thunder 
without lightning, since Thor’s hammer may not always have ignited a 
spark even though it always produced a sound. Here it is our understand-
ing of the causal connection that determines whether we accept or reject 
the counterfactual, and, as far as I can tell, the same is true for every causal 
counterfactual. This argument is completely open to refutation. Just come 
up with a counterfactual we accept while being ignorant of a causal con-
nection, and which establishes that there is indeed a causal connection. 
But in the absence of a plausible example, consider the idea refuted that 
CTCs can clarify the content of the ordinary concept of causation.
I have demonstrated that you can make sense of counterfactuals if you 
presuppose the causal realist understanding of causation paraphrased by 
Bunge. On the other hand, I can see no discernible prima facie reason for 
thinking that counterfactuals can explain causation. Of course, if one 
is already persuaded by philosophical arguments that the causal realist 
conception is false—that causation is contingent and thus cannot ground 
counterfactual dependence no matter what our ordinary concept says—
one might be tempted to find another basis for counterfactual claims, 
such as similarity between possible worlds. But will any other ontology 
do the trick, in particular an ontology of possible worlds? If it is not at all 
clear which ontological model of possible worlds will ground the truth 
of counterfactual claims, how optimistic can we be about the promise of 
A Critique of Counterfactual Theories of Causation 157
explaining an unclear notion of causation by appeal to a clearer notion 
of counterfactual dependence?
9.4  Possible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers?
Before moving on to discuss what kind of possible worlds ontology can 
ground the truth of counterfactual and causal claims, I should address 
the fact that talk of ‘possible worlds’ is often understood to be void of 
ontological commitment, or ontologically neutral:
Like most contemporary counterfactual theories, Lewis’s theory 
employs a possible world semantics for counterfactuals. Such a 
semantics states truth conditions for counterfactuals in terms of simi-
larity relations between possible worlds. Lewis famously espouses 
a realism about possible worlds, according to which non-actual 
possible worlds are real concrete entities on a par with the actual 
world. However, most contemporary philosophers would seek to 
deploy the explanatorily fruitful possible worlds framework while 
distancing themselves from full-blown realism about possible worlds 
themselves. For example, many would propose to understand pos-
sible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions; or even 
to treat them instrumentally as useful theoretical entities having no 
independent reality.
(Menzies 2017: §2.1)
Like Martin (2000), I worry that if possible worlds talk is merely a means 
to state truth-conditions for counterfactuals, but without ontological 
commitment, it has no explanatory value in ontology.
Truth-conditions, as Menzies says, are conceptual entities, typically 
said to represent what would have to obtain in order for a given claim 
to be true. However, false claims also have truth-conditions; ergo, truth-
conditions are not truthmakers. To elucidate the meaning of causal 
claims in terms of the truth-conditions of counterfactuals has very limited 
value in ontology, because it will not tell us which truthmakers actually 
obtain. Can it perhaps tell us what the world could be like? Well, if as I 
have argued, to elucidate the truth-conditions of counterfactuals is just to 
draw out the implications of the causal knowledge we think we already 
possess, then the possible worlds that are the result of such deliberation 
do not tell us anything new about the world. It only makes explicit the 
consequences of what we already presume to know.
Of course, if we were able to infer from a given claim one and only one 
truth-condition, i.e. what the world must be like to make it true, then that 
would narrow the scope of our ontological investigations enormously. 
However, the situation is not so simple for the kind of claims that figure 
in philosophical controversies, such as what it is for some event to be the 
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cause of another. Our beliefs about what must be the case in order for 
some claim or other to be true varies according to the philosophical the-
ory we are committed to, and hence there are as many truth-conditions 
for causal or counterfactual claims as there are theories that profess to 
provide an account of the claim. That is why I consider it naïve to think 
that the mere elucidation of the truth-conditions of counterfactual claims 
will clarify anything about causation or counterfactual dependence.
It is also naïve to think that spelling out truth-conditions of causal and 
counterfactual claims in terms of possible worlds is ontologically neutral. 
If truth-conditions only represent what we think the world must be like 
to make the claim true, given some already assumed knowledge of the 
world, then to spell them out in terms of possible worlds reveals that you 
have already assumed that our reality is one accurately represented on 
the model of possible worlds. This means the approach is not ontologi-
cally innocuous, not even as a way to spell out how we ordinarily think 
about the world. To give the truth-conditions of causal claims in terms of 
possible worlds really is prescriptive of how we should think instead of 
descriptive of how we actually think.
What exactly is the philosophical value of elucidating the truth- 
 conditions of causal claims? There is, arguably, a truth-conditional analogue 
to the underdetermination thesis for scientific theories. For any given set of 
observations there is always more than one theory compatible with those 
observations, wherefore the observations are unable to ultimately deter-
mine which theory is true (but can at times rule out one or other theory). 
By analogy, for any causal claim there is always more than one idea about 
what would make that claim true, i.e. there will be more than one truth-
condition for every claim. If this is right, then to clarify truth- conditions 
is, at best, to clarify what a particular theory is claiming but that does not 
constitute a theory in its own right or support a theory. Having clarified 
the truth-conditions of a particular claim in light of various theories, we 
have yet to address the question of which of those many truth- conditions 
are most likely to represent what the world is really like. We cannot resolve 
the latter question by further elucidation of truth-conditions.
Consider again the claim ‘lightning causes thunder’. According to CTCs 
the meaning of this claim is to be given in terms of the truth-conditions 
of the counterfactual ‘thunder would not have occurred if lightning had 
not occurred’; i.e. the claim is true iff in all the worlds closest to ours, 
thunder only occurs if lightning does. Have we dispelled all controversies 
about what it is that makes causal and counterfactual claims true? We 
have not. The causal realist will still insist that the causal claim is true iff 
lightning is the invariant and unique producer of thunder; the regularity 
theorist will say the claim is true iff every lightning is as a matter of brute 
fact invariantly followed by thunder, and so on, mutatis mutandis, for 
every theory of causation. But then, surely, to clarify the truth-conditions 
(plural) of a claim (singular) is only the first step in any ontological 
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inquiry; it is an inventory of conceivable alternatives. It is then a further 
step, and ontologically weightier, to discuss which of the many conceiv-
able types of truth-conditions mutually exclude one another and which 
of these we have best reason to believe actually obtains in reality in the 
form of truthmakers.
To sum up, possible worlds construed as truth-conditions may be 
regarded as hypothetical or theory-dependent ideas about what the world 
might be, but do not justify any claim about the world; they are only as 
justified as the theory on which they depend. This could be the sense in 
which talk of possible worlds is meant to be a useful heuristic for talking 
about causation and counterfactuals within some or other framework, 
but it can hardly be understood as a theory of causation in its own right 
and doesn’t resolve any controversies about the nature of causation.
Now, obviously, if it isn’t in the power of ontology to even address the 
question of which truth-conditions actually are true—only to make an 
inventory of all the conceivable truth-conditional models—then ontology 
only deals with truth-conditions and never in truthmakers. This book is 
written on the assumption that ontology is concerned with truthmakers. 
Let us have a look at the kind of truthmakers an ontology of possible 
worlds can muster.
9.5  Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract?
There are two main ways in which possible worlds are construed as 
ontological models of reality: concrete or abstract models. Menzel lists a 
third, ‘combinatorialism’ (2017: §2.3), but I ignore it here, because it isn’t 
clear to me that all versions of it are ontologically serious, and because 
any problems found with the concrete and/or abstract constructs will 
threaten combinatorialism as well.
What Menzel calls ‘concretism’—i.e. modal realism—construes pos-
sible worlds as concretely existing worlds existing in parity with the 
world we inhabit but not sharing our spatio-temporal boundary. Some 
opponents of CTCs argue that this is the only ontologically serious (but 
absurd) view of possible worlds (Martin 2000; Heil 2003). Indeed, even 
proponents of CTCs admit that hardly anybody accepts modal realism 
(e.g. Weatherson 2014).
The problem I have with concretism is that, even if we accept the 
reality of a plurality of concretely existing worlds—despite misgivings 
about empirically inaccessible worlds—then the viability of CTCs will 
vary depending on the ontology of a given particular world, and will 
at best only appear to be viable if it is assumed that all worlds are con-
tingent in accordance with neo-Humean metaphysics. If a world is gov-
erned by primitive natural laws that are not reducible to patterns in the 
distribution of facts but make things happen in determinate ways, or is 
a world in which the causal powers of particulars make things happen 
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in determinate ways, then other worlds are irrelevant to what happens in 
those worlds. It does not matter whether the laws are contingent in the 
sense that there could be other laws at other worlds. That comparison is 
irrelevant to decide if the facts in this world could have been distributed 
differently in this world.
What I am arguing here contradicts the received view. For instance, 
Collins, Hall, & Paul believe that the counterfactual account of causation 
is available also to non-Humeans:
Can facts about the laws themselves be reduced to the totality of 
categorical facts? Some—notably, Lewis (e.g., 1986b)—will say ‘yes,’ 
others ‘no.’ We wish merely to note that with respect to the aims of 
the essays in this volume, almost nothing hangs on this dispute. (For 
example, Lewis’s account of causation could be adopted wholesale 
by one who disagreed with him about whether the laws themselves 
reduce to categorical facts.)
(Collins, Hall, & Paul 2004: 12)
Like Tim Maudlin (2004), I disagree with this claim. For someone like 
Maudlin who thinks that laws are sui generis primitives that secure that 
nature evolves in certain patterns, then other possible worlds are onto-
logically irrelevant. Maudlin has no reason at all to adopt Lewis’ account 
of causation. Possible worlds in his conceptual scheme represent at best 
possible ways the world could evolve within the boundaries allowed by 
the laws, i.e. possible worlds are determined by the world, and not vice 
versa. Indeed, all ontologies that include a commitment to substantial 
lawful or causal connections that govern what happens have thereby 
grounded counterfactual dependence on those substantial connections, 
in which case other possible worlds become redundant, or merely con-
sequential. Whoever thinks that the laws of a world do not supervene 
on the contingent matters of facts of that world, but instead connect 
these matters of fact in determinate ways, has no reason to appeal to 
similarities between possible worlds as the basis for either causal or 
counterfactual claims. In such worlds ‘C caused E’ is not true in virtue 
of similarities between closest possible worlds, but in virtue of a lawful 
connection between Cs and Es in the world in question. My conclusion 
is that it is not clear at all whether anyone other than neo-Humeans will 
find any reason to adopt Lewis’ account of causation. Indeed, it is not 
even clear that neo-Humeans can make use of CTCs (see Section 9.6).
It bears mentioning that Marcus Arvan offers an analogous argument 
when criticising the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals for not 
being able to handle the possibility that possible worlds are computer 
simulations. In his view, the primitive causal features of ‘necessitarian’ 
simulations/worlds make other worlds irrelevant (2016: §2.3). In fact, 
he argues that the same goes for neo-Humean simulations (2016: §2.2).
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According to what Menzel calls ‘abstractionism’, possible worlds are 
‘abstract entities of a certain sort: They are states or conditions, of vary-
ing detail and complexity, that a concrete world could be in — they are 
ways that things, as a whole, could be’ (2017: §2.2.). Now, a prerequisite 
to make this work as an ontological theory, these abstract entities must 
be the truthmakers of the counterfactuals whose truth-conditions are 
meant to give the meaning of causal claims. They must be considered to 
be some kind of contrary-to-fact truthmakers, or contrary-to-fact ‘facts’ 
that make our beliefs true. It is not enough that they represent truth-
conditions, since they would then just be the conceptual consequences 
of a certain theory; consequences that would be just as much in need of 
truthmakers as the original claims we are considering.
I find that an ontology of abstract truthmakers threatens to make con-
crete reality irrelevant for the truth of our claims about concrete reality 
(see also Joshua Mozersky’s criticism of ersatz presentism (2015: 44)). 
If counterfactuals are made true in terms of abstract truthmakers, and 
causal claims are true derivatively of the truth of counterfactuals, then it 
seems that no causal claim of the kind ‘C caused E’ is ever made true by 
concretely occurring instances of causation but solely by some kind of 
abstract reality. To be sure, it may be true that the events C and E occur 
merely in virtue of their concrete occurrence, but that does not make true 
‘C caused E’, since this is true only in virtue of the abstract contrary-to-
fact truthmaker that ‘if C hadn’t occurred, E would not have occurred’. 
And, observe, in particular, that on this account the abstract truthmaker 
is not grounded in any concrete truthmaker, because there is no concrete 
state of affairs manifesting what wouldn’t have happened if something 
else hadn’t happened. The contrary-to-fact truthmaker that the bottle 
would not have shattered had not Suzy thrown the rock must exist as 
abstractum whether or not Suzy actually throws a rock, or else we would 
have to conclude, contrary to abstractionism, that the actual goings-on in 
concrete reality ground the abstract entities, which would undermine the 
fundamentality of the contrary-to-fact truthmakers. In sum, it appears to 
be a consequence of abstractionism that the claims whose meaning we 
are supposed to elucidate in terms of the truth-conditions of counterfac-
tuals, never are claims about concrete reality but only about an abstract 
reality whose instantiation is contingent. I think this would come as a 
surprise to most competent speakers of English, which further under-
mines the claim that CTCs offer a plausible account of the ordinary con-
cept of causation.
Does anything of the above show that abstractionism is false? No, it 
just shows that to accept it comes at an intellectual cost that is rarely 
brought out; a cost that is relevant for making an educated evaluation 
of the appeal of CTCs. In fact, most of what I have said could be inter-
preted merely as taking sides with some form of concretism (see below). 
However, it still seems to me that within the domain of abstractionism we 
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see the same problems being repeated. First, that CTCs based on abstract 
possible worlds are implausible as an account of the ordinary concept of 
causation for the same reasons given above; we ordinarily accept counter-
factuals on the basis of our causal knowledge, not the other way around. 
Second, that even in abstract ontologies where there are substantial con-
nections, those connections will ground the counterfactual dependence 
between antecedent and consequent in counterfactual worlds, and then 
comparative similarity between worlds in an abstract plurality of worlds 
becomes irrelevant. Again, only a small subset of abstractionist ontolo-
gies will suit CTCs, and those assumed to be contingent will be open to 
the same objections I develop in Section 9.6.
In sum, abstractionism threatens to make concrete reality irrelevant for 
the truth of our causal and counterfactual claims, and abstractionism and 
concretism alike seem to imply that CTCs could at best be applied to that 
subset of worlds that are neo-Humean, i.e. where laws/substantial con-
nections supervene on the distribution of local matters of fact. However, 
I worry there are not enough constraints on the manner in which such 
worlds can differ—whether concrete or abstract—to provide the structure 
required to ground counterfactual dependency on comparative similarity.
9.6  Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCs
I have suggested that only neo-Humeans should find CTCs appealing, 
because they reject the substantial connections that others appeal to as 
the basis of counterfactual dependence, and therefore find themselves in 
need of something else to ground the truth of counterfactuals. The sugges-
tion is that a plurality of possible worlds will do the trick. Now, from the 
outset one can wonder why neo-Humeans should think counterfactual 
dependence is so important that they need to find an ontological basis for 
it. Shouldn’t they just accept that if the world is contingent—i.e. anything 
can follow from anything—then counterfactuals just are false? Causal 
realists that give up on necessary connections, Mumford & Anjum being 
a case in point (2011: 148–55), realise that they are unable to ground 
the truth of counterfactual conditionals and accept that they are strictly 
speaking false. Similarly, Hájek argues that most counterfactuals are false 
because they concern outcomes from chance processes (2014). I will not 
pursue this worry further here. It simply is a fact that many take CTCs 
and possible worlds to provide ontological grounds for counterfactuals, 
so let us consider the options within a neo-Humean framework. Neo-
Humean metaphysics, as I understand it, is the view that reality is noth-
ing but the contingent distribution of ‘local matters of fact’ on which 
everything else supervenes:
Humean metaphysics is the deliberate affirmation that, as a matter of 
fact, our world is such that it instantiates no necessary connections 
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between its instances. Nothing follows in a metaphysical sense from 
something else. There is only contingent co-existence. This is the sim-
ple and explicit framework of neo-Humean ontologies. The whole 
but only the distribution of fundamental contingent entities in the 
world is to be taken as a primitive ontological given. According to 
the neo-Humean, this distribution is enough to determine all the 
other features of our world. There could not be a difference in the 
world without a difference in the distribution of fundamental contin-
gent properties. In other words, this distribution is the basis on which 
everything there is in the world supervenes.
(Sparber 2009: 15)
Lewis himself describes it as the view that all truths supervene on the 
distribution of fundamental categorical properties over points or regions 
of spacetime, and where the instantiation of a categorical property entails 
nothing about the instantiation of properties outside that region (Lewis 
1986a: ix–xi). I take it, then, that Lewis accepts the standard view on 
supervenience:
A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no 
two things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differ-
ing with respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot 
be an A-difference without a B-difference”.
(McLaughlin & Bennett 2018: first paragraph)
My worry is that if every world is contingent and the laws supervene on 
the distribution of facts in the above-mentioned sense, there is nothing 
that prevents two worlds from being near perfect duplicates whose only 
difference is in respect of the entities C and E of any arbitrary chosen 
counterfactual ‘if it hadn’t been for C then E would never have hap-
pened’, C is always followed by E in one world while in the other E 
occurs in the absence of C. The only worlds that could be closer than that 
are those that are perfect duplicates. To base counterfactual dependence 
on perfect duplicates would make counterfactual dependence so trivial as 
to mean absolutely nothing for our causal deliberations.
If worlds are contingent in the manner spelled out above, there can be a 
world where I invariably sneeze when my nose tickles (and only then), and 
then a near-perfect duplicate world where my nose doesn’t tickle before 
I sneeze. Remember that we are dealing with perfectly contingent worlds 
where the presence/absence of a fundamental fact implies nothing for 
anything else. Such regularities are brute regularities, as the neo-Humean 
supposes every regularity to be. As a consequence, the counterfactual con-
ditional ‘you would not have sneezed if your nose hadn’t tickled’ is true 
and false, respectively, in worlds that differ in nothing except for the fact 
that in one a tickling nose is followed by a sneeze, but not in the other.
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Many readers will not be convinced about the intelligibility of the exam-
ple above, because they can’t help thinking that a sneeze in the absence of 
a tickle must imply a lot of other differences, say about the neurology of 
my nose. But that kind of thinking only reveals either an implicit rejection 
of neo-Humeanism (i.e. implies that one fact does imply something about 
other facts), or a failure to understand how extreme neo-Humeanism 
really is. The bottom line is that if everything is contingent, in the manner 
described above, the presence or absence of a particular quality makes no 
difference to any other quality.
Perhaps it is better to formulate the point in a more abstract manner, 
to avoid letting our intuitive causal understanding of the world get in the 
way of understanding what neo-Humean metaphysics entails. Assume 
that every world is constituted by a certain distribution of fundamen-
tal categorical properties across spacetime, and that the instantiation of 
one property entails nothing about instantiation of other properties. This 
means that for any world, w1, you can have a set of near duplicate worlds 
[w2, w3, w4… wn,] each of which is different from w1 by the absence of 
one single type of fact C corresponding to a particular consequent of 
an arbitrary counterfactual conditional accepted as true in w1. We can 
formulate that on the level of the individual instances of the categorical 
properties that are supposed to constitute that world. Can there be a 
smaller difference between worlds? In fact, we don’t even have to assume 
that C is always absent when E occurs. It is enough that C is absent on 
one occasion for it to be false in w2 that ‘E only if C’, and similarly for it 
to be false that it takes less of a departure from the actual world to make 
the antecedent true along with the consequent than to make the anteced-
ent true without the consequent. In a contingent reality, no other depar-
ture from the actual world is needed for the antecedent to be true without 
the consequent. If you don’t accept this conclusion and believe that the 
absence of one thing implies the absence or presence of something else, 
you clearly do not believe that the world is completely contingent; you 
deny that the instantiation of a property entails nothing about the instan-
tiation of other properties.
Interestingly, in a discussion of the counterfactual ‘if kangaroos had no 
tail they would topple over’, Lewis appears to address the concern I have 
raised and deny the consequence:
We might think it best to confine our attention to worlds where kan-
garoos have no tails and everything else is as it actually is; but there 
are no such worlds. Are we to suppose that kangaroos have no tails 
but that their tracks in the sand are as they actually are? Then we 
shall have to suppose that these tracks are produced in a way quite 
different from the actual way. […] Are we to suppose that kangaroos 
have no tails but that their genetic makeup is as it actually is? Then 
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we shall have to suppose that genes control growth in a way quite 
different from the actual way (or else that there is something, unlike 
anything there actually is, that removes the tails).
(Lewis 1973b: 9)
Ty my mind it appears as if Lewis is denying his neo-Humean convic-
tions; things are intimately connected with each other. Consider that he 
does not merely deny that a world where kangaroos don’t have tails and 
still don’t topple over would count as a closest possible world; he denies 
there could be any such world at all. Clearly, there are constraints on how 
things combine to form worlds, in which case neo-Humean metaphysics 
is false. My problem with neo-Humean metaphysics, in the form I have 
presented it, is that it excludes nothing and allows everything; except pos-
sibly violations of the law of contradiction and Leibniz’ Law, but these 
are violations that only are relevant within a world and so would be irrel-
evant to CTCs. That Lewis is straight in one world while his counterpart 
is bent in another is neither a contradiction nor violation of Leibniz’ Law; 
it is only a sign of the qualitative distance between those worlds.
Now, several anonymous referees have objected to my argument in this 
section. Two objections stand out. The first is that Lewis didn’t exclude 
the reality of causal powers, and hence didn’t exclude the reality of sub-
stantial connections; he just didn’t think there were any powers in our 
world. I think the rationale behind this objection is that one shouldn’t 
think of neo-Humeanism as the view that all worlds are neo-Humean; 
that it is enough that some worlds are neo-Humean for it to be correct 
to say that reality is contingent. So even if there are worlds that are gov-
erned by laws, then those laws are contingent because worlds are not 
necessarily governed by laws, and therefore reality (i.e. the totality of 
possible worlds) is contingent.
To my mind, this objection doesn’t do CTCs any favours. It basi-
cally turns possible worlds ontology into the philosophical analogue of 
Douglas Adams’ plentiful universe depicted in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
the Galaxy. Adams’ universe is so plentiful that there is no point of pro-
ducing any commodities because somewhere there is a planet where they 
grow naturally, even earmuffs, mattresses, and space-rockets. Possible 
worlds ontology is so plentiful that even causal powers are real, some-
where. Indeed, if it admits that causal powers are real in some world, it 
surely must also admit that there are worlds where laws do not supervene 
on the facts but instead necessarily connect the facts in determinate ways 
(qua Maudlin 2004). We could then have two worlds that are exactly 
alike in the distribution of matters of fact, differing only in the fact that 
in one world the laws supervene on the facts and in the other the laws 
necessitate the distribution of the facts; we couldn’t tell the difference. 
That would be manifestly absurd. Possible worlds ontology appears to be 
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plentiful enough to allow every philosophical theory to be true in some 
world or other, and that is why I cannot consider it an ontologically seri-
ous theory. It admits everything and forbids nothing.
Furthermore, if there are worlds where there are causal powers and/or 
lawful connections, then they are worlds in which CTCs is false, because 
in that world ‘E only if C’ is true because C produces E and is the only 
thing to do so, regardless of any similarities to any closest possible world. 
Which shows that those who endorse substantial connections have no 
reason to adopt CTCs.
The other objection is that I am wrong to conclude that if laws super-
vene upon local matters of fact then laws cannot affect independently the 
overall similarity and difference between worlds. I’ll address that objec-
tion below.
9.7  Comparative Similarity and Supervenience
It has been objected that my comparison between worlds with respect 
to a single matter of fact is out of place, because comparisons between 
worlds are rarely so simple. Lewis emphasises that the ‘respects of simi-
larity and difference that enter into the overall similarity of worlds are 
many and varied’ and in particular that ‘similarities in matters of par-
ticular fact trade off against similarities of law’ (Lewis 1973a: 560). I am 
struggling to understand the relevance of this objection, just as much as I 
am struggling to see how there can be trade-offs of the kind Lewis men-
tions, given the basic ontology he is committed to. Let’s first focus on the 
relevance. Whether or not comparisons between worlds can be, or even 
often are, ‘many and varied’ does not really undermine my claim that 
there is nothing in the neo-Humean ontology that prevents two worlds 
from being near-exact duplicates that differ only with respect to the mini-
mal requirements to make a counterfactual true in one world and false in 
the other. If there is nothing in the ontology that shows this to be impos-
sible, then the objection holds good.
I detect two ways in which it is argued that laws contribute to overall 
similarity independently of the distribution of facts. The first relates to 
an early definition of ‘nomic dependence’ offered by Lewis, in which he 
claims that the set F of true propositions of particular fact does not imply 
on its own every material conditional, but that we need in addition a set 
of law-propositions L:
The family C1, C2, … of propositions depends nomically on the family 
A1, A2, … iff there are a nonempty set L of true law-propositions and 
a set F of true propositions of particular fact such that L and F jointly 
imply (but F alone does not imply) all the material conditionals A1 ⊃ 
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C1, A2 ⊃ C2, … between the corresponding propositions in the two 
families.
(Lewis 1973a: 563)
The suggestion here is that F and L contribute independently of each 
other to the set of material conditionals true in a given world. I find 
that this conflicts with Lewis’ understanding of the laws as supervening 
on the distribution of particular fact, which is the standard sense often 
paraphrased as ‘there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference’ 
(McLaughlin & Bennett 2018). Indeed, Lewis says quite explicitly that: 
‘we have an arrangement of qualities. And that is all. There is no difference 
without difference in the arrangement of qualities. All else supervenes on 
that’ (Lewis 1986a: ix). This makes laws epiphenomenal consequences of 
the distribution of qualities, and thus we should be able to infer all the 
material conditionals from F alone, i.e. from the set of true propositions 
of fact. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the local matters 
of fact—on which the truth of the law-propositions in L supervene—and 
the true propositions in F, in which case F alone surely implies all the 
material conditionals and the law-propositions in L. After all, the regu-
larities in a world are not there because of the laws in that world, the 
laws are there because the regularities are there; that is what is meant by 
the laws supervening on the facts. Basically, when all worlds reduce to a 
mosaic of local matters of fact there really is only one respect of similarity 
and difference: distribution of local matters of fact.
The second way in which it is argued that even if laws supervene on the 
facts they can still contribute individually to similarity between worlds 
is by analogy to other kinds of supervening phenomena. So, for instance, 
that even if the moral supervenes upon the physical, there could be a big 
overall difference between worlds that were physically very alike, since a 
tiny physical difference can make a big moral difference. The argument 
here is that a tiny difference in base properties can make a big difference 
in higher-order properties. Two responses come to the fore. First, I am 
finding it difficult to construe an example where a tiny physical difference 
gives a big moral difference, except those that translate into examples of 
tiny physical differences leading to big physical differences on which big 
moral differences supervene. A tiny nudge in the ice-hockey rink may 
not amount to much morally, but on the edge of a cliff it may have seri-
ous moral implications. However, there is a moral difference only if the 
nudge leads in one case but not the other to a physical fall and physical 
death or injury. The big supervening moral difference then reduces to a 
big physical difference. Second, for CTCs to work it is not enough to 
show that there can be tiny base differences that give big higher-order 
differences. They must show that any tiny difference in the distribution of 
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base qualities that contradicts any given counterfactual must make such 
a big difference with respect to overall similarity that there will always 
be a comparatively closer world where the tiny differences in base quali-
ties do not contradict the counterfactual. It is the latter claim that I am 
challenging.
Although I have nowhere come across anyone arguing this, one could 
consider whether the distinction made between strong and weak super-
venience could support the case of CTCs. However, as McLaughlin & 
Bennett point out (2018: §4.3.4) when the domain of base properties 
is restricted to intrinsic properties—as is the case with neo-Humean 
worlds—then weak and strong supervenience coincides. And yes, there is 
talk of supervenience relations of varying modal force, but the variation 
is between nomological and logical necessity (McLaughlin & Bennett 
2018: §3.1). None of these distinctions will support the idea that in a 
neo-Humean reality laws can vary somehow independently of the facts.
Is there still a sense of ‘supervene’ that could be used to make sense of 
overall comparative similarity and consequently motivate the intelligi-
bility of CTCs? I am happy to leave that open. My aim is only to show 
that on closer inspection there is nothing particularly clear about the 
notion of counterfactual dependence to make CTCs look more appeal-
ing or promising than causal accounts of counterfactuals (or to simply 
give up counterfactuals), and to show that the scope of ontologies for 
which CTCs are apt, or relevant, is considerably smaller than popularly 
believed.
It bears mentioning that I am not the first to question the intelligibility 
of the concept of comparative overall similarity. Michael Morreau argues 
that ‘there can be no combining of the various similarities and differ-
ences of things into useful comparisons of overall similarity’ (Morreau 
2010: 469). However, while I question that there can be but one kind of 
similarity/difference, Morreau argues that even if worlds could differ in 
many different respects, there is no useful way to combine these different 
respects into one measure of overall comparative similarity.
9.8  Conclusion
Above I have tried to undermine the appeal and promise of CTCs, ini-
tially by appeal to relatively simple considerations that I think have been 
overlooked. For instance, that nobody accepts counterfactual claims 
about phenomena whose causal connection they don’t think they under-
stand, and that this understanding agrees with a longstanding philosoph-
ical tradition according to which counterfactual dependence is grounded 
in necessary causal connections. These considerations do not prove that 
CTCs are completely untenable but should show that their intuitive 
appeal has been exaggerated and that they have yet to address fairly 
basic objections.
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The thrust of my argument is that, contrary to popular belief, CTCs 
are not equally appealing to everyone regardless of their ontological com-
mitments. In particular, I argue that an ontology of possible worlds is 
irrelevant for everyone who is committed to substantial connections of 
some form. Indeed, philosophers who deny both neo-Humean contin-
gency and necessary connections do not thereby automatically turn to 
CTCs but instead simply accept that counterfactuals are strictly speak-
ing false. Finally, I have argued that CTCs should not even be appealing 
to the proponents of neo-Humean metaphysics. Or, to be more pre-
cise, I have argued that if reality is contingent in the way neo-Humeans 
claim it is, there is nothing to constrain reality in the way required to 
reinstate counterfactual dependency in terms of comparative similar-
ity. Neo-Humeans, in giving up substantial connections, should give up 
counterfactual dependence.
We have now arrived at the end of rather long and winding argumenta-
tion in which I have at once tried to draw up a contrast between causal 
realist, objectivist, and neo-Humean approaches—and between the range 
of accounts within each approach—and introduce into the mix a novel 
causal realist account; the view that causation is at rock bottom a ques-
tion of reciprocal interaction between powerful particulars. In order to 
help the reader sort out the resulting chaos, I will here briefly summarise 
the contrasts I have drawn, as well as point out some of the more impor-
tant writers from the 20th century that I have neglected. I start with the 
causal realist vs. neo-Humean contrast. Please note that I do not offer 
any repetition here of the contrast between different views on substance, 
process, constitution, and persistence, because the discussion on those 
subjects is pretty much confined to the particular chapters in which they 
are discussed.
10.1  The Neo-Humean Contrast
I have argued that the various accounts within the dominant neo-Humean 
framework—the regularity, probabilistic, conditional, counterfactual, 
and interventionist accounts—can at best be considered characterisa-
tions of how causation appears to us in experience/measurements. They 
cannot explain what it is about the world that makes it appear that 
way. I have also pointed out that there is a difference between endors-
ing neo-Humean accounts with or without the commitment to Humean 
supervenience and the principle of recombination, i.e. to neo-Humean 
metaphysics; the view that objective mind-independent reality is a mosaic 
of local matters of fact between which there are no substantial connec-
tions. First, one can endorse some or other (or all) neo-Humean account 
as an adequate account of how causation appears to us, and/or of how 
we think about causation, without making a judgement on whether they 
really explain what causation is all about. That is an approach to neo-
Humean accounts that is irrelevant to metaphysics, but I think Chapter 9 
provides some reasons to doubt that this is how we actually think.
10 The Contrast to Alternative 
Views
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Second, one can treat neo-Humean accounts as the best we can get 
because of some or other epistemic constraint, e.g. that we are unable 
to form concepts that go beyond the content provided by the senses. But 
such a conclusion, it seems to me, relies on a radical scepticism that will 
also entail not only that metaphysics is a non-starter—including neo-
Humean metaphysics—but also that empirical science is confined to 
merely characterising reality. I have said nothing to decisively exclude 
that position, but I have pointed out the commitments that come with 
that view, and I think they amount to a pretty decent objection to it, at 
least to everyone who thinks that metaphysics is an intelligible enterprise.
Third, one can treat neo-Humean accounts as the best accounts we 
have for what objective mind-independent reality is like, i.e. that reality 
is a mosaic of local matters of facts between which there are no sub-
stantial connections. For the neo-Humean that explicitly endorses neo-
Humean metaphysics, i.e. doesn’t just suspend judgement but positively 
affirms there are no substantial connections, the situation is different. 
First of all, I am not sure I can identify any motivation for taking that 
view at all, once it has been pointed out that Hume’s philosophy only 
supports  epistemic/sceptical neo-Humeanism and renders neo-Humean 
metaphysics just as much a non-starter as other realisms. Indeed, like 
Hájek (2014), I find that proponents of the realist neo-Humean position 
are striving in directions in which I see no reason for them to strive. If 
everything is loose and separate, as they claim it is, why not just accept 
that probability is all we can get? But let’s be clear. All we can get is brute 
probability. After all, this is a question of adopting probabilistic accounts 
because of a commitment to the idea that there are no substantial causal 
connections. To adopt this view will have repercussion on the prevail-
ing view in the sciences that correlation does not entail causation. Or, 
rather, it entails that it is correct that correlation does not entail causa-
tion, but for very different reasons than is currently the case. The current 
reading is  epistemic—we can’t know about causation on the basis of 
 correlation—but on a neo-Humean view it will have to give way to an 
ontological reading; correlation is all there is. In reality, smoking doesn’t 
cause cancer, it is only correlated to it.
10.2  The Causal Objectivist Contrast
What I have called causal objectivist accounts are those accounts whose 
proponents believe there are substantial causal connections but accept 
what I have described as the realist empiricist approach to making sense 
of such connections. It basically means they think we should seek to 
explain the nature of causal connections but in terms of what the sciences 
take to be observable. Here we have, to mention a few, Salmon’s account 
of propagation and production, Kitcher, Dowe, and Kistler’s account of 
transmission of conserved quantities, and Glennan’s mechanistic account. 
172 The Contrast to Alternative Views
I consider these accounts to be very interesting, and indeed, I build my 
own account on the works of these authors, but cannot deny that, ulti-
mately, I find them wanting. The problem is that the accounts they pro-
pose only work for the same paradigmatic examples that proponents of 
the standard view focus on, i.e. where there is an ‘active’ object that exerts 
an influence on a ‘passive’ recipient of the action, and which consequently 
‘suffers’ a change. None of these accounts generalise to all the cases, in 
particular the ones where the interaction not just actually is thoroughly 
reciprocal, but also appears to be. This is a very serious objection in the 
face of the fact that the natural sciences assume that every interaction is 
thoroughly reciprocal.
10.3  The Contrast to the Standard View
According to the standard view, causation is the action of an Agent upon 
a Patient, which brings about a change in the Patient. Like Bunge, I think 
the standard view is the best approximation to the way we ordinarily 
think about causation and have done for millennia. We think causation 
involves an exertion of influence, and we think that objects in motion act 
on objects at rest, causing them to change. It is Suzy’s throw that breaks 
the bottle, the horse that pulls the carriage, the falling leaden ball that 
makes a hollow in the pillow, etc. What I have pointed out, picking up 
on Bunge’s suggestion, is that this very intuitive view contradicts what is 
today accepted as fact in the natural sciences, that interactions are not 
unidirectional but reciprocal. No object acts on another object without 
the second acting in like measure on the first.
Now, even though the standard view falsely depicts interactions as 
involving unidirectional action, it does admit that the outcome of an 
interaction is determined by all the interacting objects alike; it agrees 
that effects are what powers-based accounts dub ‘mutual manifestations’. 
For this reason, the view I propose is the result of simply accepting the 
reciprocity of interactions and consequently abandoning the Agent vs. 
Patient distinction, wherefore we can no longer talk of the contribution 
of each as ontologically different types of causes. Indeed, the suggestion is 
that we consider interactions as a single unitary phenomenon from which 
neither ‘action’ nor ‘reaction’ can be separated.
Notable modern advocates of the standard view are Dorothy Emmet 
(1985) and Ingvar Johansson (1989/2004). Of the two, Emmet comes 
closest to holding a traditional standard view and the arguments that 
I develop against assumption of unidirectional action and distinction 
between Agent and Patient apply to her position. Johansson, while 
accepting the distinction between power and quality, and active and pas-
sive powers, develops an interesting case for analysing efficient causality 
in terms of what he calls ‘action by mixture’ (1989/2004: 190–1), which 
comes very close to my analysis of causation in terms of interaction. He 
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describes efficient causation as exertion of influence between entities that 
in a sense become one during their interaction, and that cause and effect 
occur simultaneously, while still the cause produces the effect. Pretty 
much the only difference is that I explicitly spell out the sense in which 
interactions are reciprocal to the degree that the Agent vs. Patient distinc-
tion is shown not to apply, whereas he doesn’t.
10.4  Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational 
Realism
I have argued that contemporary powers-based accounts can be under-
stood as attempts to revive the standard view, and in so far as they 
assume the Agent vs. Patient distinction, they are subject to the problems 
associated with that distinction. That provides one of very few contrasts 
between myself and Martin. However, many powers-based accounts are 
also implicitly influenced by the neo-Humean framework. This comes out 
most clearly in the acceptance/use of the dispositional analysis of powers, 
and in the assumption that no harm will come from the continued char-
acterisation of causation as a two-place relation, albeit between the exer-
cise/instantiation of a power and the realisation of a manifestation. This 
is what I have called relational realism. Relational realism, I have argued, 
is the result of a conceptual shift that occurred when empiricism rose 
to power and strove to eliminate everything judged to be unobservable. 
The result was that the concept of influence was reduced to mere uni-
form regularity, even by those who still believed that there are substantial 
causal connections that involve the exercise of influences. I have argued 
that while the effort to reintroduce a concept of causal influence and/or 
production is admirable, it just won’t work if one sticks to relational real-
ism. In fact, although I have mostly complained about Russell’s problem 
of action at a temporal distance—arguing it is a straw man argument—it 
is still a very effective argument against relational realism. Russell’s argu-
ment still misses the point, because relational realism isn’t usually pro-
moted in defence of causal necessity.
The main problem, however, is that relational realism really merges 
influence and production, or, rather, it merges the relation between the 
entities that exercise influence on each other, with the relation between 
what produces and what is produced. They cannot really be treated as the 
same thing. Nothing can exert an influence on something and at the same 
time produce that same something. Influence must be exercised between 
coexistent entities (neither produces the other), and it is the change that 
this influence brings about that is the effect (mutual exercise of influ-
ence produces a change). Writers that I take to at least implicitly endorse 
relational realism, and to which my criticism applies, are for instance, 
Bigelow, Ellis, & Pargetter (1988), Esfeld & Sachse (2011), Bird (2007a), 
and Tugby (2012), just to name a few.
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10.5  Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process Realism
Writers like Mumford & Anjum (2011) and Chakravartty (2005) reject 
relational realism, and argue in favour of treating causation as a continu-
ous process of production. Indeed, they favour simultaneous causation. 
However, they don’t really provide an in-depth analysis of what this pro-
cess involves. Mumford & Anjum’s vector model can at best be thought 
of as a characterisation of the consequences of the process, but not as an 
explanation of why those consequences obtain.
It seems to me that Chakravartty more or less accepts the Agent vs. 
Patient distinction, but it is an interesting question whether Mumford & 
Anjum endorse or reject it. As far as I know, they don’t address any prob-
lems with it, and sometimes they use examples that imply unidirectional 
influence, such as a stove heating a room, depicting this roughly in terms 
of the transmission accounts. However, sometimes they use examples 
that are more reciprocal. For instance, they don’t describe the dissolution 
of sugar in water in terms of water acting unidirectionally on the sugar. 
They describe it in terms of water and sugar both being parts of the cause 
that produces a sweet solution (2011: 121–5). It is difficult to decidedly 
tell whether this is endorsement of reciprocity in my intended sense, or 
more in the way Marmodoro (2017) describes interactions as reciprocal 
and yet asymmetrical, i.e. that while water dissolves salt, salt also influ-
ences the water by salting it. The fact that Mumford & Anjum’s works 
are ambiguous on this point at least shows that they are not completely 
aware of the problems I have highlighted in this book. But it is clear that, 
of all existing accounts, I agree with theirs the most.
The main contrasts to Mumford & Anjum’s view is that, while I 
(attempt to) provide an explanation of the process of production, they 
merely characterise it in a way that is largely in agreement with the impli-
cations of that explanation, except that they deny that causation involves 
necessity, even though it is a substantial connection. These two differences 
are intimately linked, because it seems to me that their argument against 
causal necessity will not work if the process of production is modelled 
in terms of interaction. I hope to have introduced new information that 
may at least persuade them to think that they may have to modify some 
detail of their account. Alternatively, that it helps them identify where I 
might have gone wrong.
10.6  Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural 
Accounts
There are various types of structural powers-based accounts, of which 
it is enough to mention two in order to draw up a contrast that argu-
ably generalises to them all. On the one hand we have Alexander Bird’s 
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causal structuralism (2007a), in which powers are intrinsic properties 
whose nature nevertheless is nothing but a relation to a manifestation 
property. He thinks they can be both intrinsic and relational because the 
standard view of ‘intrinsic’ is of something whose nature is independent 
of the nature of other substances. Bird’s powers are properties whose 
nature is exhausted by a relation to a manifestation property, even when 
the object is not exerting that power, and so is not dependent on stand-
ing in a relation to an instantiated property in any other object. They do 
however depend on there being an abstract realm of possibilia, that form 
an interconnected structure. Now, I have argued that this doesn’t really 
make powers intrinsic, because possibilia are still external to the power, 
and so there remain doubts about the reconciliation of ‘intrinsic’ and 
‘relational’ (Ingthorsson 2015). But the main point of departure is that 
Bird does accept a distinction between active and passive possibilia and 
doesn’t characterise interactions as reciprocal. Hence his view is liable to 
the criticism directed at the standard view.
Neil Williams has for some time been developing what he calls blue-
print holism (2019), which in many ways reminds me of Bird’s view. The 
idea is that powers are intrinsic properties which contain in themselves 
what he describes as a ‘blueprint’ of the specific types of interactions the 
bearer can engage in. It differs from Bird’s view in that Williams insists 
that the potentiality inheres in the object and does not require the exis-
tence of an abstract structure of possibilia. The criticism I direct against 
Bird, that it cannot reconcile the intrinsic/relational incompatibility, does 
not obviously apply here. The crucial question will therefore be whether 
Williams provides an account of how powers produce effects.
It is interesting to note that Williams explicitly declares that those who 
talk of active and passive powers, and Agents and Patients, are the ‘worst 
offenders’ with respect to falsely singling out individual powers as causes 
unto their own, or at least as particularly important in bringing about an 
effect (2019: 125). Instead he argues in favour of a total cause conception 
and insists that the relationship between powers is reciprocal. He talks 
about ‘constellations of power’, which when they obtain bring about an 
effect. Furthermore, he stresses that such constellations are not simply 
a collection of powers, but—like I argued against Mumford & Anjum’s 
version of the interference and prevention argument (Section 5.5)—that 
it really matters how the powers are ‘arranged’ in the constellation.
Now, I can complain that, while Williams rejects the Agent vs. Patient, 
and active vs. passive distinction, and endorses reciprocity, the exam-
ples he uses are exactly the same as those used by those who endorse 
those distinctions, such as water dissolving salt, and that the reciprocity 
involved is merely that of equal importance. So, he clearly imagines that 
the blueprint present in the solubility of salt contains the interaction with 
the dissolving power of water. He does not take it a step further to argue 
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that, under the microscope of science, the dissolution of salt in water is 
in the end a matter of molecules mutually influencing each other with 
respect to the same power and not two different powers.
What is more interesting though is that Williams explicitly means for 
his model of constellations to be ontological rock bottom: ‘Instances of 
various constellations obtain, and they give rise to their manifestations. 
That is the full picture; it is not a metaphor designed to give way to 
some deeper analysis’ (Williams 2019: 129). Although he doesn’t refer 
to ‘Causal Production as Interaction’ (Ingthorsson 2002), it is clear that 
he thinks that analyses of the kind I present there, and defend again in 
this book, are bound to fail. His argument is that accounts that invoke 
constellations of objects that exert influence on each other, say energies 
or forces, only mean that the powers aren’t powers at all. I take him to 
mean that if manifestations are the results of forces and not, say, of the 
momenta of the objects involved, then momentum is not a power.
I have three worries. The first is that Williams’ account ends up being 
only a characterisation. It says—adapting the example I used in Section 
5.5—that when constellation A[p1, p2] + B[p3, p4] obtains, it brings about 
E, but it doesn’t explain why that constellation brings it about (or why 
any constellation brings anything about). It is really just a brute fact that 
p1, p2, p3, and p4 contain the blueprint that make that particular constel-
lation bring E about, but there is no further story to be told about how 
they actually do it.
Second, I don’t see how his account relates to the theories and find-
ings of the natural sciences, which do talk about forces and energies in 
an attempt to explain why certain constellations bring something about. 
Finally, I don’t see how talk of forces implies that the properties of objects 
are not powers. Surely the idea is that momentum is a property that 
objects have, and which make the object able to exert a force. The force 
isn’t a power or distinct property that somehow arises to exert a force. 
It is the influence that the object exerts in an interaction in virtue of hav-
ing momentum. Otherwise we have an infinite regress of the kind Psillos 
thinks the conception of pure powers leads to (Psillos 2006), namely that 
powers need powers, that need powers, that need powers … etc. ad infi-
nitum. For a critique of Psillos’ position, see Marmodoro (2010).
10.7  Contrast to 20th-Century Friends of Powers
What this book doesn’t do, and which a complete discussion of the phi-
losophy of powers should do, is to discuss the input of all those 20th-
century thinkers that arguably kept powers ontology alive and which had 
a decisive influence on those who initiated the 21st-century realist revival. 
I am talking about philosophers like Roy Bhaskar (1975), Rom Harré 
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& E.H. Madden (1975), Sydney Shoemaker (1980), Dorothy Emmet 
(1985), Nancy Cartwright (1989), and Ingvar Johansson (1989/2004). 
I have mentioned some of them, and discussed some of their views to a 
certain degree, but not really given their views much space. This is the 
result of a conscious choice. An effort to simplify the discussion to some 
little degree, by focusing on 21st-century thinkers. However, it is appro-
priate to acknowledge their importance.
What I can add, by way of indicating some similarities and contrast, 
is that Shoemaker, and Cartwright tend to think of the role of powers in 
event-causal terms, i.e. in terms of Kim-style events constituted by powers, 
and their view of powers is pretty close to the standard view. In Bhaskar’s 
views I find more similarity than contrast to my own views, also with 
respect to his naturalism and how he relates to science, which is also a 
characteristic of Cartwright. Harré & Madden, Emmet and Johansson 
formulate themselves more in substance-causal terms, yet, like me, stress 
the processual nature of causation, and Johansson comes pretty close to 
the interaction view I develop here. That is no fluke. Johansson is prob-
ably the person whose works and 25 years of personal/professional com-
munication have influenced me the most.
10.8  Concluding Remark
What I have so far said about alternative powers-based accounts really 
amounts to the following. Notably, that while proponents of powers-
based accounts usually aim to explain causation rather than merely char-
acterising it, I find that most of them don’t in the end fully reach that aim. 
But they all represent a step in the right direction. I believe my account 
has the advantage of providing a general model that very plausibly comes 
across as a generalisation from the theories and findings of the natural 
sciences, and therefore is a philosophical account that aligns well with 
the explanations the sciences already offer for a range of different phe-
nomena. To show it to be wrong will involve arguing that, despite my 
claims to the contrary, it isn’t a good generalisation from the sciences. 
Alternatively, one will have to show that, even though my account works 
on the more fundamental levels on which we find particles, atoms, and 
chemical compounds, it doesn’t apply to the world of ordinary middle-
sized dry goods, because objects on that level have emergent properties/
powers that allow unidirectional influence. I am ready to admit already 
now that I find intentional agency difficult to reconcile with a world in 
which all interactions are reciprocal. However, the solution to that prob-
lem will hinge on a better understanding of agency.
What I definitely think I have provided, never mind whether it is actu-
ally true or false, is a novel perspective on a very complicated issue. 
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I hope it will be received as just that; not as a claim to ultimate truth, 
but as an attempt to push the issue just a little bit further by providing a 
fresh, albeit provocative, perspective. I don’t believe in what appears to 
be a fashionable approach to metaphysics, namely to be reconciliatory 
and cater to what everyone can agree. If everyone agrees, despite differ-
ences, we have only decided on the minimal common denominator and 
are ready to address what really matters: which one is the true account?
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